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This dissertation examined the contributions of mood valence and arousal to false memory (FM) 
for neutral DRM word lists.  There has been a lively debate in the literature regarding whether 
valence or arousal is the primary cause of mood-dependent FM.  Because much past research has 
not effectively disentangled valence from arousal, the present studies used a new mood 
manipulation that allowed valence and arousal to be controlled and their associated retrieval 
processes to be measured.  In Experiment 1, low-arousal negative moods reduced false memory 
compared to positive and neutral moods by increasing verbatim memory traces, confirming the 
prediction that valence can influence false memory independent of arousal.  In Experiment 2, 
low-arousal negative moods reduced false memory for both list lengths, but the processes 
associated with false memory for short lists were not the same as the processes associated with 
false memory for long lists.  High arousal negative moods in Experiment 3 now increased false 
memory compared to neutral moods—but still reduced false memory compared to positive 
moods—which suggested that high arousal increased false memory compared to low arousal. 
Experiment 4 provided a direct test of arousal’s effect on false memory and confirmed that 
higher levels of arousal increase false memory via strong gist traces, regardless of valence.  The 
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results were discussed in support of fuzzy-trace theory—but not affect-as-information theory—
and practical applications to the law were noted.   
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The most memorable moments in our lives are often those most charged with emotion.  
Memory accuracy—and the feeling of accuracy, which is not the same thing as real accuracy—
for these events may depend on the nature of that emotion.  Even during casual conversation 
people exhibit belief in a relationship between our emotions and our memories.  One common 
belief is that the details of highly positive events become blurred. We might discuss a fond 
memory of an event such as a wedding by recalling how much fun we had but not being able to 
account for what we did during each hour.  Another belief is that we are highly accurate at 
remembering the details of highly negative events.  After witnessing a disaster or terrorist attack, 
people often report that they can recall every detail with striking clarity, as if they can re-watch a 
movie of the event in their mind’s eye.  
The latter type of memory—for negative events—has been the subject of much research 
because of its many real-world applications and because of the longstanding belief that memory 
for negative events is particularly vivid and accurate.  Much focus has been devoted to flashbulb 
memory, which is the idea that highly emotional, negative events ensure memory accuracy 
(Brown & Kulik, 1977).  However, research testing this flashbulb memory effect has shown that 
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although feelings of accuracy and vividness were high for memories of events such as the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, actual accuracy was not (Talarico & Rubin, 2003). Other evidence similarly 
points to the idea that emotional (particularly negative) experiences may lead to memory 
inaccuracies.  For example, during police interviews witnesses may be especially prone to 
misremembering the details of crimes (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005).  In some cases, negative 
emotion has been associated with false memories for events that never even occurred (and are 
highly unlikely to occur, such as an alien abduction) (e.g., Shaw & Porter, 2015; Spanos, 1996). 
The association between false memory and negative emotion has clear practical 
implications because the situations in which consequences of false memories are the most 
serious are also highly emotional situations.  Police interviews, eyewitness testimony, and 
recounting of abuse during therapy are three notable examples.  In these situations, and in the 
types of situations assessed in the research mentioned above, emotion plays a role in two ways.  
First, the event that occurs (or the materials used in the laboratory) may be emotional itself (e.g., 
a crime, disaster, or emotional words or pictures).  I refer to this aspect of emotion as emotional 
content.  Second, people’s moods while the events are experienced may also be emotional (e.g., 
fearful, angry, or happy).  I refer to this aspect of emotion as mood, generally, but it has also 
been referred to as emotional context in the literature (see Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016).  Thus, 
emotion can figure into memory situations in two different ways, and the qualities of emotional 
content and mood may not necessarily match or remain stable over time.  For example, someone 
may be fearful while witnessing a crime, but after repeated police interviews may become 
irritated when repeatedly recounting the same details, although the negative evaluation of the 
crime remains the same.     
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In order to determine precisely how emotion affects false memory, then, it is necessary to 
investigate the effects of mood and content separately, since there is evidence that their effects 
on memory are not the same (Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016).  Research using a variety of 
materials has demonstrated fairly consistently that negative emotional content elevates false 
memory compared to positive content (e.g., Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2017; Brainerd, Stein, 
Silveira, Rohenkohl, & Reyna, 2008).  Conversely, research using experimentally-induced 
moods has shown that positive moods elevate false memory compared to negative moods (e.g., 
Storbeck, 2013; Storbeck & Clore, 2005), not to mention naturally-occurring moods, such as 
those related to psychopathy, which have an entirely different relationship with memory (see 
Otgaar, Muris, Howe, & Merckelbach, 2017).  However, in both content and mood research the 
results have been difficult to interpret because of the conflation of two dimensions of emotion.  
As will be discussed in the upcoming theoretical section, emotion is commonly thought to vary 
along the dimensions of valence and arousal.  In some emotion research, however, valence and 
arousal have been confounded, prohibiting researchers from drawing conclusions about whether 
valence, arousal, or both affect memory.  In the study of emotional content, this problem has the 
beginning of a solution thanks to research that controls one dimension while manipulating the 
other or factorially manipulates the two.  These data suggest that valence has a fairly consistent 
effect on false memory (for a review see Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016).  In the study of mood, 
however, precise control of valence and arousal is more difficult to achieve.  Creating mood 
inductions that induce reliable mood changes in subjects is difficult in the laboratory to begin 
with, and it is particularly difficult to induce reliable changes in mood that are strong enough to 
affect memory while keeping arousal levels low; when arousal is kept low, levels of valence that 
are reliably different are difficult to achieve.  On the other hand, when creating levels of positive 
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and negative valence that are not only different from each other but also different from neutral 
moods, arousal levels are apt to become higher for positive and negative moods compared to 
neutral moods.  Thus, much research has focused on comparing highly arousing positive and 
negative moods to neutral moods, which leaves open the question of what combination of 
valence and arousal is necessary and sufficient to affect false memory.  
The present research addresses this open question by creating a mood induction 
procedure (MIP) that allows valence and arousal to be separated and by measuring the effect of 
this MIP on true and false memory.  Furthermore, this series of experiments is the first to 
additionally measure the retrieval processes associated with true and false memory, for subjects 
experiencing a variety of moods and for several other factors that may influence the mood-
memory relationship.  In the following sections of the first chapter of this dissertation I will 
discuss the theoretical framework that led to my predictions about mood effects on false 
memory.  Chapters 2 through 6 detail the pilot tests and the four studies comprising this line of 
research.  Finally, Chapter 7 provides a general discussion of these results and their implications.  
To begin the theoretical background for this research I discuss theories of emotion and how they 
have been applied to theories of memory. 
Theoretical Background: False Memory  
It is necessary to first clarify the type of false memory that this research deals with and 
the theoretical explanations for it.  I then discuss how false memory may be measured and 
manipulated, focusing on emotion as one factor that may influence false memory.  
When I mention that I study false memory to a friend outside my field, they often show 
keen interest as they imagine me convincing subjects of absurd past experiences such as going 
swimming with the pope or owning a pet monkey.  In reality, the false memories that researchers 
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typically measure are much more mundane.  They are not usually events that subjects have never 
experienced (e.g., owning a monkey), but rather, they are false in that they have never been 
experienced in a particular context (e.g., falsely remembering that you had a pirate-themed 
birthday party when really it was your sibling’s party).  (Although, as mentioned earlier, some 
interesting research has shown that it is possible to implant memories of absurd, unlikely events).  
The typical sort of false memories is also not usually related to highly unfamiliar events (e.g., the 
pope [for most people]) but rather are related to familiar events or items (e.g., birthday parties).  
Finally, false memories are usually congruous with the general meaning content, or gist, of an 
event that did happen (e.g., remembering that you ate cake at the birthday party when you really 
had cupcakes, rather than remembering that you had gruel at a birthday party, which is not 
consistent with the gist of birthday parties).  In this way, false memories are not fantastical, 
random memories that have no grounds in reality but instead are memory distortions where the 
meaning of a real event is preserved.  There are two main types of false memory that fit these 
criteria. 
Types of False Memory 
Spontaneous false memories occur as a result of trying to remember events that fit with a 
particular gist of experienced events.  For example, if you go to the zoo and see a lion, a tiger, 
and a leopard, when you get home you might try to remember the animals you saw and falsely 
remember that you saw a cheetah as well.  This error occurs because cheetah fits with the gist of 
what you experienced: big cats that are typically seen at the zoo.  Research on spontaneous false 
memories might use pictures, word lists, narratives, or even videos.  It can be seen how the zoo 
scenario could be adopted for any of those presentation modalities.  Subjects’ memories for those 
presented events are typically measured using either recall or recognition tests.  On recall tests 
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subjects are simply asked to list everything they remember experiencing (e.g., tiger, cheetah 
[false alarm], lion).  On recognition tests, subjects are presented with targets (presented items to 
measure true memory; lion), related distractors (RDs; unpresented items to measure false 
memory; cheetah), and unrelated distractors (URDs; unpresented unrelated items to measure 
response bias; goldfish) and respond “yes” or “no” to whether that item was previously 
presented.  In addition to simply responding to whether an item has been presented or not, 
sometimes subjects are asked to rate how confident they are in their response, or to decide 
whether they “remember” that an item was presented earlier because of conscious recollection of 
details, or whether they simply “know” that it was presented earlier because of a more general 
sense of familiarity (remember/know procedure; Tulving, 1985).   
The Deese/Roediger/McDermott paradigm (DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 
1995); is the most commonly used method of studying spontaneous false memories and is the 
method used in the present research.  Subjects listen to (or read) lists of words (e.g., table, sit, 
desk, bench) that are all related to a single unpresented critical distractor word (CD; chair).  They 
then complete recall or recognition tests in which the unpresented critical distractors are the false 
memory items.  Other related words (RDs) may serve as additional false memory items.  These 
lists reliably produce high levels of false memory and can easily be adapted to study emotional 
effects.  Researchers have created variations of the standard neutral DRM lists in which the CDs 
are emotional (e.g., Budson et al., 2006) and researchers have also implemented mood induction 
procedures prior to presentation of neutral study lists (e.g., Corson & Verrier, 2007).  The latter 
method is the one adopted in the present research.  In a third type of design, researchers have 
used mood induction techniques along with emotional rather than neutral lists, in order to test 
mood congruency effects on false memory (e.g., Ruci, Tomes, & Zelenski, 2009).   
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The other main type of false memory does not factor into the present research, but I 
discuss it here briefly for completeness and to provide contrast.  Imagine that after you went to 
the zoo you were recounting your experience to a friend and she asks whether you saw a cheetah 
(remember that you did not).  “Are you sure you didn’t see a cheetah? They always have 
cheetahs at the zoo,” she insists. In this case you might be quite apt to agree and say that yes, you 
saw a cheetah even though you did not, because what is being suggested to you is consistent with 
the gist of your zoo experience.  If your friend asked if you saw a fireman at the zoo, however, 
you would be less likely to misremember and say yes to that.  Whereas spontaneous false 
memories can be fully attributable to endogenous distortion, here any false memories that occur 
are additionally influenced by external distortion (your friend’s question, social pressure to agree 
with your friend, etc.) as well.  This fact introduces another element into the emotion-false 
memory equation, but one that is not an issue in the present spontaneous false memory design. 
Factors Affecting the DRM Illusion     
 In addition to emotion, which will be discussed as a false memory factor in the next 
section, several factors have been manipulated within the DRM paradigm to determine the 
conditions under which true memory and false memory will increase or decrease.  In one of the 
earliest studies of this nature, Roediger, Watson, McDermott, and Gallo (2001) identified seven 
factors that can account for variance in false recall rates, with the most variance accounted for by 
backward associative strength (BAS).  BAS is correlated with both false recall and false 
recognition and refers to the association from the targets to the CD.    
Several other characteristics of study lists as well as the way the lists are tested influence 
DRM false memory.  Increasing the number of targets, or the list length, increases false recall 
and recognition, but reduces true memory (Robinson & Roediger, 1997; Sugrue & Hayne, 2006).  
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When lists of 7 and 14 targets were compared, false recall was higher for lists of 14 targets.  
DRM lists that are presented visually reduce false memory compared to lists that are presented 
auditorily (Gallo, McDermott, & Percer, 2001; Smith & Hunt, 1998), and the length of time that 
each word is presented, or the time between words, matters as well.  Increasing presentation 
duration increases false memory up to a point, but after about 5000ms false memory rates begin 
to decrease (Gallo & Roediger, 2002; McDermott & Watson, 2001).  Finally, how subjects 
encode study lists may influence their later memory as well.  Deeper processing, which 
encourages subjects to consider words’ meaning, increases false memory compared to shallow 
processing, which encourages subjects to focus on visual or phonemic characteristics (Rhodes & 
Anastasi, 2000; Thapar & McDermott, 2001).   
Two other factors relate to how memory is tested rather than how lists are presented.  
When subjects’ memories are tested more than once, earlier memory tests may influence their 
responding on later memory tests.  For example, half of the subjects in Roediger and 
McDermott’s (1995) Experiment 2 completed recall tests after each list, while the other half did 
math problems after each list.  When a final recognition test was given after all lists had been 
presented, false recognition was higher for subjects who had done recall tests earlier as opposed 
to math problems.  Similarly, when initial recall tests were administered, later false recall was 
higher compared to subjects who did not do earlier recall tests, and true recall was higher as well 
(McDermott, 2006).  Furthermore, remember (as opposed to know) judgments were more 
common, for both targets and CDs, after repeated testing.  Thus, although repeated testing has 
beneficial effects on true memory, it is detrimental to false memory to the extent that falsely 
remembered words are specifically remembered, rather than generally known.  
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Finally, the amount of time between studying targets and the memory test, known as 
retention interval, may also affect false memory, although there has historically been some 
inconsistency on that topic.  On one hand, McDermott (1996) found that false memory remains 
stable over a two-day delay, whereas on the other hand, Lampinen and Schwartz (2000) found 
that false memory rates declined over two days.  What is relatively consistent, however, is the 
finding that true memory declines rapidly over time, and that that decline is faster than the 
decline of false memories (Seamon, Luo, Shulman, Toner, & Caglar, 2002; Thapar & 
McDermott, 2001; Toglia, Neuschatz, & Goodwin, 1999).   
These variations on the DRM illusion have informed the several theoretical explanations 
for the illusion, which will be discussed next.  Emotion, of course, is another potential influencer 
of DRM false memory, which I discuss in detail in the next section.  Importantly, the way that 
emotion-memory effects depend on the above factors may provide insight into the process basis 
for emotional effects.   
Theories of False Memory 
Early theorists of false memory proposed that true and false memory relied on a single 
process, resulting in predictions that true and false memory would be correlated and would be 
affected in the same way by any one manipulation.  One of the first of such theories, implicit 
associative response theory, explained two responses made following to-be-remembered words: 
a representational response, directly capturing the presented words themselves, and an implicit 
associative response, capturing unpresented words associated with studied words (Underwood, 
1965).  When implicit associative responses are confused with representational responses false 
memory occurs.  Furthermore, the more often an implicit associative response occurs, the more 
likely false memories become, which explains why DRM lists with more associated targets 
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results in higher levels of false memory (even when the total number of list words is held 
constant, see Robinson & Roediger, 1997).  However, implicit associative response theory was 
not able to account for false memories’ persistence over time, because implicit associative 
activation decays quickly (Anderson, 1983).     
Later, schema theory relied on the idea that target events are encoded into schemata, and 
retrieval from those schemata results in false memories (Alba & Hasher, 1983).  Similarly, the 
source-monitoring framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) proposed that true 
memories included source attributions about the context of events; relying on source attributions 
could lead to false memories as well.  In these original conceptions, increasing subjects’ 
understanding of a schema or source would not only enhance their true memory but would 
increase the likelihood of memory distortion as well.  That is, by these accounts true and false 
memory should be correlated, and any manipulation that increases true memory should increase 
false memory as well. 
However, early research testing the two predictions of one-process theories did not reveal 
support for either one.  True and false memory are usually uncorrelated (e.g., Reyna & Kiernan, 
1994) and some manipulations can affect true and false memory in opposite ways, or affect one 
type of memory but not the other (e.g., Schacter, Israel, & Racine, 1999).  For example, the 
effect of list length described above—increasing the number of presented targets from 7 to 14—
increased false memory while reducing true memory. Since one-process accounts could not 
explain these results, opponent-process theories emerged, providing a better account of 
unparallel true and false memory effects.  
Opponent-process theories draw on the concepts of dual-process theory, which describes 
two retrieval processes that contribute to (correctly) remembering an item.  Recollection involves 
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the conscious reinstatement of details of the item’s presentation and familiarity involves strong 
feelings that the item was presented without awareness of its details.  These two retrieval 
processes contribute to falsely remembering an item as well, but their contributions are opposite 
in this case.  Recollection suppresses false memories because it consciously reinstates details of 
the items’ presentation, which enables the rejection of similar items whose details do not match 
presented details.  Familiarity, on the other hand, supports false memories because the details 
that related/critical distractor items share with target items produce strong feelings that they were 
presented.   
These two processes can be dissociated using the remember/know paradigm described 
above as well as other methods such as process dissociation (Jacoby, 1991) and item versus 
associative recognition tasks (Yonelinas, 1997).  The results from these various methods 
provided evidence for separate neural regions controlling the two processes, that these processes 
are independent at retrieval, and that they exhibit different processing speeds (for a review see 
Yonelinas, 2002).  On the other hand, others have found overlap in the brain regions associated 
with TM and FM (Dennis, Bowman, & Vandekar, 2012).   
Several opponent-process theories provide specific predictions about true and false 
memory effects and the processes driving them.  Spreading activation theory (McDermott & 
Watson, 2001; Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001) was originally developed to explain semantic 
processing and was later applied to the DRM illusion.  By this account, words and concepts are 
semantically organized in mental storage, so that processing one word activates its mental node, 
which activates surrounding, related nodes that correspond to associated words.  False memories 
occur when activation of nodes of studied words causes activation of nodes of semantically 
related CDs.  False memories can be prevented when strategic processing allows subjects to 
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differentiate experienced events from activated events.  Two theories grew out of this theoretical 
framework: associative activation theory and activation monitoring theory.   
Activation monitoring theory (AMT; Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001) 
expanded upon spreading activation theory by conceptualizing a broader type of activation that is 
not limited to semantic associations, but can include phonological, orthographic, or other 
associations.  Study lists activate concepts related via semantic or other connections, which may 
activate other related concepts, and thereby activate CDs.  Again, on the memory test, subjects 
may be unable to differentiate studied words from words that were activated during the study 
phase (even though they were not presented).  Lists that have high levels of association to related 
concepts will thus produce high levels of false memory.  This theory can explain why repeated 
testing increases false memory, because recalling CDs or seeing them on a recognition test 
strengthens activation and makes it more difficult to differentiate them from targets on a later 
memory test.  It also provides an explanation for false memory reduction through the concept of 
monitoring.  Differences between studied words that have actually been experienced and 
activated words that have not been experienced can be used to differentiate words during a 
memory test and can be used to correctly reject CDs.  The stronger the activation of CDs, the 
more difficult it may be to monitor and reject them during a memory test.  Monitoring may also 
occur during encoding, which explains why false memory declines at longer presentation 
durations, because subjects have more time to monitor.  By this account, then, lists that produce 
high levels of activation, or low levels of monitoring, will produce high levels of false memory.  
However, AMT is specific to words, and cannot explain false memory’s persistence over time 
compared to true memory. 
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The final opponent process theory I will discuss, which provides the motivation for the 
present research, can be applied to stimuli other than words and provides an explanation for the 
time span of true and false memory.  This theory is different from activation theories because 
rather than explaining how targets may activate lexical representations of other words, this 
theory makes predictions regarding the type of memory traces that are stored for targets during 
item presentation and later retrieved during a memory test.  According to fuzzy-trace theory 
(FTT; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) verbatim traces store items’ surface form, are the basis for 
recollection, and support true memory but suppress false memory.  Gist traces, on the other hand, 
store items’ meaning, are the basis for familiarity, and support both true and false memory. 
According to AMT, stronger word associations elevate false memories, whereas 
according to FTT, stronger gist (a concept which can be applied to pictures and other stimuli 
aside from words) strengthens false memories.  A comparison of the predictions of FTT and 
associative theories (Dewhurst, Pursglove, & Lewis, 2007) revealed that when gist was 
strengthened without strengthening word associations, by presenting targets within a narrative, 
false memories increased.  Furthermore, false memory effects can be found for pictures as well 
as words, which cannot easily be explained by AMT (e.g., Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2017), and 
FTT predicts that verbatim traces fade more rapidly than gist traces because surface details 
become less clear over time. 
Another notable finding in the false memory literature is that false memories are often 
accompanied by remember judgments rather than know judgments, signifying strong feelings of 
remembering that they were previously presented even though they were not.  FTT explains this 
phenomenon via the concept of phantom recollection:  When gist traces are sufficiently strong, 
they can create vivid mental reinstatement of a CD’s prior occurrence despite the fact that it was 
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not ever experienced.  Phantom recollection may thus explain why strong feelings of 
remembering or high confidence may accompany false memories and cannot be relied upon as a 
measure of accuracy.  Associative theories do not provide a similar explanation for remember 
judgments of false memories.  
Concepts of FTT may be applied to explain the way that emotion affects false memory, 
specifically, as well.  Emotion—in the form of content or mood—could potentially affect 
verbatim traces or gist traces.  A review of the existing emotion-false memory literature points to 
the general conclusion that emotional content affects gist traces whereas emotional context has a 
greater effect on verbatim traces (Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016).  Emotion’s effect on false 
memory can be further defined at the level of specific retrieval processes relying on either 
verbatim or gist memory traces.  Existing research has begun to investigate the question of 
retrieval processes in false memory for emotional words (Brainerd, Stein, Silveira, Rohenkohl, & 
Reyna, 2008) and emotional pictures (Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2017).  The results of those 
studies will be reviewed in the next section.  The present research is the first to measure retrieval 
processes involved in false memory related to emotional mood.  
Conjoint Recognition 
The methodology designed to measure verbatim and gist retrieval processes is known as 
conjoint recognition (CR; Brainerd, Wright, Reyna, & Mojardin, 2001).  This procedure can be 
adapted in any memory paradigm by altering the standard recall or recognition test.  Instead of 
asking subjects “was this item presented?” to which they should answer “yes” or “no,” a conjoint 
recognition test asks three questions: (1) was this item presented? (the same question asked on 
standard recognition tests), (2) was a similar item presented?, or (3) was either this item or a 
similar item presented?  These questions are referred to as verbatim (V), gist (G), and verbatim-
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plus-gist (VG) questions and can be applied either within- or between-subjects.  In order to 
measure underlying retrieval processes a multinomial model is applied to the resulting data.  As 
displayed in Table 1.1, these retrieval processes relate to the processing of verbatim or gist traces 
and support either true or false memory.  
Table 1.1 
Parameters of the Conjoint Recognition Model 
Parameter Definition 
False Memory Processes 
PD 
Phantom recollection (RD produces retrieval of gist trace of similar 
target and false acceptance of RD) 
RD 
Recollection rejection (RD produces retrieval of verbatim trace of 
similar target and correct rejection of RD) 
FD 
Similarity judgment (RD produces retrieval of gist trace of similar 
target and acceptance of RD) 
True Memory Processes 
ET 
Erroneous recollection rejection (target produces retrieval of 
verbatim trace for another target and incorrect rejection of target) 
RT 
Identity judgment (target produces retrieval of verbatim trace and 
correct acceptance of target) 
FT 
Similarity judgment (target produces retrieval of gist trace of 
similar target and acceptance of target) 
Response Bias Processes 
ΒV URD produces false alarm in V condition 
βG URD produces false alarm in G condition 
βVG URD produces false alarm in VG condition 
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Brainerd, Stein, et al. (2008) applied the CR model to memory for emotional word lists in 
the DRM paradigm, becoming the first to measure retrieval processes involved in memory for 
emotional words.  They used positive, negative, and neutral lists that had equivalent arousal 
levels and found differences in the CR parameters as well as differing levels of true and false 
memory.  Negative word lists increased false memory compared to positive and neutral lists, 
because the familiarity parameter was higher and the recollection rejection parameter was lower.  
In other words, false memories for negative words were due to both increased gist and reduced 
verbatim retrieval for negative words.  
Later, Bookbinder and Brainerd (2017) extended that sort of design to pictures.  They 
applied a CR design to positive, negative, and neutral pictures with equivalent arousal levels in a 
DRM-like false memory design.  Similar to Brainerd, Stein, et al.’s (2008) results with words, 
Bookbinder and Brainerd found that negative pictures increased false memory compared to 
positive and neutral pictures.  In further parallel to Brainerd, Stein et al., this was because 
negative pictures increased familiarity and reduced recollection rejection.   
Taken together these two sets of results suggest that negative emotional content elevates 
false memory through two mechanisms: increasing gist retrieval and reducing verbatim retrieval.  
However, this conclusion does not directly lead to predictions regarding mood because content 
and mood do not affect false memory in the same way.  In the next section I discuss the 
theoretical reasons to expect different false memory and process effects as a result of mood 
compared to emotional content.  
Theories of Emotion 
In the preceding sections I have been referring to the distinction between emotional 
content and mood, and I have also briefly mentioned a second important emotional distinction:   
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valence versus arousal.  Different theoretical approaches provide different terms for valence 
(e.g., approach/avoid, pleasant/unpleasant; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1998; Tellegen, Watson, 
& Clark, 1999), but here I refer to the two dimensions as valence, ranging from negative to 
neutral to positive, and arousal, ranging from low to high.  In Russell’s (1980, 1991) circumplex 
model of emotion, valence and arousal are separate, continuous dimensions that are free to vary 
independently of each other.  Any given emotion can be represented as a linear combination of 
valence and arousal.  The independence of valence and arousal has been supported by 
neuroimaging research that has shown different patterns of brain activation for the processing of 
arousal (amygdala; Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, & Gabrieli, 2003) and valence 
(prefrontal and cingulate cortices; Colibazzi et al., 2010).  This framework is also supported by 
data in which ratings of positivity and negativity are correlated, because in this 
conceptualization, positivity must decrease as negativity increases, and vice versa, because they 
are represented by the same scale (e.g., Russell & Carroll, 1999). 
 Others, however, have argued that valence and arousal are actually correlated.  Instead of 
separate scales for valence and arousal, this framework posits two separate scales for positivity 
and negativity, with arousal represented on both scales (see Larsen, 2017).  That is, as either 
positivity or negativity increase, arousal increases as well.  This structure also allows for 
positivity and negativity to vary independently and has been supported by findings that valence 
and arousal are correlated in ratings of several kinds of stimuli (Bradley & Lang, 1999, 2007; 
Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993) and that positivity and negativity can be 
uncorrelated (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997).   
In response to these two conflicting frameworks of emotion, Mattek, Wolford, and 
Whalen (2017) have recently developed a third framework that can potentially account for cases 
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where positivity and negativity are correlated as well as when valence and arousal are correlated.   
In short, the relationships between valence and arousal and between positivity and negativity are 
not constant.  Rather, valence and arousal my sometimes be correlated and sometimes be 
uncorrelated, and likewise for positivity and negativity.  The determining factor, they argue, is 
how ambiguous valence is: when valence is unambiguous valence and arousal are correlated, and 
when valence is ambiguous positivity and negativity are inversely correlated.  The model 
describing these relationships, taking into account valence ambiguity, accounts for much of the 
variance in valence ratings predicted by arousal.  However, it leaves some questions unanswered, 
such as why the negativity-arousal correlation is stronger than the positivity-arousal correlation 
(see Brainerd & Bookbinder, under review).  Therefore, there is still work to be done toward the 
development of a coherent framework of valence and arousal. 
Manipulating Emotional Content and Mood 
 Both valence and arousal have been manipulated via both content and mood for the 
purpose of studying false memory.  Although the findings are informative, I argue that a 
difficulty with the existing literature is that valence and arousal have not always been 
manipulated independently, in either content or mood research.  In this section I briefly describe 
the way that emotional content is manipulated before discussing the way that moods are induced, 
which is of direct relevance to the present study.  
Content.  Emotional word lists are the most common method of altering the emotional 
content of target items.  I discussed earlier the DRM paradigm as a method of measuring false 
memory; the neutral lists in the standard DRM design can be replaced with lists that vary in 
terms of valence, arousal, or both, in order to measure false (and true) memory for emotional 
items.  Budson et al. (2006) were the first to develop said emotional DRM lists (e.g., tears, sad, 
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tissue for the CD “cry”).  However, due to limitations of Budson et al.’s lists such as the fact that 
they did not include positive lists and that arousal was not controlled, others have created lists in 
which arousal is controlled (Brainerd, Stein, et al., 2008) and factorially manipulated with 
valence (Brainerd, Holliday, Reyna, Yang, & Toglia, 2010).  These improvements have allowed 
researchers to assess whether false memory can be affected by valence even when there is no 
influence of arousal and whether valence and arousal may interact to affect false memory.  When 
valence and arousal were factorially manipulated, Brainerd et al. (2010) indeed demonstrated a 
valence-arousal interaction:  Higher levels of arousal increased false memory, but only for 
negative lists.   
Pictures have also been used as an emotional content manipulation by making use of 
picture databases that have been normed for valence and arousal.  The IAPS (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2005) and the GAPED (Dan-Glauser & Scherer, 2011) are two that contain a large 
number of color photographs with varying levels of valence and arousal.  They also contain 
enough pictures with similar themes and meaning to enable their use in false memory paradigms, 
where pictures conveying the same meaning as targets are used as false memory items.  Since 
these picture databases contain valence and arousal norms, valence and arousal can be 
controlled, although such control has not always been put into practice in prior work.  The results 
of picture experiments are mixed because some have mirrored the pattern of word results 
(Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2017), whereas others have found that negative pictures reduce false 
memory (Choi, Kensinger, & Rajaram, 2013).  After reviewing the results of mood induction 
studies, it will become clear that a potential explanation for Choi et al.’s result is that the pictures 
they used were powerful enough to affect subjects’ moods. 
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Mood.  Various mood induction procedures (MIPs) have been implemented to alter 
subjects’ emotional states before or after they are exposed to target items, which can be neutral 
or emotional themselves.  An example of a mood induction protocol is the following: 1) pre-
induction mood measurement, 2) mood induction, 3) post-induction mood measurement, 4) 
target presentation, 5) memory test.  MIPs include videos (e.g., Gross & Levenson, 1995; 
Storbeck & Clore, 2011), music (Justin Storbeck, 2013; Justin Storbeck & Clore, 2005), a 
combined method that implements both music and a guided imagery task (Mayer, Allen, & 
Beauregard, 1995), or simply pictures (Storbeck, 2013).  All of these MIPs can be implemented 
either before target presentation, in order to affect encoding processes, or after target 
presentation but before the memory test, in order to affect retrieval and consolidation processes.  
Before target presentation is the more typical procedure. 
As a manipulation check, subjects’ moods are measured before and after the mood 
induction, using a scale such as the Positive and Negative Affective Schedule (PANAS; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), the Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS; Mayer & Gaschke, 1988), 
or the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994).  On the PANAS, subjects rate 
the degree to which they are experiencing a series of emotions (e.g., scared, joyful) at a particular 
time (for the purpose of a mood manipulation check, that time would be “right now,” but other 
contexts may call for other time periods).  On the BMIS subjects similarly rate how well several 
adjectives describe their present mood, and on the SAM they use a pictorial assessment to rate 
how happy/sad and how calm/excited they are currently feeling.  
Although such mood inductions have been implemented in false memory designs, the 
results (reviewed below) have been called into question because of the conflation of valence and 
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arousal.  The successful disentanglement of two potential false memory factors is one of the 
primary motivations for the present research.   
Emotion and Memory 
In this section I discuss the existing theories that have been applied to explain emotional 
effects on true and false memory.   
Emotional content. Turning to theories of emotional content first, one of the earliest 
accounts was Easterbrook's (1959) hypothesis, which proposed that emotional content focuses 
attention on central details and reduces attention to peripheral details, thereby increasing true 
memory for central details and reducing accuracy for peripheral details.  The mechanism for the 
memory difference for different types of details was thought to be related to effects of arousal on 
attention.  Hamann (2001) explained the adaptive nature of arousal-enhanced memory: Arousing 
events are likely to be related to survival, so improved memory for those events enables us to 
respond to them quickly or avoid risky events in the future.  Although Hamann and Easterbrook 
not address valence, what is implicit in the survival-based account is that the arousing events are 
negative (i.e., risky).  This explanation could not be applied to arousing but positive events.  In 
terms of false memory, the implication is that when content is negative and arousing, false 
memories are more likely to occur for peripheral details of an event.  This explanation is thought 
to account for a phenomenon known as the weapon focus effect (Loftus, 1979).  Witnesses of 
crimes (highly emotional events), have highly accurate memory of the weapon (the central 
detail), but their memory for other details such as the appearance of the perpetrator (peripheral 
details) may not be as reliable.  
Kensinger and colleagues (e.g., Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2007) expanded 
this theory to events that were not necessarily crime-related, such as a picture of a snake in the 
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forest, proposing that when events contain both emotional and neutral information, memory 
accuracy differs for the emotional versus neutral aspects of the event.  As with the weapon focus 
effect, negative, arousing aspects of negative events are subject to improved memory compared 
to neutral aspects of negative events.  False memory would be reduced for negative aspects of 
negative events compared to neutral aspects of negative events.  Mather (2007) proposed an 
explanation of this effect on the basis of arousal: Emotional aspects of events will receive more 
processing, reducing false memory, because they are more arousing than the neutral content, 
which receives less processing.  To sum up, initial accounts of emotional content effects centered 
on arousal to explain better memory for central, emotional information as compared to peripheral 
or neutral information, because arousal is an adaptive signifier of information that it is beneficial 
to remember. 
Kensinger and colleagues have also proposed that valence plays a role as well, although 
their methodology does not necessarily directly lead to that conclusion.  Kensinger and Corkin 
(2003) found that negative, arousing words elicit more “remember” responses than neutral 
words, although in their study it was possible that this effect was driven more by arousal than 
valence, since the negative words used were more arousing than the neutral words.  Similarly, 
Kensinger, O’Brien, Swanberg, Garoff-Eaton, and Schacter (2007) found that subjects are better 
able to distinguish imagined information from presented information if it is negative relative to 
when it is positive or neutral.  However, this effect is not purely related to valence, as negative 
items were more arousing than positive or neutral items.  Thus, arousal in particular may 
improve memory for specific details of item’s presentation, but the possibility of a valence 
contribution was not categorically ruled out.  Also, it should be noted that this “remember” 
advantage for negative arousing stimuli is not indicative of higher accuracy.  When Dehon, 
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Larøi, and Van der Linden (2010) measured remember/know judgments for emotional DRM 
lists, they found more “remember” responses to CDs from negative lists compared to positive 
and neutral lists.  Unlike some of Kensinger’s work, arousal was equivalent across valence, so 
Dehon et al. were able to conclude that it was negative valence per se that increased remember 
judgments.  To sum up, negative or negative-arousing information may be associated with 
stronger feelings of remembering and better memory for details, but stronger feelings of 
remembering are not an indicator of accuracy in themselves.    
The paradoxical negative emotion hypothesis (PNE; Porter, Taylor, & Ten Brinke, 2008) 
explains why negative information may elicit both improved accuracy and more distortion.  As 
noted above, there may be an adaptive advantage to remembering negative information better in 
order to avoid future risks, but this increased memory may also involve the incorporation of 
more information and broader information, perhaps by consolidating information from several 
sources.  This expanded memory for relevant negative information may result in higher risk of 
distortion because sources may be confused.   
Others, however, have noted that positive information as well incurs a memory advantage 
over neutral, and sometimes negative information.  Heuer and Reisberg (1990) proposed the idea 
of emotional enhancement of memory (EEM), which is the general idea that emotional content 
enhances memory (for both central and peripheral details) compared to neutral content.  This 
effect may be related to both valence and arousal, as it is thought to be a result of both 
heightened physiological arousal and semantic relatedness, the latter of which is a feature of 
items of high emotional valence (Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004).  Although the high semantic 
relatedness of emotional content increases true memory, it increases false memory as well, 
compared to neutral content. To truly disentangle EEM, Adelman and Estes (2013) carefully 
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controlled valence and arousal levels in a large set of words and found that both positive and 
negative words were remembered better than neutral words regardless of arousal.  Thus, there is 
additional evidence that valence contributes to memory independent of arousal. 
Fuzzy-trace theory on emotion and memory. Clearly, the results are mixed when it 
comes to emotional content effects on memory, which may explain why a unified theory has yet 
to take hold.  FTT provides an opponent process account for memory differences in emotional 
content, separately for valence and arousal, enabling it to account for many of the above effects.  
Turning to valence first, emotional content (whether positive or negative) should strengthen gist 
traces compared to neutral content because the semantic connections are stronger.  Furthermore, 
this gist should be strengthened even more for negative valence compared to positive valence 
because the semantic connections for negative content are more salient.  Thus, one would expect 
to find more false memories for emotional content compared to neutral content and to find more 
false memories for negative content compared to positive content.  In terms of verbatim traces, 
they should be strengthened by positive valence compared to neutral valence and weakened for 
negative valence compared to neutral valence.  Support for this claim comes from research on 
retrieval processes involved in recall of emotional words: Gomes, Brainerd, and Stein (2013) 
found better recall for positive words compared to negative words, which was because recall of 
positive words was more influenced by recollective retrieval, a process that involves 
reinstatement of contextual features of prior experience.  On the other hand, recall of negative 
words was primarily accomplished through nonrecollective retrieval, which does not involve 
reinstatement of features of prior experience.  Again, this result supports the prediction that 
negative content increases false memories, but contrary to the prediction about gist traces, 
suggests that positive content can also reduce false memories.  Thus, positive content can 
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increase or decrease false memory depending on whether it affects verbatim or gist traces, which 
may depend on methodological factors such as stimulus type.   
FTT can thus explain predictions of both EEM and PNE accounts within a single theory.  
Furthermore, it makes predictions about arousal as well, whereas none of the earlier theories 
explicitly make predictions for both valence and arousal.  Theories have tended to focus on either 
valence or arousal being the primary determinant of memory effects, but it might well be the 
interaction between valence and arousal that best explains memory effects.  For arousal, the 
predictions focus on verbatim but not gist traces.  A small increase in arousal will strengthen 
verbatim traces, but high levels of arousal will actually weaken verbatim traces because they blur 
attention.  This prediction can be thought of as a variant of the Yerkes-Dodson law (Yerkes & 
Dodson, 1908), whereby performance increases with increasing arousal up to a certain point at 
which it plateaus and then declines.  Thus, false memory would decline as arousal increases from 
low to moderate levels but would increase again when arousal becomes high enough.  The 
various possible combinations of valence and arousal can thus lead to a variety of effects on false 
memory due to affecting verbatim and gist traces in different ways.  In that connection, Gomes et 
al. (2013) found that the recall advantage for positive words compared to negative words held 
only when arousal was high; recall of negative words was dominated by nonrecollective retrieval 
when arousal was high but was dominated by recollective retrieval when arousal was low, 
suggesting that valence effects on word recall, at least, depend on the degree of arousal.  The 
results also confirmed that true memory increases with moderately high levels of arousal, 
consistent with the above prediction concerning strengthened verbatim memory traces.   
Associative accounts of emotional memory.  Based on the assumption that valenced 
information is more densely connected that neutral information (Talmi, Luk, McGarry, & 
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Moscovitch, 2007), associative theories predict that valenced word lists are more associated, 
which leads to stronger activation of both studied words and any related words of the same 
valence.  Thus, true and false memory should both be higher for emotional stimuli compared to 
neutral stimuli.  In making separate predictions for positive and negative valence, some 
proponents of associative theories have argued that while both valences create stronger 
associations than neutral stimuli, negative stimuli are more distinct from each other and positive 
stimuli are more strongly associated with each other.  Thus, negative valence should increase 
true memory but reduce false memory, compared to positive valence. In other words, memory 
accuracy would be better for negative information, due to the adaptive function of remembering 
threatening or survival-related information well (see Howe & Otgaar, 2013).  Associative 
theories also predict valence-based differences in change in activation over time.  Whereas 
activation of neutral related stimuli declines over time, activation of emotional stimuli, because it 
is more strongly associated, is more robust and can even increase over time (Howe, Candel, 
Otgaar, Malone, & Wimmer, 2010).  Note that associative accounts do not make specific 
predictions about the role of arousal as it relates to activation of targets or CDs.  
Theories of mood and memory.  Bower's (1981) network theory of affect provided an 
early theoretical account that formed the basis for more recent theories.  In this conception, mood 
provides a context for remembering so that when the mood experienced during encoding 
matches the mood experienced during retrieval, true memory will be enhanced.  In other words, 
Bower proposed that memory will be enhanced when study and test moods are the same, a 
concept that is now known as mood-congruent memory.  There is some recent evidence for such 
an effect on true memory as well as evidence of a mood-congruent memory effect on false 
memory (Knott & Thorley, 2013; Ruci, Tomes, & Zelenski, 2009).  However, Bower did not 
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make specific predictions about valence differences, nor did he directly address mood effects on 
false memory.   
The affect-as-information hypothesis (AAI; Clore & Storbeck, 2006; Schwarz & Clore, 
1983) was one of the first to address such questions.  In terms of valence differences, this theory 
draws on the distinction between two types of processing defined by Hunt and Einstein (1981).  
Item processing, which focuses on distinguishing features of individual items, is employed under 
negative moods, whereas relational processing, which focuses on connections among items and 
their meanings, is employed under positive moods.  Drawing on this distinction one would 
predict that positive moods promote false memory whereas negative moods protect against it, 
because false memories result from semantic connections but are inhibited by recollection of 
surface details unique to individual items.  In this way, the item versus relational processing 
distinction is compatible with FTT’s verbatim versus gist distinction, and considering the 
theories in tandem leads to clear predictions about false memory:  Relational processing in 
positive moods encourages subjects to focus on the gist of target events, leading to false 
memory, but item-specific processing in negative moods shifts the focus to item’s surface form, 
suppressing false memory by enhancing the ability to reject similar but not presented related 
distractors.   
Within the affect-as-information framework, Clore and Storbeck (2006) further specified 
the conditions determining which processing style would be used.  They argued that relational 
processing is the more dominant of the two styles, and that processing shifts to the item-specific 
style to signal a problem.  Negative affect provides a signal that something is amiss, shifting 
processing to become more item-specific. For example, fear in response to a dangerous situation 
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should stimulate item-specific processing of that situation because it will be advantageous to 
remember those details in the future.  
Furthermore, Storbeck and Clore (2008) later integrated arousal into this framework, 
proposing that whereas negative affect may signal something dangerous or problematic, arousal 
signals importance or urgency.  What is so powerful about the role of arousal in this framework 
is that the arousal need not be sourced from the object that is undergoing processing.  Rather, 
arousal from an external source—e.g., physiological arousal—that is attributed to an emotional 
reaction to the processed object signals urgency of processing that object.  Arousal can thus 
modulate judgment or memory via processing even if the item being judged or remembered is 
itself not arousing.   
The classic example of this role of arousal is Dutton and Aron's (1974) bridge study, 
where men who crossed high bridges experienced high levels of arousal which they misattributed 
as physical attraction to a woman they met after crossing the bridge.  More recently, Cahill, 
Gorski, and Le (2003) showed that increasing subjects’ arousal via a cold pressor stress task 
increased memory for emotional but not neutral pictures.  These results were interpreted as 
evidence that arousal signals the greater importance of negative stimuli, which resulted in 
enhanced encoding and subsequent improved memory.  
Affect-as-information theory predicts that the mechanism for enhanced processing under 
high arousal is that higher levels of arousal signify high urgency, encouraging people to continue 
to use the processing style they are already using and elaborate more on their current mode of 
processing.  In other words, high arousal intensifies reliance on item-specific processing in 
people experiencing negative moods, and high arousal intensifies reliance on relational 
processing in positive moods.  Lower levels of arousal, however, should not impact processing 
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style or could attenuate its effects.  Evidence for this prediction on the negative side comes from 
findings that priming people with fearful faces in order to increase their arousal enhances item-
specific processing as measured by contrast sensitivity in a discrimination task, but priming with 
neutral, non-arousing faces had no impact (Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006).  Hurlemann et al. 
(2005) provided further evidence of arousal effects on both kinds of processing:  When positive 
and negative “oddball” words were presented in a list of neutral words, negative words reduced 
memory for previous words whereas positive words enhanced memory for subsequent words, 
confirming that positive valence encourages relational processing and negative valence focuses 
processing on individual items at the expense of neutral items.  When subjects’ physiological 
arousal was increased, both of these effects became stronger, and when their arousal was 
lowered, both effects were reduced.    
The affect-as-information approach does not explicitly make predictions about how 
arousal influences false memory, but if arousal is expected to amplify the effects of valence-
directed processing style, then one would expect an interaction between valence and arousal.  
Specifically, false memory should be higher when subjects are in positive moods compared to 
negative moods and this difference should be larger when subjects’ arousal is higher.  In that 
connection, there is evidence of different processing styles associated with distinct negative 
moods (anger/high arousal and sadness/low arousal), suggesting that differences in arousal level 
(within a given valence) can affect memory via processing differences (Semmler & Brewer, 
2002).   
AAI and FTT make congruous predictions about valence, but are not quite as compatible 
regarding arousal.  Whereas AAI predicts that arousal will modulate the effects of valence on 
memory, FTT predicts separate effects of valence and arousal, and thus arousal may affect 
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memory without any impact of valence (although it can account for a modulating effect of 
arousal as well).  Recall that arousal is expected to reduce false memory at low levels, but 
increase false memory at higher levels.  Arousal may have such an impact across different levels 
of valence, or it may interact with valence; FTT allows for both options.  Furthermore, the 
predicted valence-arousal interaction may not be the same for AAI and FTT.  In AAI, higher 
arousal is expected to increase the false memory difference between positive and negative mood, 
whereas at low arousal the positive-negative difference would be smaller or even nonexistent.  
According to FTT, on the other hand, low levels of arousal should further reduce false memory 
for negative moods, but may reduce false memory in positive moods as well by strengthening 
verbatim traces.   Higher levels of arousal would increase false memory in positive moods, but 
may also increase false memory in negative moods by reducing the ability to use verbatim traces.  
Thus, in FTT it is not clear whether valence-based false memory differences would be larger 
when arousal is low or high. One method of comparing the two theories, then, would be to 
compare valence differences in false memory when arousal is low versus high.  If the valence 
gap increases, it would provide clear support for AAI, although it would not necessarily provide 
an argument against FTT.  If valence differences are attenuated at higher levels of arousal, that is 
supportive of predictions of FTT and not AAI.  Finally, if arousal is able to impact memory 
when valence does not have an effect, that would provide clear support for FTT.  
Previous Finding and Gaps in Prior Research 
A review of the existing research led to the conclusion that, in general, negative moods 
reduce false memory and the most straightforward explanation for this result is that mood 
induction primarily affects verbatim memory (Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016).  I review here 
some of the research that contributed to that conclusion that is most relevant to the present 
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experiments.  In an early experiment, Storbeck and Clore (2005) used music to induce positive 
and negative moods prior to a DRM task with neutral words.  Consistent with predictions of FTT 
and affect-as-information theory, subjects in positive moods had higher levels of false recall and 
subjects in negative moods had lower levels of false recall compared to the control group.  
Storbeck and Clore (2011) expanded this result by comparing mood inductions before and after 
target presentation.  They found that, again, negative mood reduced false memory when mood 
was induced before target presentation, but did not find false memory effects when mood was 
induced after.  They concluded that mood affects encoding but not retrieval processes, consistent 
with both the processing style predictions of AAI and the memory trace storage predictions of 
FTT.  Mood did not impact true memory in either study. 
Storbeck (2013) provided further evidence that negative moods reduce false memory for 
neutral words, using both music and picture mood inductions.  He found that negative moods 
reduced false recall and false recognition.  When words were accompanied by pictures, however, 
negative mood no longer reduced false recognition compared to positive and neutral moods.  
Altogether these results support the prediction from the affect-as-information hypothesis that 
negative mood promotes item-specific processing, and supports the prediction from FTT that this 
processing produces stronger verbatim traces.  The fact that the false memory result disappeared 
with pictures is consistent with these predictions because pictures strengthen verbatim traces, 
leaving less latitude for further strengthened by negative mood.  
Emery, Hess, and Elliot (2012) and Knott, Threadgold, and Howe (2014) provided 
further corroborating evidence that negative moods reduce false recall, but arousal was not 
mentioned in either article, indicating that it was likely not controlled.  Emery et al. used a video 
mood induction and found lower false recall for subjects in negative moods.  Knott et al. did 
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something slightly different and used their false recall task to prime responses to a compound 
remote associate task (CRAT) in order to confirm the hypothesis that false memories occur due 
to spreading activation.  Subjects in the positive and neutral mood groups were better at solving 
CRAT problems when they had recalled the CD that was the solution to the problem.  Subjects in 
the negative mood group, however, were not any better at solving the problems after the recall 
task.  Knott et al. proposed that item-specific processing in negative moods leads to less 
spreading activation during priming.  In terms of FTT, this result suggests that negative moods 
could enhance verbatim retrieval but also reduce gist retrieval, at least on certain tasks.   
In all of the above studies, the false memory differences obtained could be alternatively 
explained by differences in arousal.  In other words, the reduced false memory for the negative, 
relatively high arousal groups could be either due to item-specific processing or improved 
verbatim traces at moderate arousal levels.  To pit valence against arousal in explaining mood 
effects on memory, Corson and Verrier (2007) factorially manipulated the two components of 
emotion.  Following the same general procedure implemented by Storbeck and Clore, subjects’ 
moods were induced prior to a DRM task with both recall and recognition tests.  Five mood 
groups were created using music and guided imagery: positive/high arousal, positive/low 
arousal, negative/high arousal, negative/low arousal, and a control group. Corson and Verrier 
found effects of arousal but not valence, on both false recall and false recognition.  Both forms of 
false memory were elevated for the high arousal groups compared to the low arousal groups, 
regardless of valence.  Van Damme (2013) replicated these results, confirming that high arousal 
increases false recognition on immediate and delayed tests, but neither valence nor arousal 
impacted false memory on an immediate recall test.  These results suggest that arousal may be a 
component of mood-false memory effects, and may indeed impact memory independent from 
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valence, but considered alongside existing research, the relative contribution of valence and 
arousal is still an open question.  
Most recently, Mirandola and Toffalini (2016) investigated mood effects on retrieval by 
inducing positive-high arousal, negative-high arousal, and neutral-low arousal moods 
immediately before a recognition test, using pictures from the IAPS.  Instead of the DRM 
paradigm, they used a picture false memory task that encourages subjects to falsely remember 
non-presented aspects of scripted scenes.  They measured false memory for causal errors 
(remembering an unpresented cause of a studied event) and gap-filling errors (remembering a 
script-consistent but unpresented detail).  They found that negative and positive moods reduced 
causal errors compared to neutral moods, but mood valence did not affect gap-filling errors.   
They then conducted a second analysis using subjects’ mood valence and arousal ratings 
as opposed to the mood valence group they were assigned to as a factor.  They found that 
arousal, but not valence, affected causal errors such that causal errors became less likely as 
arousal increased.  Similarly, arousal but not valence affected gap-filling errors because these 
errors decreased as arousal increased.  Finally, hits (true memory) were unaffected by valence 
but increased as arousal increased.  Therefore, Mirandola and Toffalini found that when valence 
and arousal were disentangled using subjects’ actual self-reported mood, arousal but not valence 
affected true and false memory.  Higher levels of arousal resulted in greater memory accuracy as 
measured by both increased hits and reduced false alarms. Furthermore relative likelihood 
estimates of a model using self-reported valence and arousal compared to a model with mood 
group as a predictor revealed the self-report model to be a better predictor of memory 
performance.  This new result calls into question prior research where subjective valence and 
arousal ratings were not factored into the false memory analysis.  Although mood researchers 
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always confirm that valence and arousal group differences are as intended, these groupings do 
not account for variability in subjects’ moods within groups.   In Mirandola and Toffalini’s 
population, at least, this variability was better at predicting mood effects than preassigned mood 
groups.  
 The experiments reviewed in this section provide evidence for two main results: a) that 
negative mood reduces false memory when arousal is not controlled (and thus arousal is likely 
higher for the emotional groups compared to the neutral group and may also higher for the 
negative group than the positive group) and b) that high arousal increases false memory and the 
valence effect disappears when valence and arousal are factorially manipulated.  Although 
Mirandola and Toffalini found the opposite effect of arousal, the fact that their MIP occurred 
before retrieval makes this result difficult to compare to the others. The simplest explanation for 
the main pair of results is that mood affects verbatim memory, because it is strengthened by 
negative valence and weakened by high arousal.  It is not clear from these results, however, 
whether valence effects on false memory hold when arousal is held constant across all groups.  If 
they do, then arousal is not a necessary component of mood-false memory effects.    
Furthermore, no existing research has addressed this hypothesis—that mood affects 
verbatim memory in order to influence false memory—directly by measuring retrieval processes.  
One can postulate that the mechanism is likely related to verbatim retrieval based on existing 
research, but in order to confirm this prediction it is necessary to directly measure the 
contributions of verbatim and gist retrieval to false memory as a function of mood.  By using the 
conjoint recognition model, the present research is the first to do so as well as identify which 
verbatim and gist processes can explain differences in false memory rates.       
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Goals of the Present Research 
Following the evidence from prior research that both valence and arousal may impact 
false memory depending on how the two factors are manipulated, the present research was 
designed to answer four questions: 1) Can purely valence-based mood effects be obtained when 
arousal is moderate, and which processes contribute to mood differences in true and false 
memory? 2) Can mood effects be strengthened by encouraging verbatim processing of study 
lists, indicating that mood creates a primarily verbatim effect? 3) Do mood valence effects 
change when arousal is increased? and 4) Can arousal affect false memory independent form 
valence, and what processes contribute to that effect?  
The first question was answered in Experiment 1 by implementing a mood induction that 
kept arousal at a low level, equivalent across positive, negative, and neutral moods.  The short 
answer is that mood valence was effective at influencing false memory, even when arousal was 
low, because negative moods increased verbatim retrieval.  The second question was answered in 
Experiment 2 by adding a manipulation to differentiate verbatim and gist processing.  The 
addition of this manipulation resulted in different processes causing the mood effect depending 
on whether verbatim or gist retrieval was favored.  The third question was answered in 
Experiment 3 through the use of a different mood induction creating higher arousal.  Elevating 
arousal changed the pattern of mood effects, increasing false memory in negative moods where 
false memory had been previously low.  Finally, the fourth question was answered in Experiment 
4 by measuring false memory as a function of arousal, independent from valence.  Arousal was 
indeed able to impact false memory even when valence was controlled and this effect was driven 
by gist processing.   
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Structure of the Experiments 
Chapter 2 details the first step in the research: the development of the mood induction 
procedures used in the three main experiments.  It includes three pilot tests based on procedures 
used in prior research.  Pilot 1 was a music and guided imagery approach which failed to produce 
reliably different moods in subjects.  Pilot 2 used videos that produced reliably different levels of 
valence at equivalent low arousal levels.  Finally, Pilot 3 followed a similar video procedure to 
Pilot 2 but in this case arousal was manipulated as well.  Therefore, the MIPs developed in Pilot 
2 and 3 were used for the main experiments. 
The four main experiments, detailed in Chapters 3-6, all followed a similar procedure.  
Subjects’ moods were measured, they viewed the videos, and their moods were measured again. 
The rest of the procedure, in all four experiments, followed a typical DRM design combined with 
conjoint recognition.  That is, subjects listened to a series of lists and completed a recognition 
test with specific instructions after all lists had been presented.  Additionally, this design 
included a second memory test after a delay period of two days (see Bookbinder & Brainerd, 
2017), which enabled the inclusion of some additional analyses to provide further insight into 
what was happening at a processing level.  All experiments followed this general procedure and 
the data from all experiments were analyzed in the same way.  Subjects were excluded from the 
analysis if their moods were inconsistent with the manipulation and the data were bias-corrected 
using responses to URD items.  Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted on the 
acceptance rates of targets and CDs, and the conjoint recognition model was fit to the acceptance 
data and its parameters were estimated.  A complete picture of the data was provided by 
interpreting the results in terms of both ANOVAs and parameter estimates, and connections were 
made between findings from the two analysis methods.   
 37 
Hypotheses, Predictions, and Theoretical Framework 
Experiment 1 was designed to test the hypothesis that arousal is not a necessary 
component of emotion-memory effects.  I predicted that true memory would not be affected by 
valence based on the lack of TM effects in the literature (Corson & Verrier, 2007; Storbeck & 
Clore, 2005).  However, I predicted that valence could affect false memory with arousal held at a 
moderate level.  Previous research has persisted in the claim that mood valence should affect 
false memory based on the item-specific versus relational processing distinction.  Although 
Corson and Verrier (2007) and Van Damme (2013) provided some evidence that valence does 
not affect false memory when arousal is controlled at high or low levels, they did not address 
whether valence effects could occur at moderate arousal levels.  Furthermore, very high arousal 
is expected to increase false memory by blurring attention, and could potentially create a ceiling 
effect such that valence differences would be undetectable.  On the other hand, when arousal is 
very low, differences in valence are likely to be smaller.  Therefore, if pure valence effects are to 
be detected, arousal must be held at a moderate level.  If negative mood encourages item-specific 
processing or affects verbatim or gist retrieval, it should be the case that false memory will be 
reduced for negative, moderately aroused moods compared to positive moods.  I predicted that 
false memory rates would thus be lower for subjects in negative moods, and more specifically 
that this difference would result from increased verbatim processes (e.g., recollection rejection) 
rather than reduced gist processes (e.g., familiarity).      
Experiment 2 was designed to test the hypothesis that mood-memory effects are 
dependent upon strong verbatim memory traces.  Shorter DRM lists were included to determine 
whether mood-false memory effects would be stronger when verbatim traces are more 
accessible, compared to longer lists where gist traces would be favored.  I predicted that negative 
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valence would reduce false memory for short lists, which would indicate that a) pure valence can 
affect false memory under certain conditions and that b) it is a verbatim effect.  Not finding any 
valence differences would support the claim that valence is not sufficient to produce mood 
effects on false memory even when verbatim traces are strong, at least at moderate arousal 
levels.     
Experiment 3 addressed the hypothesis that increasing arousal would attenuate the 
difference in false memory between positive and negative moods.  This hypothesis is supported 
by prior research showing that emotional effects on false memory are the result of an interaction 
between valence and arousal, at least for emotional content (Gomes et al., 2013), or are wholly 
dependent on arousal (Corson & Verrier, 2007).  If pure valence effects were detected in the first 
two experiments, increased arousal could interact with valence and provide a test of the 
competing hypotheses born out of AAI and FTT:  Higher arousal increasing the false memory 
difference between positive and negative valence would support AAI, whereas higher arousal 
reducing that difference would be more consistent with FTT.   
Finally, Experiment 4 addressed the hypothesis that high levels of arousal can increase 
false memory regardless of valence, and that this effect is driven by reduced verbatim retrieval at 
higher levels of arousal.  In other words, this study was designed to determine whether arousal is 
sufficient to produce false memory effects. This prediction is based on FTT’s account of arousal, 
wherein it enhances verbatim retrieval at low levels but reduces verbatim retrieval at high levels, 
and this verbatim effect does not rely on processing styles associated with different valences.  In 
this final study, arousal was measured based on subjects’ self-report, in accordance with 
Mirandola and Toffalini’s (2016) finding that these ratings are a better predictor of false 
memory.  If arousal is found to increase false memory here, it would provide corroborating 
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evidence for the claim that higher arousal increases false memory and would additionally 
provide information on the retrieval processes controlling that effect.  Furthermore, a pure effect 
of arousal is supportive of FTT, but not, AAI where the influence if arousal is only to modulate 
valence effects.   
Other manipulations.  Beyond the major goals of the experiments outlined above, I 
included several other manipulations relevant to emotionally-laden real-life situations.  In all 
four studies, I used a form of memory test that provided information on two additional factors 
that affect true and false memory.  The general form of this type of recognition test is as follows.  
On the test that immediately follows the study phase, subjects respond to only half of the 
memory test items.  On the later memory test, subjects respond to all memory test items; that is, 
over the course of the whole procedure they respond to half of those items twice and they 
respond to the other half only once.  In this way I was able to compute measures of two useful 
factors: retention interval, which provides information on forgetting over time, and repeated 
testing.  Retention interval can be measured by comparing the immediate test items to half of the 
delayed test items—the ones that were not previously tested on the immediate test.  Any 
difference in memory for immediate test versus delayed test items is due to any forgetting that 
occurs before the items are tested.  Repeated testing is measured by comparing the two halves of 
items on the delayed test.  One half was already tested once before and the other half was tested 
for the first time.  Any difference in memory for those two groups of items is due to prior testing 
effects.   
The inclusion of these two factors was relevant for several reasons.  First, both of these 
factors provide clear predictions about verbatim and gist memory and so any general forgetting 
or repeated testing effects can provide confirmation of those theoretical predictions.  More 
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specifically, repeated testing should increase both true and false memory if it increases both 
verbatim and gist memory, but forgetting should cause a reduction in both true and false 
memory, although that reduction should be smaller for false memory, if it reduces verbatim 
memory more than gist memory (McDermott, 2006; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Thapar & 
McDermott, 2001).  
Second, if forgetting and repeated testing are clearly linked to increases or decreases in 
gist or verbatim retrieval, any differences in their effects on subjects in different moods can 
provide more information about whether verbatim or gist retrieval is emphasized by a particular 
mood.  For instance, if it is true that forgetting causes a reduction in verbatim traces but not gist 
traces, and forgetting has a larger impact on memory in negative moods than positive moods, 
there is support for the hypothesis that negative moods encourage verbatim processing.   
Finally, repeated testing and forgetting are relevant to situations when witnesses of 
crimes or people who have experienced abuse are asked the same questions more than once or 
are not asked until some time has passed since the original event.  Knowledge about how 
repeated testing and forgetting affect false memory—especially when subjects are in negative 
moods—would be important to consider in the context of police interviewing, eyewitness 
testimony, therapy, medical reporting, etc.   
The primary goals of my dissertation were to determine the impact of mood valence and 
arousal on true and false memory, to identify the retrieval processes associated with mood-
memory effects, and to identify conditions under which mood effects on false memory are most 
likely to occur.    
 41 
CHAPTER 2 
PILOT TESTS: DEVELOPMENT OF MOOD INDUCTION PROCEDURE 
In order to develop a mood induction procedure that could be effectively implemented 
online, I pilot tested two previously-used MIPs adapted to be presented as part of an online 
survey.  The first method was Mayer, Allen, and Beauregard's (1995) music and guided imagery 
induction.  The second was the presentation of videos, as done by Storbeck and Clore (2011), for 
example.  For the music and guided imagery and the first video inductions, arousal was intended 
to be held constant across three mood groups differing in valence.  For the second video 
induction, arousal was intended to be higher for the positive and negative mood groups 
compared to the neutral group, but equivalent across the positive and negative groups.   
Pilot 1: Music and Guided Imagery (Low Arousal) 
Mood inductions that have ostensibly been designed to manipulate subjects’ valence have 
often tended to alter subjects’ arousal as well, making it impossible to determine whether valence 
or arousal cause any resulting effects.  Researchers have noted the difficulty of maintaining 
equivalent arousal levels across positive, negative, and neutral moods groups, because neutral 
moods cannot be very arousing, and as positivity and negativity become stronger arousal is apt to 
increase as well (e.g., Bradley & Lang, 1999).  However, the challenging task of creating a mood 
induction that controls arousal is necessary in order to determine whether mood effects on 
memory can be obtained as a function of valence alone.  I began with the combined music and 
guided imagery technique because of its past efficacy (Corson & Verrier, 2007) as well as the 
fact that the wide range of normed musical stimuli allowed me to select pieces with high degrees 
of positivity and negativity but low arousal.   
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Method 
Subjects.  29 undergraduate students participated for course credit (Mage = 19.34, SD = 
1.79, 14 women).  9 subjects were in the positive mood condition, 10 were in the negative mood 
condition, and 10 were in the neutral mood condition.   
Materials.  The SAM (Bradley & Lang, 1994) and the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen) were used to measure subjects’ moods before they completed the mood induction task 
and after.  They rated their current levels of valence and arousal on two 9-point scales ranging 
from calm to excited (arousal) and unhappy to happy (valence).  They also rated how much they 
were currently experiencing each of 16 emotions on a 4-point scale from “definitely do not feel” 
to “definitely feel.”   
The materials for the mood induction task were comprised of 1) musical pieces and 2) 
one-sentence descriptions of positive, negative, or neutral situations.  Three musical pieces were 
used for this task: one was positive, one was negative, and one was neutral.  Selection of these 
pieces was based on norms found in Eerola and Vuoskoski's (2010) database.  They were each 
about three minutes long.  24 sentences were used: 8 were positive (e.g., “you have worked hard 
on a paper for the past month and you just found out you got an A on it”), 8 were negative (e.g., 
“your friend cancels your plans for tonight at the last minute”), and 8 were neutral (e.g., “the 
capital is usually one of the biggest cities in the country”).   
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Table 2.1  
Descriptive Statistics for Pilot Tests 
  Pilot 1 Pilot 2 Pilot 3 
  M SD M SD M SD 
ArousalPre Positive 4.67 1.41 4.12 1.62 4.65 1.57 
 Negative 3.90 1.52 4.20 1.23 4.23 1.60 
 Neutral 4.00 1.41 4.14 1.75 4.43 1.47 
ValencePre Positive 6.22 1.09 4.94 1.95 6.10 1.17 
 Negative 6.60 1.17 5.70 1.42 6.41 1.14 
 Neutral 6.20 1.62 5.71 1.38 5.81 1.08 
ArousalPost Positive 5.67 1.73 3.94 1.52 5.60 1.70 
 Negative 5.00 1.41 4.20 0.79 5.09 1.38 
 Neutral 4.90 1.60 4.07 1.69 4.14 1.85 
ValencePost Positive 6.44 1.01 6.00 2.00 6.45 1.32 
 Negative 5.80 1.32 4.30 1.34 3.68 1.17 
 Neutral 5.80 1.87 5.35 1.66 6.10 1.00 
ArousalDiff Positive 1.00 1.41 -0.18 1.70 0.95 1.15 
 Negative 1.10 1.20 0.00 1.63 0.86 2.21 
 Neutral 0.90 1.20 -0.07 1.59 -0.29 1.90 
ValenceDiff Positive 0.22 0.67 0.41 2.43 0.35 0.88 
 Negative -0.80 1.75 -1.40 1.51 -2.73 1.64 
 Neutral -0.40 1.90 0.29 1.68 0.29 0.85 
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Procedure.  Subjects completed the pilot test online through the survey website Qualtrics 
(Qualtrics, Provo, UT).  After completing the first mood measurement, subjects were instructed 
that they should try to enter the given mood state (positive, negative, or neutral) and to press a 
button when they were ready.  After the button press, the music started to play and they were 
again instructed to think about how pleasant or unpleasant it was (no instruction was given in the 
neutral condition).  After listening to the music for 1 minute, subjects received more instructions.   
“Now, the music will continue as you read several sentences.  You will have some time to focus 
on each sentence before proceeding to the next.  Please use this time to imagine what you would 
feel like in the situation described by the sentence, and allow yourself to feel the [positive or 
negative] feelings associated with it. Feel free to re-read the sentence as many times as you are 
able.  The survey will automatically proceed to the next sentence once the allotted time is 
up.  Click to continue when you are ready.” 
After pressing the button, the music resumed and the first sentence was presented.  It 
stayed on the screen for 30 seconds before proceeding to the next sentence.  The music continued 
while all 8 sentences were displayed (about 4 minutes; when the song ended it restarted 
immediately).   After the last sentence was displayed the music stopped and subjects completed 
the second mood measurement.  The entire task took about 10-15 minutes to complete.   
Results 
Difference scores were computed for valence and arousal to determine the change in 
mood as a result of the induction.  One-way ANOVAs were conducted on pre- and post-
induction valence and arousal as well as on the difference scores.  Pre-induction mood 
measurement results revealed no reliable differences in valence or arousal for the three groups; 
F(2,28) = .28 for valence and F(2,28) = .77 for arousal, both ns.  However, post-induction mood 
scores did not differ by valence, F(2,28) = .61, or arousal, F(2,28) = .65, both ns; difference 
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scores did not differ by valence, F(2,28) = 1.02, or arousal, F(2,28) = .06, either, both ns.  These 
results show that despite its effectiveness in prior research, the music and guided imagery mood 
induction was not effective in the present sample (see Table 2.1), perhaps due to its 
implementation online rather than in person.  However, others have previously demonstrated the 
efficacy of certain types of MIPs online, so the lack of results was more likely due to the 
particular MIP used (Verheyen & Göritz, 2009).     
Pilot 2: Video Mood Induction (Low Arousal) 
Following Storbeck and Clore’s (2011) successful use of a video MIP in a false memory 
design, this pilot test was designed to test the efficacy of video mood induction online.   
Method 
Participants.  41 undergraduate students participated in exchange for course credit (Mage 
= 19.87, SD = 1.54, 32 women).  17 subjects were in the positive mood condition, 10 were in the 
negative mood condition, and 14 were in the neutral mood condition.   
Materials.  Three short videos were used for the pilot test.  The selection of videos was 
based on Gabert-Quillen, Bartolini, Abravanel, and Sanislow's (2015) norms for emotional film 
clips.  In the neutral condition, the video depicted several scenes from nature and human 
exploration with peaceful background music. The selection of this video was based on Gabert-
Quillen et al.’s use of a video taken from the introduction to the television series Planet Earth as 
a neutral stimulus.  The negative video was a scene from The Shawshank Redemption, based on 
Gabert-Quillen et al.’s norms for this video (Mpleasantness = 2.22; Marousal = 2.62) on a 5-point scale.  
Finally, the positive video depicted babies and puppies.  Each video was approximately three 
minutes long.  
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Procedure.  Subjects completed the pre-induction SAM and BMIS measures, viewed the 
videos, and completed the post-induction SAM and BMIS measures.  They were given the 
following instructions prior to watching the videos: 
“In the next part of the survey, you will watch a short video.  Please pay close attention to the 
images and sounds and allow yourself to feel any positive/negative emotions induced by the video. 
(Previous sentence omitted in neutral condition).  Try to imagine yourself in the context of the 
video and feel any emotions that arise.” 
Results 
Difference scores were computed for valence and arousal to determine the change in 
mood as a result of the induction.  One-way ANOVAs were conducted on pre- and post-
induction valence and arousal as well as on the difference scores.  Pre-induction mood 
measurement results revealed no reliable differences in valence or arousal for the three groups; 
F(2,38) = 1.07 for valence and F(2,38) = .01 for arousal, both ns. However, post-induction mood 
scores did marginally differ by valence, F(2,38) = 2.77, p = .08, but not arousal, F(2,38) = .10, 
ns, as predicted. 
Furthermore, difference scores were marginally affected by valence, F(2,38) = 2.94, p = 
.07, but not arousal, F(2,38) = .04, ns.  Planned comparisons revealed significant differences 
between valence difference scores for the negative group compared to the neutral group, p < .01, 
for the positive group compared to the negative group, p < .01, and inspection of the means 
revealed a trend in the predicted direction for the comparison between the positive and neutral 
groups (see Table 2.1 for descriptive statistics).  Because the pattern of means was appropriate 
and the effects were marginal, I concluded that differences in mood would become reliable when 
a larger sample was used in the primary experiments.  
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Pilot 3: Video Mood Induction (High Arousal) 
Following Pilot 2 resulting in a successful mood induction in which arousal levels were 
held equivalent, I then developed a second set of videos in which the arousal levels of the 
emotional conditions would be higher—but not extremely high—in the effort to create stronger 
memory effects.  
Method 
Participants.  63 undergraduates participated in exchange for course credit (Mage = 
20.10, SD = 1.35, 46 women).  22 subjects were in the negative-high arousal group, 20 were in 
the positive-high arousal group, and 21 were in the neutral group.   
Materials.  Two new high-arousal positive and negative film clips were selected based 
on Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, and Philippot's (2010) norms for emotional film clips.  The neutral 
film clip was the same as the one used in Pilot 2.  The negative video was a scene from American 
History X, based on Shaefer et al.’s norms for this video (Mnegativeaffect = 2.731; Marousal = 5.84) 
Finally, the positive video was a scene from The Dead Poet’s Society based on Schaefer et al.’s 
norms (Mpositiveaffect = 2.82; Marousal = 5.66).  These values represent moderately high levels of 
arousal and high levels of negative and positive affective tone, respectively.   
Procedure.  The procedure was the same as the procedure for Pilot 2.  
Results 
Difference scores were computed for valence and arousal to determine the change in 
mood as a result of the induction.  One-way ANOVAs were conducted on pre- and post-
induction valence and arousal as well as on the difference scores.  Pre-induction mood 
                                                 
1 Negative and positive affect were measured on separate 1-3 scales, so these values 
represent fairly high levels of valence.  Arousal was measured on a scale from 1-7. 
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measurement results revealed no reliable differences in valence or arousal for the three groups; 
F(2,60) = 1.27 for valence and F(2,60) = .39 for arousal, both ns.  However, post-induction 
mood scores did differ by both valence, F(2,60) = 35.71, p < .01, and arousal, F(2,60) = 4.15, p < 
.05.   
Furthermore, difference scores were affected by valence, F(2,60) = 46.74, p < .01 and 
marginally differed for arousal as well, F(2,60) = 2.99, p = .06.  Planned comparisons revealed 
significant differences between valence difference scores for the positive group compared to the 
negative group, p < .01, and for the negative group compared to the neutral group, p < .01, and 
inspection of the means revealed a trend in the predicted direction for the comparison between 
the positive group and the neutral group (see Table 2.1 for descriptive statistics).  Planned 
comparisons also revealed significant differences between the arousal levels of the two 
emotional groups and the neutral group, p < .05 for both comparisons, but not between the two 
emotional groups, as expected.  
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CHAPTER 3  
EXPERIMENT 1: EFFECT OF MOOD VALENCE ON TRUE AND FALSE MEMORY FOR 
NEUTRAL WORDS 
Findings in the mood-false memory literature have been interpreted as evidence that 
negative moods reduce false memory compared to positive moods.  However, issues with control 
of arousal suggest that we should question the validity of that claim.  It is possible that instead, 
arousal differences between valenced and neutral moods can account for the variability in false 
memory.  To determine whether valence truly impacts false memory, independent of arousal, the 
present study implemented a MIP with low arousal across all three valence groups.  Beyond the 
typical measures of true and false memory, this study also identified retrieval processes 
associated with mood valence and its effect on memory as a function of forgetting and repeated 
testing.   
Method 
Participants 
117 subjects participated in exchange for course credit.  91 subjects were women and all 
were between the ages of 18 and 25 (Mage = 20.52, SD = 1.29).  35 subjects were in the negative 
condition, 51 were in the neutral condition, and 31 were in the positive condition.  Conjoint 
recognition instruction was manipulated within-subjects.   
Materials 
The mood induction materials were identical to those used in Pilot 2.  They included the 
pre- and post-induction mood measurements and the three videos designed to induce positive, 
negative, and neutral moods with equivalent levels of arousal.   
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The memory task materials consisted of 234 words.  Based on Stadler, Roediger, and 
Mcdermott's (1999) norms for false memory of 36 standard DRM lists, the 18 lists with the 
highest levels of recognition were selected for use in the present experiments.  The one exception 
was that the “anger” list was not used and the next best list was used in its place, to avoid 
presenting inherently emotional words.  The 11 words with the highest combined BAS and FAS 
values to the critical word were identified.  The top ten of these words served as targets and the 
11th served as a related distractor for each list.  The decision to use 10-item word lists was based 
on Robinson and Roediger’s (1997) norms for false recognition as a function of number of target 
items.  18 unrelated distractors were selected from the 18 unused lists.  Thus, the materials were 
comprised of 18 CDs, 18 RDs, 18 URDs, and 180 targets.  See Table 3.1 for lists of targets.  
Audio files were created for presentation of the 18 10-word lists.  The words were read aloud in 
order of descending associative strength at a two-second rate.    
Table 3.2 displays how the conjoint recognition test questions were assigned to the items 
on the immediate and delayed test.  As shown, on the immediate test subjects responded to 9 
CDs, 9 RDs, and 9 URDs, with three of each item type being assigned to each of the three 
questions.  They also responded to 18 targets, with 6 assigned to each of the three questions.  
There were 72 items on the immediate test.  On the delayed test, all of the values were doubled, 
such that subjects responded to 18 CDs, 18 RDs, 18 URDs, and 36 targets, with 6 of each 
question for CDs, RDs, and URDs, and 12 of each question for targets.  In this way, all of the 
immediate test items were tested again on the delayed test, along with an equal number of items 
that not been tested before.  Items that were being tested for a second time were paired with the 
same CR question that they had been paired with originally.  All 18 of the CDs, RDs, and URDs 
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were thus tested on the delayed test, along with 36 of the 180 targets, comprising 144 items on 
the delayed test.   
Table 3.1 
Experiment 1 Items 
CD doctor needle sleep smoke foot sweet trash mountain cup 
T1 nurse thread bed cigarette toe sour garbage hill saucer 
T2 physician  syringe nap cigar shoe candy dump climber mug 
T3 stethosco
pe 
pin rest pipe inch sugar can climb glass 
T4 surgeon haystack tired fire ankle bitter litter peak Measurin
g 
T5 patient sewing snooze chimney hand honey junk valley coffee 
T6 dentist injection drowsy puff leg tart waste summit tea 
T7 medicine thimble slumber flame sandal chocolate landfill range soup 
T8 lawyer prick dream billow sock taste bag ski drink 
T9 sick knitting snore blaze boot tooth rubbish molehill straw 
T10 health eye wake lung kick heart debris steep Sip 
RD cure sharp yawn tobacco knee nice pile top coaster 
UD shirt lion thief music army rubber king car fruit 
          
CD river city chair cold window smell soft rough slow 
T1 stream town table hot pane aroma hard smooth fast 
T2 creek suburb seat chilly sill scent pillow sandpaper snail 
T3 flow state couch shiver shutter stench  gentle tough turtle 
T4 lake county sit arctic glass sniff smooth bumpy quick 
T5 brook country stool frigid door fragrance cotton uneven molasses 
T6 water street desk ice curtain nose skin coarse speed 
T7 boat village sofa freeze ledge hear feather gravel delay 
T8 swim metropoli
s 
bench warm shade see plush ground traffic 
T9 fish capital cushion frost view nostril loud jagged lethargic 
T10 tide urban rocking heat open breathe tender sand sluggish 
RD bridge big recliner winter house stink touch rugged stop 
UD black girl pen flag angry spider high man bread 
 
  
 52 
Table 3.2 
Experiment 1 Test Items with CR Statement 
Type Word Times 
Tested 
CR  Type Word Times 
Tested 
CR 
CD foot 1 G  CD chair 2 G 
CD mountain 1 G  CD rough 2 G 
CD cup 1 G  CD slow 2 G 
CD needle 1 V  CD river 2 V 
CD sweet 1 V  CD cold 2 V 
CD trash 1 V  CD smell 2 V 
CD doctor 1 VG  CD city 2 VG 
CD sleep 1 VG  CD window 2 VG 
CD smoke 1 VG  CD soft 2 VG 
RD cure 1 G  RD coaster 2 G 
RD sharp 1 G  RD bridge 2 G 
RD nice 1 G  RD rugged 2 G 
RD knee 1 V  RD winter 2 V 
RD top 1 V  RD stink 2 V 
RD big 1 V  RD stop 2 V 
RD yawn 1 VG  RD recliner 2 VG 
RD tobacco 1 VG  RD house 2 VG 
RD pile 1 VG  RD touch 2 VG 
T1 eye 1 G  T1 urban 2 G 
T1 kick 1 G  T1 rocking 2 G 
T1 sip 1 G  T1 sand 2 G 
T1 health 1 V  T1 open 2 V 
T1 heart 1 V  T1 tender 2 V 
T1 tide 1 V  T1 sluggish 2 V 
T1 wake 1 VG  T1 steep 2 VG 
T1 lung 1 VG  T1 heat 2 VG 
T1 debris 1 VG  T1 breathe 2 VG 
T2 physician 1 G  T2 chilly 2 G 
T2 candy 1 G  T2 scent 2 G 
T2 suburb 1 G  T2 sandpaper 2 G 
T2 nap 1 V  T2 mug 2 V 
T2 shoe 1 V  T2 seat 2 V 
T2 dump 1 V  T2 snail 2 V 
T2 syringe 1 VG  T2 creek 2 VG 
T2 cigar 1 VG  T2 sill 2 VG 
T2 climber 1 VG  T2 pillow 2 VG 
UD shirt 1 G  UD pen 2 G 
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UD music 1 G  UD angry 2 G 
UD fruit 1 G  UD man 2 G 
UD rubber 1 V  UD spider 2 V 
UD king 1 V  UD high 2 V 
UD car 1 V  UD bread 2 V 
UD lion 1 VG  UD black 2 VG 
UD thief 1 VG  UD girl 2 VG 
UD army 1 VG  UD flag 2 VG 
 
Procedure 
Subjects participated in the experiment online through the survey platform Qualtrics in 
exchange for course credit.  They completed the experiment in two separate sessions separated 
by approximately 48 hours.  The first session included the mood induction, the study phase, and 
the immediate conjoint recognition test.  The second session was the delayed conjoint 
recognition test.   
To begin the first session, subjects underwent the mood induction identical to the second 
pilot test:  They completed the pre-test mood measurement, viewed one of the three videos, then 
completed the post-test mood measurement.  Then, they proceeded to the study phase, in which 
they listened to all 18 auditory word lists.  The order of the lists was randomized, although the 
order of items within each list was held constant in order of descending BAS.  Subjects were 
instructed to simply listen to the lists.  After each list was presented, subjects were given 5 
seconds to work on an arithmetic problem before the next list was presented.  After the final list 
was presented, subjects were given one minute to work on as many arithmetic problems as they 
could complete.   
After one minute they proceeded to the first (immediate) conjoint recognition test.  The 
instructions explained that they would be presented with a series of words that may or may not 
have been presented previously.  Each word would be accompanied by one of three statements: 
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1) “I heard this word during the study phase;” 2) “This word is new but similar to a word from 
the study phase;” or 3) “I heard either this word or a similar word during the study phase.”  
Subjects were instructed to respond to each word by clicking a button to indicate that the 
provided statement was correct or incorrect.  They were then provided with several examples 
explaining how to respond to the statements before proceeding to the memory test.  Subjects 
were able to spend as much time as they needed responding to each item, and they were required 
to provide an answer (“yes, correct” or “no, incorrect”) to each item.  
Data Analysis 
Responses on the recognition test were bias-corrected using the two-high threshold 
method (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988).  ANOVAs were conducted on the bias-corrected target and 
CD acceptance rates, separately for the immediate and delayed tests.  Analyses were first 
restricted to the V condition as a measure of standard true and false memory, and were then 
extended to the full data set (i.e., all three instructional conditions).  Additional ANOVAs were 
conducted on the URD acceptance rates to determine whether false alarms were influenced by 
mood.   
Finally, estimates of the conjoint recognition model were computed after confirming that 
the model provided an adequate representation of the data.  The model was fit using the 
responses to the three instructional conditions across all factors in the design, and parameter 
significance tests were computed to assess theoretically-motivated parameter differences in 
different conditions.  This method was followed for all four experiments. 
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Results 
Mood manipulation check 
Participants whose mood was not manipulated as intended were excluded from the 
analyses, resulting in 117 subjects (35 in the negative mood group, 51 in the neutral mood group, 
and 31 in the positive mood group).  Participants were excluded if the change in their valence 
rating from the pre-test to the post-test was more than 2 points in the direction opposite to the 
intended direction (e.g., participants in the positive group whose moods became substantially 
more negative), and participants were excluded if the change in their arousal rating from the pre-
test to the post-test was more than two points (i.e., if there was a substantial increase in arousal). 
Analysis of the resulting 117 subjects revealed reliable differences in post-test valence for the 
three groups, F(2,116) = 37.61, p < .05, with valence being the highest for the positive group (M 
= 7.28, SD = .76), followed by the neutral group (M = 5.52, SD = .59), followed by the negative 
group (M = 3.49, SD = .54).  As expected, there were no reliable differences in arousal among 
the three groups, F(2,116) = .86, ns, (Mpositive = 4.59, Mneutral = 4.19, Mnegative = 4.31). 
Bias correction 
The effects of CR question and mood on unrelated distractor acceptance were identified 
in order to determine the proper method of bias correction.  Two parallel 3 (question: V, G, VG) 
x 3 (mood: positive, negative, neutral) ANOVAs were performed on the acceptance rates for 
unrelated distractors, separately for the immediate and the delayed tests.  There were reliable 
main effects of question on both tests and a reliable effect of mood on the immediate test but no 
interactions (see Table 3.3 for descriptive statistics).  On the immediate test, unrelated distractor 
acceptance was higher in the G condition than the V and VG conditions, F(2,228) = 9.67, p < 
.05.  
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Table 3.3 
URD Acceptance Rates  
  Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
  M SD M SD M SD 
Immediate 
 Negative .21 .27 .26 .33 .38 .24 
V Neutral .24 .28 .39 .36 .31 .30 
 Positive .26 .27 .29 .32 .24 .30 
 Total .24 .27 .32 .34 .30 .31 
 Negative .31 .30 .45 .29 .41 .33 
G Neutral .37 .34 .50 .30 .35 .29 
 Positive .47 .31 .39 .31 .41 .29 
 Total .38 .33 .45 .30 .39 .30 
 Negative .16 .27 .22 .28 .22 .29 
VG Neutral .27 .31 .21 .30 .27 .34 
 Positive .33 .30 .25 .34 .33 .32 
 Total .25 .30 .23 .31 .28 .32 
 Negative .23 .36 .31 .43 .34 .29 
Total Neutral .29 .29 .37 .39 .31 .32 
 Positive .36 .38 .30 .40 .32 .30 
Delay 
 Negative .42 .27 .38 .25 .41 .24 
V Neutral .40 .29 .47 .27 .37 .28 
 Positive .54 .25 .38 .23 .41 .26 
 Total .44 .27 .41 .25 .39 .26 
 Negative .31 .30 .31 .23 .37 .25 
G Neutral .27 .25 .43 .30 .42 .24 
 Positive .38 .25 .36 .26 .34 .28 
 Total .31 .27 .37 .27 .37 .26 
 Negative .31 .30 .27 .24 .38 .28 
VG Neutral .27 .25 .49 .30 .31 .28 
 Positive .38 .25 .38 .29 .39 .30 
 Total .31 .27 .39 .29 .36 .29 
 Negative .34 .44 .32 .42 .38 .26 
Total Neutral .32 .38 .46 .39 .38 .26 
 Positive .43 .53 .37 .39 .37 .28 
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On the delayed test, unrelated distractor acceptance was higher in the V condition than in the G 
and VG conditions, F(2,180) = 16.25, p < .05.  As for mood, there was a reliable effect on 
unrelated distractor acceptance on the immediate test, F(2,114) = 3.51, p < .05, but not on the 
delayed test, F(2,90) = 1.89, ns.  This effect on the immediate test occurred because unrelated 
distractor acceptance was higher for positive moods compared to negative moods (acceptance for 
neutral moods did not differ reliably from either emotional mood).  Unrelated distractor 
acceptance was also highest for positive moods on the delayed test, although that difference was 
not reliable.  Because the unrelated distractor acceptance was affected by both mood and 
question, the data were bias-corrected using the unrelated distractor acceptance rates separated 
by question and mood.  The following analyses were conducted on the bias-corrected values.   
Analysis of Standard True and False Memory 
 In order to compare the present findings to the large body of research that has measured 
mood effects on standard measures of true and false memory, I began by isolating the data to the 
instructional condition that closely represents standard recognition tests.  In those tests, subjects 
are simply asked to indicate with “yes” or “no” whether a given item has been presented.  In the 
present study, I thus isolated the data to the V instructional condition, where subjects responded 
to the statement “I heard this word during the study phase.”  Thus, I was able to determine 
whether the present results are consistent with prior research before examining differences 
among the instructional conditions.  This method was implemented for all four experiments. 
 The design was a one-way ANOVA with valence (negative, neutral, positive) as the 
between-subjects factor, with verbatim acceptance of targets and CDs on the immediate and 
delayed tests as the dependent variables.  Valence did not have a reliable effect on true memory 
on the immediate test, but false memory was higher for subjects in positive moods (M = .45) 
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compared to negative moods (M = .33), consistent with prior research (false memory for subjects 
in neutral moods did not reliably differ from the other two mood groups), F(1,89) = 6.57, p < 
.05.  
 On the delayed test, negative moods (M = .19) increased true memory compared to 
neutral (M = .12) and positive (M = .08) moods, which did not differ from each other, F(1,89) = 
5.23, p < .05.  Valence did not have an effect on false memory on the delayed test, F(2,89) = 
1.72, ns.  Note that there is no evidence that mood affects true memory in prior research. 
Main ANOVA Results 
 Separate 3 (question: V, G, VG) x 3 (valence: negative, neutral, positive) ANOVAs were 
conducted on target and CD bias-corrected acceptance rates, separately for the immediate and 
delayed memory tests, with question as a within-subjects factor and mood valence as a between-
subjects factor.    
Immediate test.  Turning to targets first, the main effect of question revealed that target 
acceptance was highest in the VG condition (M = .45), followed by the V (M = .27) condition 
and finally the G (M = .17) conditions, F(2,228) = 32.81, p < .05; all mean differences were 
reliable.  There was also a marginal main effect of valence, with target acceptance being greater 
for the negative (M = .32) and neutral (M = .30) mood groups compared to the positive mood 
group (M = .24), F(2,114) = 2.93, p = .06.  
 Moving on to CDs, on the immediate test the effect of question was reliable, but there 
was no main effect of valence or an interaction even though valence affected CD acceptance 
when isolated to the V condition.  The main effect of question was such that CD acceptance was 
highest in the VG condition (M = .55), followed by the V condition (M = .41), then the G 
condition (M = .23); all mean differences were reliable, F(2,228) = 27.41, p < .05.   
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 Delayed test.  For targets there was again a reliable main effect of question, such that 
target acceptance was greater in the VG condition (M = .33) than the V (M = .13) and G (M = 
.16) conditions, which did not differ reliably from each other, F(2,178) = 30.18, p < .05.  Note 
that verbatim memory declined over the delay period but gist memory did not.  There was also a 
main effect of valence, with target acceptance being greater for the negative mood group (M = 
.25) compared to the positive mood group (M = .14); the neutral mood group (M = .22) did not 
differ reliably from the other two groups, F(2,89) = 3.94, p < .05.   
 For critical distractors the main effect of question was similar to the effect for targets, 
such that CD acceptance was greater in the VG condition (M = .42) than the V (M = .18) and G 
(M = .20) conditions, which did not differ from each other, F(2,178) = 39.92, p < .05.  There was 
no effect of mood valence on the delayed test. 
Prior testing.  Another set of ANOVAs was conducted in order to compare acceptance 
rates of targets and CDs on the delayed test that had not been tested on the immediate test to 
targets and CDs on the delayed test that had been tested on the immediate test.  That is, this 
comparison was an analysis of the effect of repeated testing, and applies only to items on the 
delayed test.  The design was thus two parallel 3 (question: V, G, VG) x 3 (valence: negative, 
neutral, positive) x 2 (times tested: once, twice) ANOVAs conducted on delayed test target and 
CD acceptance rates.   
 Turning to targets first, there was a main effect of prior testing (times tested), because 
items that were tested twice (M = .23) were more likely to be accepted than items that were 
tested only once (M = .19), F(1,89) = 7.55, p < .05.  Furthermore, the question x prior testing 
interaction revealed that testing twice increased target acceptance in the V and VG conditions, 
but prior testing did not affect items in the G condition (see Figure 3.1, panel A), suggesting that 
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this manipulation affects verbatim but not gist retrieval, F(2,178) = 5.08, p < .05.  Finally, the 
valence x prior testing interaction revealed that prior testing increased target acceptance in the 
negative mood group (.22 versus .29) but not in the neutral (.22 versus .21) and positive (.12 
versus .16) groups, F(2,89) = 3.15, p = .05.  This finding, considered with the previous effect, is 
consistent with the proposition that negative moods enhance verbatim retrieval.   
 
 
Figure 3.1. Effect of prior testing and question on delayed test targets (panel A) and CDs (Panel 
B) in Experiment 1.   
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 Turning now to CDs, again there was a reliable effect of prior testing, because CDs that 
were tested twice (M = .30) were more likely to be accepted than CDs that were only tested once 
(M = .24), F(1,89) = 6.64, p < .05.  There was also a reliable question x prior testing interaction 
that was similar to the parallel interaction for targets, F(2,178) = 6.89, p < .05.  Prior testing had 
no effect on CDs in the G condition (although mean was higher for untested items compared to 
tested items), but CDs in the V and VG conditions were more likely to be accepted when they 
were presented twice as compared to those presented only once (see Figure 3.1, panel B).  
Forgetting.  In order to measure subjects’ forgetting over the 48-hour delay period, 
additional ANOVAs were computed with test (immediate vs. delayed) as a factor, excluding 
items on the delayed test that were being tested for a second time.  That is, a comparison was 
made between items that were tested immediately after the study phase and items tested for the 
first time two days after the study phase.  The design was thus two parallel 3 (question: V, G, 
VG) x 3 (valence: negative, neutral, positive) x 2 (test: immediate, delayed) ANOVAs with 
target and CD acceptance rates as the dependent variables.   
 Turning to targets first, acceptance was higher on the immediate test (M = .31) than on 
the delayed test (M = .19), F(1,90) = 18.18, p < .05.  Furthermore, the test x question interaction 
supported the prediction that verbatim memory traces would decline more rapidly over time, 
F(2,180) = 11.65, p < .05 (see Figure 3.2, panel A): in the V and VG condition, target acceptance 
was higher on the immediate test than on the delayed test but in the G condition target 
acceptance was equivalent across tests. That is, forgetting occurred for verbatim acceptance but 
not gist acceptance of targets. 
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Figure 3.2. Forgetting of targets (panel A) and CDs (panel B) by question (Experiment 1). 
 Similarly, for critical distractors, the main effect of test and the question x test interaction 
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delay while CD acceptance in the G remained stable over the delay (see Figure 3.2, panel B), 
F(2,180) = 15.92, p < .05.  
 Summary.  Examination of standard true and false memory revealed two results: a) 
negative moods reduced false memory compared to positive moods immediately after list 
presentation and b) negative moods increased true memory compared to positive moods after a 
two-day delay. Both of these effects are consistent with the prediction that mood effects on 
memory are driven by enhanced item-specific processing, or enhanced verbatim retrieval, when 
subjects are in negative moods. When the analysis was expanded to all three instructional 
conditions, negative moods increased target acceptance on the immediate test as well.   
 The second major set of results concerned prior testing.  In that connection, testing items 
twice a) increased both target and CD acceptance compared to testing items only once and b) 
increased target and CD acceptance in the V condition but not the G condition.  These results are 
consistent with the idea that repeated testing affects verbatim retrieval.  Furthermore, prior 
testing increased target acceptance for subjects in negative moods but not positive and neutral 
moods, consistent with the idea that negative moods increase reliance on verbatim retrieval.   
Finally, forgetting occurred for both targets and CDs, and affected responses in the V and 
VG conditions but not the G condition.  Thus, similar to repeated testing, forgetting impacts 
verbatim memory traces more than gist traces, because gist traces remain more stable over time.  
We next turn to the results of the conjoint recognition model to determine whether the parameter 
estimates provide further support for the hypothesis that negative mood, forgetting, and repeated 
testing all impact verbatim processes more than gist processes.   
 64 
Model Fits 
The model’s fit was evaluated by computing likelihood ratio tests, which generate G2 
statistics asymptotically distributed with χ2 with one degree of freedom per condition.  The 
critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis that the model fits the data is 3.84.  The G2 values 
for all of the conditions were below 3.84, indicating that the model provided a statistically 
acceptable estimation of the data.   
Parameter Estimates 
Regarding the first of the above effects, recall that the identity judgment parameter is a 
measure of a verbatim process which allows subjects to correctly accept targets on the basis of 
matching verbatim traces.  An examination of the parameter estimates in Table 3.4 confirms that 
there was variability in identity judgment as a result of valence.  Recall that negative moods 
increased target acceptance compared to positive moods on both tests, and reduced false memory 
on the immediate test.  Consistent with the first effect, identity judgment was .29 for negative 
mood and .16 for positive mood on the immediate test, and .19 for negative mood and .11 for 
positive mood on the delayed test.  However, there were no reliable differences in the false 
memory parameters on the immediate test as a function of valence.  
Turning now to the second major ANOVA result, concerning prior testing, testing items 
twice increased verbatim acceptance of targets and CDs.  For targets, testing items twice 
increased acceptance for subjects in negative moods only, and, consistently, identity judgment 
increased with prior testing for negative moods but not positive and neutral moods.  On the false 
memory side, familiarity and phantom recollection were both higher for items that had been 
previously tested, suggesting that despite being driven by gist processes, the prior testing effect  
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Table 3.4 
Experiment 1 Parameter Estimates 
 RT FT PD RD FD βV βG βVG 
Immediate Test 
Negative .29 .14 .35 .12 .32 .34 .34 .30 
Neutral .22 .13 .34 .15 .33 .39 .35 .39 
Positive .16 .13 .31 .16 .29 .38 .33 .38 
Mean .24 .12 .34 .15 .31 .37 .34 .34 
Delayed Test 
 U T U T U T U T U T U T U T U T 
Negative .16 .25 .17 .20 .15 .41 .03 .14 .28 .33 .37 .44 .32 .29 .32 .44 
Neutral .18 .14 .11 .12 .21 .25 .17 .11 .20 .39 .46 .48 .35 .28 .35 .48 
Positive .10 .14 .13 .07 .14 .40 .24 .12 .13 .17 .48 .46 .23 .40 .39 .53 
Mean .16 .19 .15 .10 .21 .37 .16 .14 .19 .29 .44 .47 .32 .33 .32 .47 
Negative .19 .17 .24 .07 .30 .40 .30 .40 
Neutral .12 .14 .19 .11 .31 .45 .30 .45 
Positive .11 .09 .29 .17 .14 .46 .32 .46 
Mean .14 .14 .24 .12 .25 .43 .31 .43 
Combined Across Both Tests 
Negative .26 .15 .34 .16 .24 .37 .33 .33 
Neutral .18 .14 .28 .13 .32 .41 .35 .41 
Positive .14 .11 .30 .16 .23 .41 .33 .41 
Mean .19 .14 .30 .13 .30 .39 .33 .39 
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on CDs results in acceptance in the V condition; i.e., false memory increases when CDs have 
been previously tested.     
Finally, addressing the forgetting results, I compared the parameter values for the 
immediate test to previously untested delayed test items.  Recall here that target and CD 
acceptance declined in the V condition but remained stable in the G condition.  Consistently, 
estimates of identity judgment declined from the immediate test to the delayed test, whereas 
target familiarity remained stable over the delay.  For CDs the only parameter that declined over 
time was phantom recollection, again suggesting that this parameter drove CD acceptance in the 
V condition. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 provided preliminary results regarding the effect of low-arousal moods on 
true and false memory.  This study was the first to control arousal at a low level while 
manipulating valence in a false memory design, and was the first to provide information on 
retrieval processes associated with different mood valences as well as forgetting and testing 
effects.  As such, there is a dearth of previous research with which to compare the results.   
I found that negative mood valence increased true memory by increasing verbatim 
retrieval, which is consistent with the prediction that negative mood results in more verbatim, 
item-specific processing.  Past researchers have not provided evidence of mood effects on true 
memory, but I argue that this difference is due to the conflation of valence and arousal in 
previous studies.  Positive and negative valence differences may become attenuated when 
arousal is high; valence effects may only be detectable when arousal is low, as in the present 
study.  This could be the case if arousal increases verbatim processing.  If low-arousal negative 
moods enhance true memory compared to low-arousal positive moods via verbatim processing, 
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when verbatim processing is increased in positive moods due to increased arousal the valence 
effect may disappear.  In Experiment 3 I investigate how valence effects change when arousal is 
increased, and in Experiment 4 I investigate whether it is true that arousal increases verbatim 
processing.  
Furthermore, the effect of mood on true memory was reliable on the delayed test but not 
on the immediate test (although mood did affect target acceptance across all instructional 
conditions on the immediate test).  If mood affects true memory (i.e., acceptance in the V 
condition) only after a delay, the lack of evidence for such an effect in prior research could be 
because the typical recall or recognition test occurs on the same day as the study phase.  
Negative mood reduced false memory compared to positive mood on the immediate test; 
however, the only reliable parameter differences were in the identity parameter.  The results were 
consistent with both ideas that negative mood would reduce false memory and that it would 
increase verbatim processing, although the data did not indicate any parameter differences on the 
false memory side, per se.  The effect of negative mood was consistent with findings of the same 
nature, including those lacking control over arousal (e.g., Storbeck & Clore, 2005, 2011).   
  Experiment 1 also provided further evidence regarding manipulations that primarily 
affect verbatim processing: namely, repeated testing and forgetting.  Repeated testing primarily 
affected the identity parameter, and forgetting resulted in declines in identity and phantom 
recollection.  In addition to providing process explanations for repeated testing and forgetting 
effects, these results provide further confirmation of the prediction from FTT that verbatim 
memory traces decline more rapidly over time than gist traces.  
It is possible that I did not detect false memory effects on the delayed test because the 
false acceptance rate was simply too low (CD acceptance in the V condition was .18 for 
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Experiment 1, as compared to .24 in Experiment 2 and .30 in Experiment 3).  If false memory 
was at floor level, perhaps subjects in all three mood conditions were able to successfully reject 
CDs, and there was not enough latitude for variation in false memory rate as a function of mood.  
In the next study, I included a manipulation that would differentially affect true memory and 
false memory as well as provide further testing of the verbatim processing in negative mood 
hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENT 2: EFFECT OF MOOD VALENCE AND LIST LENGTH ON TRUE AND 
FALSE MEMORY FOR NEUTRAL WORDS 
 Using the same general design and the same mood manipulation as Experiment 1, in 
Experiment 2 I introduced a list length manipulation designed to strengthen verbatim memory 
traces (in one list length) and promote more false memories (in another list length).  Prior 
research has shown that a) shortening DRM lists to as few as just one item makes it easier to use 
verbatim retrieval (Brainerd & Reyna, 2007) and b) lengthening lists up to around 14 items 
increases false memory rates (Robinson & Roediger, 1997).  In place of the 10-item lists used in 
Experiment 1, Experiment 2 used a) 6-item lists to promote verbatim retrieval and b) 14-item 
DRM lists in order to heighten false memory rates as much as possible and thus eliminate the 
possibility that false memory rates were simply too low in Experiment 1.  List length has been 
demonstrated to be a manipulation that dissociates verbatim and gist processing (Sugrue & 
Hayne, 2006), so if mood interacts with list length it could provide further information regarding 
the contribution of the two types of processing to different moods. 
Method 
Participants 
112 subjects participated in exchange for course credit.  94 subjects were women and all 
were between the ages of 18 and 24 (Mage = 19.61, SD = 1.14).  33 subjects were in the negative 
condition, 39 were in the neutral condition, and 40 were in the positive condition.      
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Materials 
The mood induction materials were identical to those used in Pilot 2.  They included the 
pre- and post-induction mood measurements and the three videos designed to induce positive, 
negative, and neutral moods with equivalent low levels of arousal.   
The memory task materials consisted of 234 words, selected in the same manner as done 
in Experiment 1.  However, rather than 18 10-item lists, 9 6-item lists and 9 14-item lists were 
used (see Table 4.1).  The 6-item lists were simply the first 6 targets of those lists in Experiment 
1, and the 14-item lists were comprised of the 10 items used in Experiment 1 plus the subsequent 
4 targets from Stadler et al.’s (1999) 15-item lists.  The remaining target was used as the RD.  
The materials were 18 CDs, 18 RDs, 18 URDs, and 180 targets, as in Experiment 1.  New audio 
files were created for presentation of the 18 lists.  The words were read aloud in order of 
descending associative strength at a two-second rate.    
Table 4.2 displays how the conjoint recognition test questions were assigned to the items 
on the immediate and delayed test.  The breakdown was similar to the breakdown of Experiment 
1 items, with the further qualification that on the delayed test, 9 of the CDs, 9 of the RDs, and 18 
of the targets were from 6-item (short) lists and the other half of the items were from 14-item 
(long lists.)  As in Experiment 1, only half of the items were tested on the immediate test and CR 
questions were distributed equally among items.  The immediate test items were re-tested on the 
delayed test along with the other, untested half of items, and the re-tested items were 
accompanied by the same CR questions as on the immediate test.  As in Experiment 1, 72 items 
were on the immediate test and 144 items were on the delayed test.   
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Table 4.1 
Experiment 2 and 3 Items 
CD Doctor needle sleep smoke foot sweet trash mountai
n 
cup 
T1 Nurse thread bed cigarette toe sour garbage hill saucer 
T2 physician  syringe nap cigar shoe candy dump climber mug 
T3 Stethosco
pe 
pin rest pipe inch sugar can climb glass 
T4 Surgeon haystack tired fire ankle bitter litter peak measurin
g 
T5 Patient sewing snooze chimney hand honey junk valley coffee 
T6 Dentist injection drowsy puff leg tart waste summit tea 
T7   slumber   chocolate landfill  soup 
T8   dream   taste bag  drink 
T9   snore   tooth rubbish  straw 
T10   wake   heart debris  sip 
T11   blanket   good refuse  lid 
T12   doze   soda sewage  handle 
T13   peace   cake sweep  goblet 
T14   awake   pie scraps  plastic 
RD Cure sharp yawn tobacco knee nice pile top coaster 
UD Shirt lion thief music army rubber king car fruit 
          
CD River city chair cold window smell soft rough slow 
T1 Stream town table hot pane aroma hard smooth fast 
T2 Creek suburb seat chilly sill scent pillow sandpape
r 
snail 
T3 Flow state couch shiver shutter stench  gentle tough turtle 
T4 Lake county sit arctic glass sniff smooth bumpy quick 
T5 Brook country stool frigid door fragrance cotton uneven molasses 
T6 Water street desk ice curtain nose skin coarse speed 
T7    freeze ledge hear feather gravel  
T8    warm shade see plush ground  
T9    frost view nostril loud jagged  
T10    heat open breathe tender sand  
T11    snow sill reek light road  
T12    wet frame whiff fur ready  
T13    weather breeze rose fluffy boards  
T14    air screen odor downy riders  
RD Bridge big recliner winter house stink touch rugged stop 
UD Black girl pen flag angry spider high man bread 
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Table 4.2 
Experiment 2 and 3 Test Items with CR Statement 
Type Word Times 
Tested 
CR Length  Type Word Times 
Tested 
CR Length 
CD window 1 G 14  CD chair 2 G 6 
CD mountain 1 G 6  CD rough 2 G 14 
CD cup 1 G 14  CD slow 2 G 6 
CD needle 1 V 6  CD river 2 V 6 
CD sweet 1 V 14  CD cold 2 V 14 
CD trash 1 V 14  CD city 2 V 6 
CD doctor 1 VG 6  CD smell 2 VG 14 
CD sleep 1 VG 14  CD foot 2 VG 6 
CD smoke 1 VG 6  CD soft 2 VG 14 
RD cure 1 G 6  RD coaster 2 G 14 
RD sharp 1 G 6  RD bridge 2 G 6 
RD nice 1 G 14  RD rugged 2 G 14 
RD knee 1 V 6  RD recliner 2 V 6 
RD touch 1 V 14  RD stink 2 V 14 
RD big 1 V 6  RD winter 2 V 14 
RD yawn 1 VG 14  RD stop 2 VG 6 
RD tobacco 1 VG 6  RD house 2 VG 14 
RD pile 1 VG 14  RD top 2 VG 6 
T1 injection 1 G 6  T1 street 2 G 6 
T1 drowsy 1 G 14  T1 desk 2 G 6 
T1 Tea 1 G 14  T1 coarse 2 G 14 
T1 dentist 1 V 6  T1 curtain 2 V 14 
T1 tart 1 V 14  T1 skin 2 V 14 
T1 water 1 V 6  T1 speed 2 V 6 
T1 leg 1 VG 6  T1 summit 2 VG 6 
T1 puff 1 VG 6  T1 ice 2 VG 14 
T1 waste 1 VG 14  T1 nose 2 VG 14 
T2 physician 1 G 6  T2 climber 2 G 6 
T2 candy 1 G 14  T2 scent 2 G 14 
T2 suburb 1 G 6  T2 sandpaper 2 G 14 
T2 nap 1 V 14  T2 mug 2 V 14 
T2 shoe 1 V 6  T2 seat 2 V 6 
T2 dump 1 V 14  T2 snail 2 V 6 
T2 syringe 1 VG 6  T2 creek 2 VG 6 
T2 cigar 1 VG 6  T2 sill 2 VG 14 
T2 chilly 1 VG 14  T2 pillow 2 VG 14 
UD shirt 1 G   UD pen 2 G  
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UD music 1 G   UD angry 2 G  
UD fruit 1 G   UD man 2 G  
UD rubber 1 V   UD spider 2 V  
UD king 1 V   UD high 2 V  
UD car 1 V   UD bread 2 V  
UD lion 1 VG   UD black 2 VG  
UD thief 1 VG   UD girl 2 VG  
UD army 1 VG   UD flag 2 VG  
 
Procedure  
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1.  
Results 
Mood manipulation check 
Participants whose mood was not manipulated as intended were excluded from the 
analyses, resulting in 110 subjects (33 in the negative mood group, 39 in the neutral mood group, 
and 38 in the positive mood group).  Participants were excluded if the change in their valence 
rating from the pre-test to the post-test was more than 2 points in the direction opposite to the 
intended (e.g., participants in the positive group whose moods became substantially more 
negative), and participants were excluded if the change in their arousal rating from the pre-test to 
the post-test was more than two points (i.e., if there was a substantial increase in arousal). 
Analysis of the resulting 110 subjects revealed reliable differences in post-test valence for the 
three groups, F(2,109) = 347.34, p < .01, with valence being the highest for the positive group 
(M = 7.32, SD = .53), followed by the neutral group (M = 5.59, SD = .55), followed by the 
negative group (M = 3.21, SD  = .86).  Recall that these values are equivalent to those found in 
the previous study.  As expected, there were no significant differences in arousal among the three 
groups, F(2,109) = .86, ns. (Mpositive = 4.88, Mneutral = 4.31, Mnegative = 4.09).  
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Bias correction 
The effects of conjoint recognition question and mood on unrelated distractor acceptance 
were identified in order to determine the proper method of bias correction.  Two parallel 3 
(question: V, G, VG) x 3 (mood: positive, negative, neutral) analyses of variance (ANOVAs) 
were performed on the acceptance rates for unrelated distractors, separately for the immediate 
and the delayed tests.  There was a reliable main effect of question on the immediate test but not 
the delayed test (see Table 3.3 for descriptive statistics).  On the immediate test, unrelated 
distractor acceptance was higher in the G condition than the V condition, which was higher than 
the VG condition, F(2,214) = 19.20, p < .05.  On the delayed test the effect of question on 
unrelated distractors was not reliable, F(2,172) = 1.07, ns.  Because the unrelated distractor 
acceptance was affected by question, and because the question effect was not consistent over the 
delay period, the data were bias-corrected using the unrelated distractor acceptance rates 
separated by question and test.  All of the following analyses were conducted on the bias-
corrected values.   
Analysis of Standard True and False Memory 
As in Experiment 1, I began by investigating the effect of valence—and now the 
additional effect of list length—on standard true and false memory. Valence did not affect true 
memory on the immediate test, but it did have a marginal effect on false memory because 
negative moods (M = .29) reduced false memory compared to positive moods (M = .40), as in 
Experiment 1, F(2,107) = 4.12, p = .05.  Additionally, longer lists (M = .32) increased false 
memory compared to short lists (M = .24) on the delayed test, F(1,86) = 8.44, p < .05. There 
were no effects on true memory and there were no mood effects on false memory on the delayed 
test.  
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I also analyzed the effect of forgetting on true and false memory, by comparing true and 
false memory on the immediate test to true and false memory for delayed test items that had not 
been previously tested.  Forgetting affected true memory because it was higher on the immediate 
test (.31) than the delayed test (.13), F(1,86)= 44.93, p < .05.  Forgetting occurred for false 
memory as well, because it was higher on the immediate test (M = .34) than the delayed test (M 
= .27), F(1,86) = 4.98, p < .05.  This effect was driven by short lists, because long lists were 
remembered equivalently on both tests (.36 vs. .35) whereas false memory for short lists was 
higher on the immediate test (M = .32) compared to the delayed test (M = .16), F(1,86) = 5.38, p 
< .05. 
Main ANOVA Results 
Separate 3 (question: V, G, VG) x 3 (valence: negative, neutral, positive) x 2 (list length: 
short, long) ANOVAs were conducted on target and CD bias-corrected acceptance rates, 
separately for the immediate and delayed memory tests, with question and length as within-
subjects factors and valence as the between-subjects factor.    
 Immediate test.  Turning to targets first, the main effect of question revealed that target 
acceptance was highest in the VG condition (M = .48), followed by the V condition (M = .32), 
then the G condition (M = .13); all mean differences were reliable, F(2,214) = 34.41, p < .05.  
There was no main effect of valence, even though this effect was reliable in Experiment 1.   
 Moving on to CDs, on the immediate test the effect of question was reliable, as was the 
question x length interaction.  None of the other main effects or interactions were reliable.  The 
main effect of question was similar to the effect for targets: CD acceptance was higher in the VG 
condition (M = .59) than the V condition (M = .34) and the G condition (M = .29), F(2,214) = 
18.68, p < .05.  The question x length interaction (see Figure 4.1) revealed that CD acceptance 
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was higher for shorter lists compared to longer lists in the G condition, but the difference was not 
reliable in the other two conditions, F(2,214) = 4.34, p < .05.    
 
Figure 4.1. CD acceptance rate by question and length on the immediate test (Experiment 2). 
 Delayed test.  For targets the effect of question was such that target acceptance was 
greater in the VG condition (M = .33) than the V (M = .19) and G (M = .18) conditions, which 
did not differ, F(2,172) = 18.10, p < .05.  There was also a main effect of length, with target 
acceptance being higher for short lists (M = .28) than long lists (M = .24), F(1,86) = 14.28, p < 
.05.  Finally, there was a length x question interaction such that shorter lists increased target 
acceptance in the G condition (.31 versus .20) but not the V or VG condition, F(2,172) = 6.94, p 
< .05. 
For CDs there was a reliable main effect of question and a reliable main effect of length.  
The effect of question was such that CD acceptance was greater in the VG condition (M = .37) 
than the V (.28) and G conditions (M = .31), which did not differ, F(2,172) = 9.89, p < .05. The 
main effect of length occurred because CD acceptance was higher for longer lists (.34) than 
shorter lists (.30), F(1,86) = 7.78, p < .05.  
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Prior testing.  Another set of ANOVAs were conducted in order to compare acceptance 
rates of targets and critical distractors on the delayed test that had not been tested on the 
immediate test to targets and critical distractors on the delayed test that had been tested on the 
immediate test.  That is, this comparison was an analysis of the effect of prior testing, and applies 
only to items on the delayed test.  The design was thus two parallel 3 (question: V, G, VG) x 3 
(valence: negative, neutral, positive) x 2 (length: short, long) x 2 (times tested: once, twice) 
ANOVAs conducted on delayed test target and CD acceptance rates.   
Turning first to targets, there was a reliable interaction between prior testing and 
question, prior testing and length, as well as a reliable three-way interaction between prior 
testing, question, and length.  The question x prior testing interaction revealed that testing targets 
twice increased target acceptance in the V condition but reduced target acceptance in the G 
condition (see Figure 4.2), F(1,172) = 7.75, p < .05.   
 
Figure 4.2. Target acceptance rate by prior testing and question on the delayed test (Experiment 
2).   
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The length x prior testing interaction revealed that prior testing reduced target acceptance 
for short lists (.31 vs. .25) but increased target acceptance for long lists (.21 vs. .27), F(1,86) = 
27.28, p < .05.  The three-way interaction, shown in Figure 4.3, indicated that testing items twice 
increased target acceptance in the V condition for both list lengths, but reduced target acceptance 
in the G condition for short lists only, F(2,172) = 4.70, p < .05.  
 
 
Figure 4.3. Target acceptance rate by prior testing and question for short lists (panel A) and long 
lists (panel B) on the delayed test (Experiment 2).  
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Turning to CDs, the main effect of prior testing was reliable because prior testing 
increased CD acceptance (.29 versus .35), F(1,86) = 8.39, p < .05.  The question x prior testing 
and length x prior testing interactions were both reliable, as was the question x length x prior 
testing interaction.  As for question x prior testing, testing items twice reduced CD acceptance in 
the G condition and increased CD acceptance in the VG condition, but did not affect CD 
acceptance in the V condition, F(2,172) = 13.20, p < .05.  In terms of length, testing items twice 
increased CD acceptance for short lists but did not affect CD acceptance for long lists, F(2,172) 
= 37.83, p < .05.  The three-way interaction, shown in Figure 4.4, revealed that prior testing 
increased CD acceptance in all conditions for short lists, but reduced CD acceptance in the G 
condition for long lists, F(2,172) = 6.38, p < .05.   
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Figure 4.4. CD acceptance rate by question and list length for short lists (panel A) and long lists 
(panel B) on the delayed test (Experiment 2).  
Forgetting.  In order to measure subjects’ forgetting over the two-day delay period, 
additional ANOVAs were computed with test (immediate vs. delayed) as a factor, excluding 
items on the delayed test that were being tested for a second time.  That is, a comparison was 
made between items that were tested immediately after the study phase and items tested for the 
first time two days after the study phase.  The design was two parallel 3 (question: V, G, VG) x 3 
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(valence: negative, neutral, positive) x 2 (length: short, long) x 2 (test: immediate, delayed) 
ANOVAs conducted on target and CD acceptance rates.   
 Turning to targets first, the ANOVA yielded a reliable main effect of test, a test x 
question interaction, a test x length interaction, and a reliable three-way interaction between 
question, length, and test.  The target acceptance rate was higher on the immediate test (M = .31) 
than on the delayed test (M = .26), F(1,86) = 12.30, p < .05.  Note that this pattern the same as 
the pattern found in Experiment 1.  Furthermore, the test x question interaction again supported 
the prediction that verbatim memory traces would decline more rapidly over time, F(2,172) = 
18.02, p < .05 (see Figure 4.5): in the V (.31 vs. .13) and VG (.48 vs. .32) conditions, target 
acceptance was higher on the immediate test than on the delayed test but in the G condition 
target acceptance was lower on the immediate test (.18) than on the delayed test (.32).  
Forgetting did not impact short lists, but target acceptance for long lists declined over time (.32 
versus .21), F(1,86) = 16.31, p < .05.   
 
Figure 4.5. Forgetting of targets by question (Experiment 2).  
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Finally, the three-way interaction, shown in Figure 4.6, revealed that forgetting reduced 
target acceptance in the V condition for both list lengths, but target acceptance in the G condition 
increased over time for short lists but not long lists, F(2,172) = 5.31, p < .05. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Forgetting of targets by question for short lists (panel A) and long lists (panel B) in 
Experiment 2. 
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was similar to the effect on targets because the critical distractor acceptance rate decreased from 
the immediate (M = .41) to the delayed test (M = .29), F(1,86) = 13.75, p < .05.  The question x 
test interaction was similar—but not identical—to the effect for targets:  CD acceptance in the V 
and VG conditions declined over the delay while CD acceptance in the G remained stable over 
the delay, F(2,172) = 15.43, p < .05.  The effect of forgetting and list length on CDs was not the 
same as the effect on targets: Forgetting did not impact long lists (.41 vs. .36), but reduced CD 
acceptance for short lists (.40 vs. .23).  Finally, the question x length x test interaction, revealed 
that subjects experienced forgetting in all conditions for short lists, but for long lists they 
remembered more CDs over time in the G condition (see Figure 4.7), F(2,172) = 7.84, p < .05. 
Summary.  As in Experiment 1, negative moods reduced standard false memory 
compared to positive moods on the immediate test.  Unlike Experiment 1, mood did not affect 
true memory on the delayed test.  The new list length manipulation affected false memory, as 
predicted, but only on the delayed test, and did not impact true memory.  Longer lists resulted in 
more false memories than shorter lists after a delay, suggesting that longer lists strengthened gist 
memory more than short lists.  Forgetting occurred for both true and false memories, but the 
effect on false memories was driven by short lists.   
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Figure 4.7. Forgetting of CDs by question for short lists (panel A) and long lists (panel B) in 
Experiment 2.  
When all instructional conditions were considered, list length still did not affect target 
acceptance on the delayed test, but CD acceptance in the G condition was higher for short lists 
than long lists on the immediate test.  On the delayed test, target acceptance was higher for short 
lists compared to long lists, whereas the opposite was true for CDs.  The effect of repeated 
testing was also conditional on list length and the pattern was identical for targets and CDs:  
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Testing items twice increased acceptance for short lists—in all instructional conditions—but 
testing items twice reduced acceptance for long lists in the G condition.  
 Finally, even though forgetting resulted in lower levels of standard true and false memory 
over time, target acceptance in the G condition actually increased over time and CD acceptance 
in the G condition remained stable.  Furthermore, forgetting occurred for short lists but not for 
long lists, for both targets and CDs.  The increase in G condition acceptance for targets was 
driven by short lists, whereas the stability of G condition acceptance for CDs occurred because 
of increased G acceptance for long lists.   
Model Fits 
The model’s fit was evaluated by computing likelihood ratio tests, as was done in 
Experiment 1.  The G2 values for all of the conditions were again below 3.84, indicating that the 
model provided a statistically acceptable estimation of the data.    
Parameter Estimates 
Negative moods increased recollection rejection and reduced familiarity on the 
immediate test, consistent with the finding that negative moods reduced false memory.  
Similarly, longer lists reduced recollection rejection and increased familiarity compared to 
shorter lists on the delayed test, consistent with the fact that standard false memory was higher 
for longer lists.  Target acceptance was higher for short lists on the delayed test, which was 
driven by increased identity judgment.  
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Table 4.3 
Experiment 2 Parameter Estimates 
 RT FT PD RD FD βV βG βVG 
Immediate Test 
Short Positive .35 .19 .27 .26 .44 .42 .42 .29 
Short Negative .34 .19 .52 .26 .05 .24 .45 .24 
Short Neutral .31 .23 .24 .18 .41 .25 .39 .25 
Long Positive .37 .03 .34 .21 .49 .42 .42 .29 
Long Negative .31 .20 .53 .26 .46 .24 .45 .24 
Long Neutral .31 .19 .34 .08 .40 .25 .39 .25 
Positive .36 .11 .30 .22 .46 .42 .42 .29 
Negative .32 .19 .47 .26 .31 .24 .45 .24 
Neutral .31 .21 .31 .11 .40 .25 .39 .25 
Short .33 .20 .33 .21 .34 .28 .43 .28 
Long .33 .16 .39 .17 .44 .27 .43 .27 
Mean .33 .18 .35 .17 .40 .27 .43 .27 
Delayed Test 
Short Positive .23 .11 .19 .18 .30 .41 .39 .39 
Short Negative .19 .20 .24 .18 .19 .36 .31 .36 
Short Neutral .24 .11 .25 .24 .01 .40 .40 .41 
Long Positive .11 .21 .08 .03 .36 .41 .39 .39 
Long Negative .18 .18 .33 .21 .24 .37 .34 .34 
Long Neutral .20 .18 .27 .13 .29 40 .40 .41 
Positive .16 .18 .13 .11 .33 .41 .39 .39 
Negative .17 .20 .27 .19 .22 .36 .31 .36 
Neutral .22 .15 .26 .19 .16 .40 .40 .41 
Short .21 .14 .22 .20 .17 .39 .37 .39 
Long .16 .20 .21 .11 .31 .38 .38 .38 
Mean .19 .17 .22 .16 .24 .38 .38 .38 
Combined Across Both Tests 
Positive .24 .16 .19 .14 .37 .41 .41 .35 
Negative .23 .19 .35 .21 .23 .33 .35 .31 
Neutral .25 .17 .29 .16 .24 .35 .39 .35 
Short .30 .20 .21 .06 .02 .28 .43 .28 
Long .22 .19 .05 .14 .50 .38 .38 .34 
Short Positive .28 .12 .24 .21 .34 .41 .41 .35 
Short Negative .24 .18 .25 .23 .15 .35 .35 .31 
Short Neutral .27 .14 .19 .24 .12 .35 .39 .35 
Long Positive .21 .18 .15 .08 .38 .41 .41 .35 
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Long Negative .21 .19 .37 .23 .31 .35 .35 .31 
Long Neutral .24 .19 .30 .11 .33 .35 .39 .35 
 
Table 4.4 
Experiment 2 Prior Testing Parameter Estimates  
 RT FT PD RD FD βV βG βVG 
Not Previously Tested 
Positive .14 .04 .11 .09 .26 .41 .39 .38 
Negative .17 .03 .16 .19 .21 .36 .31 .36 
Neutral .21 .04 .14 .21 .09 .40 .40 .41 
Short .21 .00 .09 .14 .09 .39 .37 .39 
Long .13 .07 .06 .09 .39 .39 .37 .39 
Short Positive .22 .00 .09 .11 .18 .41 .39 .39 
Short Negative .17 .00 .21 .19 .09 .36 .31 .36 
Short Neutral .23 .04 .00 .12 .00 .39 .39 .41 
Long Positive .06 .08 .08 .00 .38 .42 .38 .38 
Long Negative .17 .06 .00 .16 .39 .36 .31 .36 
Long Neutral  .18 .04 .09 .13 .38 .40 .40 .41 
Mean .17 .04 .13 .16 .19 .39 .37 .39 
Previously Tested 
Positive .18 .30 .14 .12 .42 .41 .39 .39 
Negative .17 .35 .38 .19 .23 .36 .31 .36 
Neutral .23 .25 .38 .16 .24 .40 .40 .41 
Short .29 .28 .30 .14 .42 .28 .43 .28 
Long .26 .37 .42 .17 .31 .28 .43 .28 
Short Positive .23 .21 .14 .13 .50 .41 .39 .39 
Short Negative .19 .37 .18 .10 .36 .36 .31 .36 
Short Neutral .25 .16 .35 .18 .25 .40 .40 .41 
Long Positive .17 .35 .07 .06 .35 .41 .39 .39 
Long Negative .15 .31 .67 .31 .01 .36 .31 .36 
Long Neutral  .24 .31 .41 .16 .23 .40 .40 .41 
Mean .27 .33 .37 .15 .35 .28 .43 .28 
 
Consistent with the finding that repeated testing increased target and CD acceptance in all 
conditions for short lists, testing items twice increased identity and familiarity parameters, but 
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did not increase recollection rejection (see Table 4.4).  On the other hand, testing items twice 
reduced familiarity for long lists, consistent with the reduction in CD acceptance in the G 
condition for long lists.   
The parameter results were fairly consistent with the ANOVAs for forgetting as well.  
Estimates of identity judgment declined over time, which is consistent with the reduction in true 
memory.  For short lists, CD acceptance declined in the V and G condition, and recollection 
rejection and familiarity both declined over time.  For long lists, CD acceptance in the G 
condition remained stable over time, and familiarity remained stable while recollection rejection 
decreased with time.  
Discussion 
Experiment 2 showed that negative moods reduce false memory compared to positive 
moods immediately after list presentation, as in the first study.   Experiment 1 also showed that 
negative moods increased true memory after a delay, an effect that was not replicated here.  The 
true memory result in Experiment 1 may have been simply an artifact of bias correction because 
target acceptance in the V condition was unusually low.  Experiment 2 also provided the 
additional new result that longer lists increased false memory after a delay by reducing 
recollection rejection and increasing familiarity.  Again, this result is consistent with the 
established idea that shorter lists favor verbatim processing and longer lists favor gist processing 
(Sugrue & Hayne, 2006).   
Although at first glance it appears that the effect of mood on false memory was the same 
in the present study as it was in the first study, inspection of the parameters reveals otherwise.  
Recall that in Experiment 1, negative mood reduced false memory because it increased identity 
judgment compared to positive moods; none of the other parameters were reliably different as a 
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function of mood.  In Experiment 2, however, negative mood increased recollection rejection and 
reduced familiarity, but did not impact identity judgment.  The only difference between 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 was the length of the study lists and indeed, further unpacking of 
the parameter estimates provides some evidence that the different processes now causing mood 
effects are related to the new list lengths.  In that connection, the reduction in familiarity for 
negative moods was entirely driven by short lists.  Conversely, the increase in recollection 
rejection was primarily driven by long lists more than short lists.  On short lists negative moods 
increased recollection rejection compared to neutral moods, but they did not increase recollection 
rejection compared to positive moods.  On long lists, however, negative moods increased 
recollection rejection compared to positive moods and especially compared to neutral moods.   
This processing difference between the first and second studies—even though the effect 
on false memory was the same—suggests that subjects using a verbatim processing style as a 
result of negative mood will be affected by whether the study items further encourage verbatim 
processing or whether they encourage gist processing instead.  When encouraged to use verbatim 
processing on short lists, subjects in negative moods will have extremely low levels of 
familiarity because verbatim traces are particularly strong.  On the other hand, subjects in 
negative moods who are encouraged to use gist processing by long lists will be better able to 
reject CDs than their counterparts using gist processing with less ability to reject CDs.  
Across list lengths, the effects of prior testing and forgetting were the same as in 
Experiment 1, and the associated parameter differences were similar, especially for prior testing:  
Repeated testing increased target and CD acceptance by increasing identity judgment, phantom 
recollection, and familiarity, while not impacting recollection rejection.  Forgetting reduced 
identity judgment, as in Experiment 2, but also reduced recollection rejection and familiarity.   
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However, repeated testing impacted memory for short and long lists differently, because 
it increased G condition acceptance for short lists, but it reduced G condition acceptance for long 
lists.  The different pattern for short and long lists was primarily driven by the fact that 
familiarity was much higher for untested items from long lists compared to short lists, such that 
short lists had more room for an increase and long lists had more room for a decrease in 
familiarity as a result of repeated testing.  This effect remains consistent with the relative 
contributions of verbatim and gist processing to short and long lists, respectively, as well as the 
idea that repeated testing is a verbatim effect.  For long lists, gist traces will be stronger initially 
due to the many associated targets presented.  If verbatim traces are strengthened by repeated 
testing it may result in lower G condition acceptance.  For short lists, on the other hand, gist 
traces will be much weaker initially and may be strengthened by repeated testing.  
Similarly, although the overall forgetting effect was the same as in Experiment 1, 
forgetting impacted short and long lists differently.  Forgetting of both targets and CDs occurred 
for short lists but not long lists, which was driven by declines in identity judgment on the target 
side and declines in familiarity on the CD side.  It appears that the stronger gist activation created 
by longer lists was more robust to forgetting.  Furthermore, target acceptance in the G condition 
increased over time and CD acceptance in the G condition remained stable.  If familiarity is 
strong for CDs right away, these strong gist traces would remain intact over two days.  In the 
case of targets, it is possible that the decay of verbatim memory traces with time allowed for 
increased retrieval of gist traces.  This would lead to increased acceptance in the G condition if 
verbatim traces were unavailable and subjects could not remember that a target had been 
presented, but did remember the theme of the list. 
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The results of Experiment 2 are generally consistent with the hypotheses that negative 
moods promote verbatim processing and that the additional manipulations are generally verbatim 
manipulations as well.  Mood effects have been isolated to the immediate test and it is possible 
that a stronger mood manipulation could create more robust mood effects that persist over the 
two-day delay period.  Alternatively, the addition of increased arousal may affect the pattern of 
mood effects on the immediate test.  If increased arousal increases false memory to the extent 
that negative moods no longer reduce false memory compared to neutral moods, it would 
indicate a valence-arousal interaction that is consistent with predictions of FTT.  If increased 
arousal reduces false memory for negative moods but increases false memory for positive 
moods, that would be consistent with predictions of AAI.  The third experiment addressed these 
possibilities via a mood manipulation that created higher levels of arousal.   
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENT 3: EFFECT OF HIGH-AROUSAL MOOD ON TRUE AND FALSE MEMORY 
FOR NEUTRAL WORDS 
 In Studies 1 and 2, mood effects were limited to the immediate test, and positive moods 
increased false memory while negative moods decreased false memory, relative to neutral 
moods.  Experiment 3 tested the hypothesis that mood effects on false memory could be 
strengthened or altered by increasing arousal from low levels to moderate to high levels.  It also 
addressed the prediction that increasing arousal would affect the processes contributing to true 
and false memory as a function of valence.     
Method 
Participants 
 98 subjects participated in exchange for course credit (71 women).  Their ages ranged 
from 18-27 (Mage = 20.41, SD = 1.60).  34 subjects were in the negative group, 37 were in the 
neutral group, and 27 were in the positive group after excluding those whose mood was 
inconsistent with the manipulation.   
Materials and Procedure 
 The mood induction materials were identical to those used in Pilot 3 (note that in 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 the mood induction materials from Pilot 2 were used).  Aside 
from the videos used in the mood induction, the materials and procedure were identical to those 
used in Experiment 2.  That is, the same short and long word lists were used, but the high arousal 
positive and negative videos were used in place of the low arousal videos.  The neutral video 
remained the same. 
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Results 
Mood Manipulation Check 
ANOVAs were conducted to determine whether the mood manipulation resulted in a) 
reliable valence differences between all three groups, b) higher arousal in the negative and 
positive groups compared to the neutral group, and c) equivalent arousal in the positive and 
negative groups.  The results confirmed that the manipulation was effective in satisfying all three 
conditions.  Post-manipulation valence ratings were highest for the positive group (M = 7.33, SD 
= .82), followed by the neutral group (M = 5.22, SD = .51), which was followed by the negative 
group (M = 2.44, SD = .71), F(2,97) = 33.65, p < .05.  Note that the valence levels for the 
positive and neutral group are equivalent to those found in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, but 
the negative group in the present study experienced a slightly lowered valence level than those in 
the previous two studies.  This difference is likely a result of the elevated arousal levels, as 
valence and arousal are sometimes correlated at more extreme valences (see Mattek, Wolford, & 
Whalen, 2017).  In other words, when arousal is increased negative moods may become more 
strongly negative.   
Post-manipulation arousal ratings were higher for the negative group (M = 5.71, SD = 
1.03) and the positive group (M = 6.04, SD = 1.67) than the neutral group (M = 4.30, SD = .73), 
F(2,97) = 19.21, p < .05, but arousal did not differ between the two emotional groups.  Note that 
these levels of arousal are higher than those found for the positive and negative valence groups in 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.  
Bias correction 
The effects of conjoint recognition question and mood on unrelated distractor acceptance 
were identified.  Two parallel 3 (question: V, G, VG) x 3 (mood: positive, negative, neutral) 
 94 
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were performed on the acceptance rates for unrelated 
distractors, separately for the immediate and the delayed tests.  There was a reliable main effect 
of question on the immediate test but not the delayed test, and no effects of valence on either test.  
On the immediate test, unrelated distractor acceptance was higher in the VG condition than the V 
and G conditions, which did not differ from each other, F(2,302) = 10.08, p < .05 (see Table 3.3 
for descriptive statistics). Because the unrelated distractor acceptance was affected by question, 
and because the effect of question was not consistent over the delay, the data were bias-corrected 
using the unrelated distractor acceptance rates separated by question and test.  All of the 
following analyses were conducted on the bias-corrected values.   
Analysis of Standard True and False Memory 
Neither mood nor length affected true memory on the immediate test.  False memory, 
however, was affected by the interaction between list length and valence on the immediate test, 
F(2,95) = 6.28, p < .05.  There were no reliable mood effects on false memory for long lists, but 
for short lists positive moods (.62) increased false memory compared to negative moods (.47), 
which increased false memory compared to neutral moods (.29).  There was no main effect of 
valence on false memory, unlike in Experiment 1 and 2.  
There were no main effects of valence on true or false memory on the delayed test.  
However, forgetting occurred for true memory, as it declined from .32 on the immediate test to 
.17 on the delayed test, F(1.95) = 30.99, p < .05.  Forgetting occurred for false memory as well, 
as it declined from .42 to .25, F(1,95) = 27.88, p < .05.  This effect was driven by short lists 
because false memory for short lists declined over time (.46 vs. .19) but false memory for long 
lists remained stable over time (.38 vs. .32), F(1,95) = 14.39, p < .05.  There was also a marginal 
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main effect of valence in the forgetting analysis, because subjects in the positive group (.41) had 
more false memories than subjects in the neutral group (.27), F(1,95) = 3.17, p = .05.  
Main ANOVA Results 
Four separate 3 (question: V, G, VG) x 3 (mood: negative, neutral, positive) x 2 (list 
length: short, long) ANOVAs were conducted on target and CD bias-corrected acceptance rates, 
separately for the immediate and delayed memory tests, with question and length as within-
subjects factors and mood as the between-subjects factor.    
 Immediate test.  Turning to targets first, the main effect of question revealed that target 
acceptance was highest in the VG condition (M = .45), followed by the V condition (M = .32), 
then the G condition (M = .19); all mean differences were reliable, F(2,302) = 29.27, p < .05.  
There were no mood effects. 
 Moving on to CDs, acceptance was highest in the VG condition (M = .55), followed by 
the V condition (M = .42), and finally the G condition (M = .27); all mean differences were 
reliable, F(2,190) = 24.25, p < .05.  Furthermore there was a length x valence interaction, 
indicating neutral moods reduced CD acceptance compared to emotional moods for short lists 
but not for long lists (see Figure 5.1), F(2,95) = 5.21, p < .05.   
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Figure 5.1. CD acceptance by valence and list length on the immediate test in Experiment 3. 
Finally, the three-way interaction was marginally significant, showing that positive 
moods increased CD acceptance in the V condition compared to negative and neutral moods, but 
only for short lists (see Figure 5.2), F(4,190) = 2.48, p = .05.  
Delayed test.  For targets there was a main effect of question, F(2,302) = 12.65, p < .05, 
revealing that the effect of question was such that target acceptance was greater in the VG 
condition (M = .33) than the V (M = .24) and G (M = .19) conditions, which did not differ.  
Target acceptance was higher for short lists (.30) than long lists (.26) as in Experiment 2, F(1.95) 
= 11.44, p < .05.  Finally, shorter lists increased target acceptance in the G condition but not in 
other conditions, as in Experiment 2, F(2,190) = 12.12, p < .05. 
For CDs there was a reliable main effect of question, F(2,188) = 20.87, p < .05, such that 
CD acceptance was greater in the VG condition (M = .42) than the V (M = .31) and G conditions 
(M = .27).  No other effects were reliable.  
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Figure 5.2. CD acceptance by valence and question for short lists (panel A) and long lists (panel 
B) on the immediate test in Experiment 3.  
Prior testing.  Another set of ANOVAs were conducted in order to compare acceptance 
rates of targets and critical distractors on the delayed test that had not been tested on the 
immediate test to targets and critical distractors on the delayed test that had been tested on the 
immediate test.  That is, this comparison was an analysis of the effect of prior testing, and applies 
only to items on the delayed test.  The design was thus two parallel 3 (question: V, G, VG) x 3 
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(mood: negative, neutral, positive) x 2 (length: short, long) x 2 (times tested: once, twice) 
ANOVAs conducted on delayed test target and CD acceptance rates.   
Turning first to targets, there was a reliable effect of prior testing, because targets that 
were tested twice (M = .29) were more likely to be accepted than targets that were only tested 
once (M = .22), F(1,151) = 41.99, p < .05.  Furthermore, there were several reliable interactions.  
The question x prior testing interaction revealed that testing targets twice increased target 
acceptance in the V condition but in not the G condition, where the reverse was true, F(2,302) = 
7.58, p < .05.  Prior testing increased target acceptance for long lists (.22 vs. .29) but not short 
lists (.31 vs. .30), F(1,95) = 14.98, p < .05.  Note that in Experiment 2 prior testing increased 
target acceptance for long lists and reduced it for short lists.  The three-way interaction, shown in 
Figure 5.3, indicated that testing items twice increased target acceptance in the V condition for 
short lists only, but testing items twice reduced target acceptance in the G condition for short 
lists only, F(2,302) = 8.75, p < .05.  Testing items twice increased target acceptance in the VG 
condition for long lists only.  Note that this pattern differs from the one found in Experiment 2 
(see Figure 4.3), where testing items twice increased target acceptance in all conditions for short 
lists, but reduced target acceptance in the G condition for long lists.  
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Figure 5.3. Target acceptance rate by prior testing and question for short lists (panel A) and long 
lists (panel B) on the delayed test (Experiment 3). 
Turning now to CDs, the main effect of prior testing was reliable because CDs were more 
likely to be accepted when tested twice (M = .37) rather than once (M = .30), F(1,188) = 9.06, p 
< .05.  Furthermore, there were several reliable interactions. First, testing items twice increased 
CD acceptance in the V and VG conditions, but not the G condition, F(2,188) = 5.45, p < .05.  In 
terms of length, testing items twice increased CD acceptance for short lists and did not affect CD 
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acceptance for long lists, F(1,94) = 26.19, p < .05.  Prior testing also increased CD acceptance 
for negative and neutral moods, but not positive moods, F(2,94) = 2.93, p = .06 (see Figure 5.4).  
Note that this effect was not present in Experiment 2, when arousal was low.   
 
Figure 5.4. CD acceptance rate by mood and prior testing (Experiment 3). 
Finally, the three-way interaction between length, question, and prior testing, shown in 
Figure 5.5, revealed that for short lists testing items twice increased CD acceptance in the V 
condition, but for long lists testing items twice reduced CD acceptance in the G condition, 
F(2,188) = 8.02, p < .05.  Note that this interaction is similar to the parallel interaction in 
Experiment 2 (see Figure 4.4).  The main difference is that here, the effect of prior testing was 
not reliable in the G and VG conditions for short lists, but the increase was reliable in 
Experiment 2.  
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Figure 5.5. CD acceptance rate by question and prior testing for short lists (panel A) and long 
lists (panel B) on the delayed test (Experiment 3). 
Forgetting.  In order to measure subjects’ forgetting over the two-day delay period, 
additional ANOVAs were computed with test (immediate vs. delayed) as a factor, excluding 
items on the delayed test that were being tested for a second time.  That is, a comparison was 
made between items that were tested immediately after the study phase and items tested for the 
first time two days after the study phase.  The design was thus two parallel 3 (question: V, G, 
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VG) x 3 (mood: negative, neutral, positive) x 2 (length: short, long) x 2 (test: immediate, 
delayed) ANOVAs conducted on target and CD acceptance rates.   
 The target acceptance rate was higher on the immediate test (M = .32) than on the 
delayed test (M = .26), F(1,95) = 29.98, p < .05.  Note that this is the same pattern observed in 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.  Furthermore, the test x question interaction was consistent with 
the previous experiments: In the V and VG conditions, target acceptance was higher on the 
immediate test than on the delayed test but in the G condition target acceptance increased over 
the delay, F(2,190) = 14.17, p < .05 (see Figure 5.6, panel A).  Target acceptance furthermore 
declined over the delay for long lists (.33 vs. .22) but not short lists (.31 vs. .31), as in 
Experiment 2, F(1,95) = 20.84, p < .05.   
Finally, the three-way interaction, shown in Figure 5.7, revealed that forgetting reduced 
target acceptance in the V and VG conditions for both list lengths, but in the G condition target 
acceptance increased over time for short lists and remained stable for long lists, similar to the 
effect in Experiment 2, F(2,190) = 15.44, p < .05.   
As for critical distractors, the main effect of test, the question x test interaction, the length 
x test interaction, and the three-way interaction were all reliable.  The main effect of test was 
similar to the effect on targets because the critical distractor acceptance rate decreased from the 
immediate (M = .41) to the delayed test (M = .30), F(1,150) = 28.45, p < .05.  The question x test 
interaction was similar to the effect for targets: CD acceptance in the V and VG conditions 
declined over the delay while CD acceptance in the G condition remained stable over the delay 
(see Figure 5.6, panel B), F(2,300) = 8.91, p < .05.  The length x test interaction occurred 
because CD acceptance was reduced over the delay for short lists (.43 vs. .26) but not for long 
lists (.40 vs. .34), F(1,94) = 11.94, p < .05. 
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Figure 5.6. Forgetting of targets (panel A) and CDs (panel B) by question in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 5.7. Forgetting of targets by question for short lists (panel A) and long lists (panel B) in 
Experiment 3.  
 Furthermore, the three-way question x length x test interaction was also reliable, F(2,188) 
= 4.47, p < .05 (see Figure 5.8).  CD acceptance declined in all conditions for short lists, but 
declined only in the VG condition for long lists.  Note that this pattern is quite similar to the 
parallel interaction in Experiment 2 (see Figure 4.7).   
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Figure 5.8. Forgetting of CDs by question for short lists (panel A) and long lists (panel B) in 
Experiment 3. 
Summary.  Valence did not affect standard true memory in Experiment 3, consistent 
with prior research, but there were false memory effects on the immediate test that differed from 
the previous two studies.  Valence did not affect false memory for long lists, but for short lists 
subjects in positive moods experienced more false memory than subjects in negative moods, who 
experienced more false memory than subjects in neutral moods on the immediate test.  Mood 
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valence did not affect CD acceptance in the G and VG conditions, suggesting that mood effects 
on false memory are related to verbatim retrieval, particularly when arousal is high.   
On the delayed test, target acceptance was higher for short lists than long lists, especially 
in the G condition, as was the case in Experiment 2.  Prior testing increased target acceptance in 
the V condition for short lists but reduced target acceptance in the G condition for short lists.  In 
Experiment 2, on the other hand, prior testing increased target acceptance in the G condition for 
short lists but reduced target acceptance in the G condition for long lists.  In other words, the 
effect of repeated testing on G condition target acceptance varied for both list lengths, 
presumably because of differences in arousal.   
As for CDs on the delayed test, there was no length effect such as the one found in 
Experiment 2.  Prior testing, however, had effects on CDs that were similar to Experiment 2, 
with the important addition of a mood effect in Experiment 3: Prior testing increased CD 
acceptance for negative and neutral moods, but not positive moods.   
The pattern of forgetting of standard true and false memory was identical to the pattern in 
Experiment 2, although here there was an additional valence effect because false memory was 
higher for subjects in positive moods than neutral moods.  Forgetting in all conditions was also 
similar to Experiment 2, for both targets and CDs. There was again forgetting of CDs in all 
conditions for short lists, but here the only decline for long lists occurred in the VG condition.  In 
Experiment 2, CD acceptance also increased in the G condition for long lists; here the pattern of 
means was the same but the difference was not reliable.  
Model Fits 
The model’s fit was evaluated by computing likelihood ratio tests in the same manner it 
was done for the previous two studies.  As in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, the G2 values for 
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all of the conditions were below 3.84, indicating that the model provided a statistically 
acceptable estimation of the data.    
Parameter Estimates 
 Inspection of the parameter estimates in Table 5.1 reveals some potential explanations for 
the effect of mood on false memory for short lists on the immediate test.  Recollection rejection 
was lower for positive moods compared to neutral moods and both phantom recollection and 
familiarity were highest for negative moods.  These results suggest that increased false memory 
in positive moods was driven by weaker verbatim traces whereas increased false memory in 
negative moods was driven by stronger gist traces.  False memory was higher for positive moods 
than negative moods, suggesting that the verbatim effect was stronger than the gist effect.   
Prior testing increased target acceptance in the V condition, and the modeling analysis 
showed that prior testing increased estimates of identity judgment and familiarity (see Table 5.2).  
As for CDs, prior testing increased acceptance for negative and neutral moods but not positive 
moods, an effect that appears to be driven by both phantom recollection and familiarity.  
Furthermore, prior testing also reduced recollection rejection for negative moods. Thus, 
increased CD acceptance due to prior testing in negative moods was driven by both verbatim and 
gist retrieval, whereas it was driven only by gist retrieval in neutral moods.  
Finally, forgetting reduced both verbatim and gist CD acceptance for short lists, because 
familiarity declined over the delay and recollection rejection increased.  In Experiment 2, the 
general forgetting effect was similar, but both recollection rejection and familiarity declined over 
time.   
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Table 5.1 
Experiment 3 Parameter Estimates 
 RT FT PD RD FD βV βG βVG 
Immediate Test 
Short Positive .28 .28 .27 .09 .36 .24 .41 .32 
Short Negative .26 .28 .40 .13 .52 .39 .39 .22 
Short Neutral .22 .20 .25 .18 .32 .31 .35 .27 
Long Positive .31 .21 .41 .17 .41 .24 .37 .37 
Long Negative .32 .23 .20 .11 .45 .38 .29 .22 
Long Neutral .17 .37 .35 .08 .41 .33 .33 .27 
Positive .27 .28 .32 .10 .37 .23 .41 .35 
Negative .27 .26 .28 .12 .49 .38 .41 .22 
Neutral .20 .29 .30 .10 .38 .33 .33 .27 
Short .26 .18 .32 .17 .32 .41 .41 .28 
Long .29 .20 .37 .16 .38 .41 .41 .28 
Mean .27 .26 .31 .11 .40 .29 .39 .29 
Delayed Test 
Short Positive .14 .26 .32 .22 .14 .40 .34 .40 
Short Negative .18 .22 .27 .18 .25 .41 .38 .38 
Short Neutral .18 .03 .37 .30 .05 .39 .39 .31 
Long Positive .13 .23 .30 .18 .36 .40 .34 .40 
Long Negative .20 .23 .32 .14 .24 .41 .38 .38 
Long Neutral .12 .17 .22 .11 .24 .39 .39 .31 
Positive .14 .24 .31 .20 .26 .40 .34 .40 
Negative .19 .22 .30 .16 .25 .41 .38 .38 
Neutral .15 .11 .27 .20 .17 .39 .39 .31 
Short .17 .18 .33 .23 .14 .38 .38 .36 
Long .15 .21 .27 .13 .29 .38 .38 .36 
Tested .19 .31 .36 .17 .35 .38 .38 .36 
Untested .12 .08 .22 .20 .11 .39 .37 .37 
Mean .17 .22 .29 .18 .23 .39 .37 .37 
Combined Across Both Tests 
Positive .19 .25 .32 .17 .30 .36 .36 .37 
Negative .23 .24 .31 .15 .33 .39 .39 .33 
Neutral .16 .17 .28 .16 .25 .37 .37 .30 
Short .21 .17 .34 .22 .19 .39 .39 .34 
Long .14 .20 .23 .09 .30 .39 .39 .44 
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Table 5.2 
Experiment 3 Prior Testing Parameter Estimates  
 RT FT PD RD FD βV βG βVG 
Not Previously Tested 
Positive .00 .14 .24 .20 .21 .40 .34 .40 
Negative .17 .08 .20 .19 .15 .40 .37 .40 
Neutral .09 .02 .24 .22 .02 .39 .39 .31 
Short .16 .03 .23 .18 .01 .38 .38 .36 
Long .11 .10 .17 .11 .29 .38 .38 .36 
Short Positive .13 .13 .19 .18 .10 .40 .34 .40 
Short Negative .21 .01 .10 .15 .13 .41 .38 .38 
Short Neutral .11 .00 .24 .21 .00 .34 .41 .34 
Long Positive .12 .11 .15 .13 .44 .40 .34 .40 
Long Negative .16 .09 .29 .20 .17 .41 .38 .38 
Long Neutral  .04 .10 .18 .12 .18 .39 .39 .31 
Mean .12 .08 .22 .20 .11 .39 .37 .37 
Previously Tested 
Positive .15 .35 .28 .20 .40 .40 .34 .40 
Negative .19 .36 .36 .11 .37 .40 .37 .40 
Neutral .22 .21 .60 .18 .18 .39 .39 .31 
Short .17 .31 .28 .19 .43 .38 .38 .36 
Long .20 .31 .41 .20 .31 .38 .38 .36 
Short Positive .15 .36 .00 .19 .58 .40 .34 .40 
Short Negative .11 .37 .30 .25 .49 .41 .38 .38 
Short Neutral .25 .16 .71 .14 .00 .39 .39 .31 
Long Positive .16 .33 .46 .25 .32 .40 .34 .40 
Long Negative .25 .36 .36 .12 .28 .41 .38 .38 
Long Neutral  .21 .25 .32 .14 .45 .39 .39 .31 
Mean .18 .31 .36 .17 .35 .38 .38 .36 
 
Discussion 
Mood affected false memory for short lists but not long lists on the immediate test.  False 
memory was highest for subjects in positive moods, followed by negative moods, followed by 
neutral moods.  In the first two studies, false memory was higher for positive moods than 
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negative moods, with neutral moods falling in between.  Therefore, increased levels of arousal 
caused an increase in false memory, lessening the reduction in false memory as a result of 
negative valence.  Furthermore, the fact that false memory differed for positive and negative 
moods even though arousal was equivalent in those groups indicates that valence contributed to 
differences in false memory as well, even when arousal was high.  The likely explanation for this 
difference is reduced recollection rejection for subjects in positive moods. 
The reason for the increased false memory in the negative mood group was related to 
increased phantom recollection and familiarity.  In the first two studies, phantom recollection did 
not differ as a function of mood, indicating that increased phantom recollection is related to 
increased arousal.  The increase in recollection rejection and identity judgment for negative 
moods observed in the first two studies did not occur here, again suggesting that elevating 
arousal changes the nature of processing in negative moods.  In particular, the difference in 
parameter results across the three studies suggests that, consistent with predictions of FTT, 
arousal reduces verbatim processing.  This proposition will be tested more directly in Experiment 
4.   
It should also be emphasized that the mood effect and its corresponding processes were 
isolated to short lists.  Familiarity was consistently high across all three moods for long lists, and 
phantom recollection was highest for positive moods.  The explanation for familiarity is clear: 
longer lists produce ceiling levels of familiarity, but shorter lists, which do not invoke familiarity 
to begin with, will have their familiarity levels raised by higher levels of arousal.  As for 
phantom recollection, it may be particularly high for subjects in positive moods, for long lists, 
because of the effect of gist processing in positive moods combining with the strong gist 
produced by long lists, resulting in strong gist traces.   
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The effect of repeated testing on CDs was generally similar to the effect in Experiment 2, 
where repeated testing increased familiarity.  Here, repeated testing increased both familiarity 
and phantom recollection (gist processes) for subjects in negative and neutral moods. Although 
this strong gist effect is a somewhat puzzling result for neutral moods, increased phantom 
recollection for negative moods is consistent with an arousal-based explanation.  If higher 
arousal impairs storage of verbatim traces, then testing items immediately may lead to later 
confusing them with studied items and may result in higher levels of CD acceptance when they 
are tested for a second time.  Whereas the repeated testing effect is driven by familiarity when 
arousal is low, heightened arousal may lead to even stronger feelings that items have been 
actually presented, resulting in phantom recollection.   
The results of Experiment 3 provide evidence that arousal contributes to false memory, 
but that valence effects may remain even when arousal is elevated.  The story so far is therefore 
that valence can affect false memory on its own, when arousal is controlled at a low level, and 
additionally that arousal can contribute to valence effects on false memory.  However, the mood 
groups used in the present study do not allow for clear conclusions about the effects of arousal 
on false memory without any potential role of valence.  The final piece of the puzzle will be to 
determine whether arousal affects false memory on its own, and in what way, when valence 
levels are controlled.  This question was addressed in the final study.   
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CHAPTER 6 
EXPERIMENT 4: EFFECT OF AROUSAL ON TRUE AND FALSE MEMORY FOR 
NEUTRAL WORDS 
The mood manipulation used in Experiment 3 created moderate to high levels of arousal 
that were equivalent across the positive and negative mood groups.  Although there was evidence 
that higher levels of arousal increased false memory, valence impacted false memory as well.  To 
directly assess differences in arousal, while controlling for valence, it is necessary to compare 
three groups that differ in arousal but not in valence.  Mirandola and Toffalini (2016) 
demonstrated that predetermined mood groups are not necessarily the best way to measure mood 
effects.  Rather, they found that subjective ratings of arousal were better predictors of memory 
because of individual variation in arousal experienced within each group.  There was not huge 
variability in valence experienced in response to the MIP, but arousal may be more subject to 
individual differences in responses to the MIP.  Using the procedure Mirandola and Toffalini 
implemented, I similarly used subjective arousal ratings to compare three groups of subjects, 
with low, medium, and high arousal at the time of encoding.  In other words, Experiment 4 
involved a reclassification of the subjects from Experiment 3 into new arousal groups (rather 
than new data from a new group of subjects). 
Method 
Subjects from Experiment 3 were assigned to one of three arousal groups based on their 
post-induction subjective arousal ratings.   
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Results 
Mood Manipulation Check 
ANOVAs were conducted to confirm that the three new mood groups resulted in a) 
reliable arousal differences between all three groups and b) equivalent valence across all three 
groups.  Post-manipulation arousal ratings were highest for the high group (M = 6.42, SD = .70), 
followed by the medium group (M = 4.51, SD = .51), which was followed by the low group (M = 
2.85, SD = .56), F(2,97) = 21.79, p < .05.  Post-manipulation valence ratings were statistically 
equivalent (Mlow = 4.68, Mmedium = 4.40, Mhigh = 5.18), F(2,97) = 1.49, ns.   
Bias Correction 
The effects of conjoint recognition question and mood on unrelated distractor acceptance 
were identified in order to determine the proper method of bias correction.  Two parallel 3 
(question: V, G, VG) x 3 (arousal: low, medium, high) analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were 
performed on the acceptance rates for unrelated distractors, separately for the immediate and the 
delayed tests.  Arousal did not impact URD acceptance on either test.   
Analysis of Standard True and False Memory 
False memory was higher for subjects with high arousal (M = .46) compared to those 
with low arousal (M = .36) on the immediate test (false memory for medium arousal did not 
differ reliably from the other two groups), F(2,95) = 3.26, p < .05.  This result suggests that 
arousal is sufficient to produce effects on false memory, and valence differences are not 
necessary to detect mood effects on false memory.  There were no other reliable effects. 
Main ANOVA Results 
Four separate 3 (question: V, G, VG) x 3 (arousal: low, medium, high) x 2 (list length: 
short, long) ANOVAs were conducted on target and CD bias-corrected acceptance rates, 
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separately for the immediate and delayed memory tests, with question and length as within-
subjects factors and arousal as the between-subjects factor.  Additional ANOVAs were 
conducted to measure forgetting and prior testing effects, as in the first three experiments. The 
results described below only include effects of arousal, as the other effects were consistent with 
the preceding studies.   
 Immediate test.  There were no arousal effects for targets or CDs on the immediate test 
when all three instructional conditions were included in the analysis. This was because arousal 
influenced CD acceptance in the V condition as described in the previous section, but differences 
in CD acceptance were no longer reliable when the G and VG conditions were considered.  
Delayed test. There was an arousal x length interaction for targets, F(2,95) = 3.98, p < 
.05.  As shown in Figure 6.1, this interaction occurred because medium and high arousal 
improved target acceptance compared to low arousal, but only for short lists. 
 
Figure 6.1.  Target acceptance rate by length and arousal on the delayed test (Experiment 4).  
There was a three-way interaction between arousal, length, and prior testing for CDs, 
F(2,84) = 4.36, p < .05.  Prior testing had the greatest effect on subjects with low arousal, 
.49 .54.59 .55.62 .57
.00
.10
.20
.30
.40
.50
.60
.70
Short Long
Ta
rg
et
 A
cc
ep
ta
n
ce
 R
at
e
Low Medium High
 115 
increasing CD acceptance for both list lengths (see Figure 6.2).  Repeated testing did not impact 
subjects with high arousal, and impacted subjects with medium arousal by only increasing 
acceptance of CDs from short lists.   
 
 
Figure 6.2. CD acceptance rate by arousal and prior testing for short lists (Panel A) and long lists 
(Panel B) on the delayed test (Experiment 4). 
Finally, the effect of forgetting depicted in Figure 6.3 depended on arousal and CR 
instruction, F(4,188) = 3.01, p < .05.  Subjects at all levels of arousal experienced forgetting in 
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the V condition but not the G condition; subjects with low and medium arousal experienced 
forgetting in the VG condition but subjects with high arousal did not.  Furthermore, CD 
acceptance was higher in the V than the G condition on the immediate test for subjects with 
medium and high arousal.  On the delayed test, however, CD acceptance in the V condition had 
declined and became equivalent to G condition acceptance at all arousal levels.    
Summary.  High arousal increased false memory compared to low arousal on the 
immediate test.  When analyses were extended to all instructional conditions, arousal did not 
impact CD acceptance on the immediate test, nor did it affect target acceptance.  On the delayed 
test, however, medium arousal levels increased acceptance of targets from short lists compared 
to low arousal.  Arousal did not impact CD acceptance overall on the delayed test, but it was 
affected by prior testing and forgetting.  When arousal was high, prior testing had no effect, but 
when arousal was low prior testing increased CD acceptance.  At moderate arousal levels, prior 
testing only increased CD acceptance for short lists.  Subjects at all levels of arousal experienced 
forgetting in the V condition but did not experience forgetting in the G condition; only subjects 
with medium and low arousal experienced forgetting in the VG condition.   
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Figure 6.3. Forgetting of CDs by CD instruction for low (panel A), medium (panel B), and high 
(panel C) arousal moods in Experiment 4.  
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Model Fits 
The model’s fit was evaluated by computing likelihood ratio tests in the same manner it 
was done for the previous three studies.  The G2 values for all of the conditions were below 3.84, 
indicating that the model provided a statistically acceptable estimation of the data.    
Parameter Estimates 
High arousal increased standard false memory on the immediate test by increasing 
phantom recollection compared to low arousal, as shown in Table 6.1.  This parameter difference 
was no longer reliable on the delayed test, consistent with the fact that arousal did not impact 
false memory on the delayed test.  For targets on the delayed test, medium arousal levels 
increased acceptance compared to low arousal for short lists because of increased familiarity 
(identity judgment estimates were equivalent).  
For CDs on the delayed test, list length affected whether prior testing increased CD 
acceptance for subjects with medium arousal levels: prior testing did not increase CD acceptance 
for long lists, and familiarity levels were equivalent regardless of prior testing (see Table 6.2).  
On the other hand, prior testing did increase CD acceptance for short lists, and familiarity was 
higher when items from short lists had been previously tested.  Familiarity was high to begin 
with for long lists but not short lists.  At low arousal, prior testing increased CD acceptance 
because of increased familiarity and phantom recollection and reduced recollection rejection. 
This pattern suggests that subjects in medium-aroused moods are more sensitive to differences in 
gist retrieval as a function of the number of items presented compared with low- and high-
arousal subjects, where the effect of prior testing was consistent across list length.  
Finally, forgetting reduced CD acceptance in the V condition for subjects with medium 
and high arousal levels because those subjects had elevated levels of phantom recollection on the 
 119 
immediate test but not after the delay, and they also experienced a decline in familiarity over 
time.  This result suggests that higher arousal leads to increased phantom recollection but that the 
effect lessens over time.  Forgetting in the V condition occurred for subjects with low arousal as 
well, but was driven by reduced familiarity and increased recollection rejection over time.   
Table 6.1 
Experiment 4 Parameter Estimates 
 RT FT PD RD FD βV βG βVG 
Immediate Test 
Low .25 .33 .22 .06 .42 .22 .44 .33 
Medium  .21 .25 .29 .10 .40 .33 .33 .27 
High .29 .26 .38 .14 .40 .30 .40 .30 
Short Low .25 .26 .23 .24 .31 .24 .44 .30 
Short Medium .20 .28 .27 .09 .39 .32 .34 .26 
Short High .33 .19 .36 .11 .41 .30 .40 .30 
Long Low .37 .30 .26 .03 .46 .27 .44 .27 
Long Medium .25 .19 .34 .12 .42 .33 .33 .27 
Long High .26 .31 .43 .18 .40 .30 .40 .30 
Delayed Test 
Short Low .17 .09 .25 .16 .22 .38 .36 .38 
Short Medium .17 .17 .40 .30 .00 .37 .36 .29 
Short High .22 .32 .31 .21 .20 .42 .40 .42 
Long Low .13 .25 .37 .15 .36 .38 .36 .38 
Long Medium .17 .20 .18 .07 .24 .36 .36 .29 
Long High .18 .25 .31 .19 .33 .42 .40 .42 
Low .14 .18 .31 .16 .28 .38 .36 .38 
Medium .18 .18 .28 .18 .15 .36 .36 .29 
High .20 .28 .31 .20 .27 .42 .40 .42 
Combined Across Both Tests 
Low .20 .21 .29 .14 .33 .35 .39 .35 
Medium .15 .21 .28 .15 .24 .35 .35 .29 
High .24 .27 .34 .19 .31 .39 .39 .38 
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Table 6.2 
Experiment 4 Prior Testing Parameter Estimates 
 RT FT PD RD FD βV βG βVG 
Not Previously Tested 
Low .10 .03 .17 .19 .21 .38 .36 .38 
Medium .14 .06 .23 .16 .01 .36 .36 .29 
High .13 .09 .27 .23 .12 .42 .40 .42 
Short Low .14 .00 .06 .08 .16 .36 .36 .38 
Short Medium .11 .05 .22 .20 .00 .35 .35 .30 
Short High .17 .10 .18 .18 .07 .41 .41 .42 
Long Low .02 .15 .16 .21 .37 .38 .38 .38 
Long Medium .16 .08 .11 .00 .24 .36 .36 .29 
Long High .11 .07 .28 .21 .25 .41 .41 .42 
Previously Tested 
Low .18 .26 .42 .12 .27 .38 .36 .38 
Medium .21 .28 .32 .20 .29 .36 .36 .29 
High .16 .32 .34 .17 .42 .42 .40 .42 
Short Low .14 .22 .35 .10 .27 .38 .38 .38 
Short Medium .22 .27 .21 .17 .43 .36 .36 .29 
Short High .14 .36 .30 .10 .46 .41 .41 .42 
Long Low .24 .30 .55 .17 .29 .38 .38 .38 
Long Medium .20 .29 .35 .20 .19 .36 .36 .29 
Long High .16 .29 .39 .22 .40 .41 .41 .42 
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 4 addressed the question of arousal’s effect on true and false memory when 
valence was held constant.  When subjects were grouped based on low, medium, and high 
arousal levels, there were no valence differences among the three groups.  The major new 
finding from this analysis method was that phantom recollection increased as arousal increased, 
which led to increased levels of false memory for subjects with higher levels of arousal.  This 
finding is consistent with prior research showing that increasing subjects’ arousal increases false 
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memory (Corson & Verrier, 2007).  This study is the first, however, to identify a mechanism for 
this effect—i.e., phantom recollection.   
 Phantom recollection has been connected to emotional content in prior work.  Brainerd, 
Stein, et al. (2008) showed that although false memories were less likely to occur for positive 
words compared to negative and neutral words, when false memories did occur for positive 
words they were driven by phantom recollection, whereas negative and neutral false memories 
were driven by familiarity.  On the other hand, emotional pictures reduced phantom recollection 
compared to neutral pictures in Bookbinder and Brainerd’s (2017) design.   Emotional content 
effects on phantom recollection may be sensitive to the type of study materials used or other 
methodological factors.   
 False memories accompanied by high levels of confidence may be similar to false 
memories driven by phantom recollection because of the strong feeling that a CD has been 
previously experienced.  Indeed, false memories in high-arousing moods were accompanied by 
higher confidence ratings in Corson and Verrier’s (2007) design, which is consistent with the 
present results.  Remember judgments involve a similar feeling of item presentation 
accompanied by memory for details.  Mirandola and Toffalini (2016) found these judgments to 
be reduced for positive and negative compared to neutral moods, but did not provide an analysis 
of remember/know judgments with respect to arousal.  Clearly, more research is needed to 
clarify the connection between emotional moods and phantom recollection-driven false memory.  
 Repeated testing may increase phantom recollection; Roediger and McDermott (1995) 
showed that false memories accompanied by remember (as opposed to know) judgments were 
higher when items had been previously tested.  The present data suggest that the mechanism for 
the repeated testing effect may depend on subjects’ arousal levels.  When arousal is low, subjects 
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are more likely to accept previously tested items because of increased phantom recollection and 
familiarity and reduced recollection rejection.  When arousal is only slightly higher, however, the 
repeated testing effect is driven by familiarity alone.  Interestingly, the repeated testing effect 
disappeared when arousal was high.  Considered in connection with the overall effect of arousal 
on false memory, one explanation for this pattern is that lower levels of false memory at lower 
arousal may be strengthened by items’ presentation during a memory test, whereas the already 
high levels of false memory due to higher arousal will not be strengthened, because those 
subjects are already experiencing phantom recollection of presented items.   
 Similarly, the present results suggest that the processes driving forgetting of false 
memories (i.e., CD acceptance in the V condition) over time are different depending on subjects’ 
arousal.  When arousal is low, this forgetting is driven by a decline in familiarity and an increase 
in recollection rejection, but when arousal was high forgetting was driven by reduced phantom 
recollection.  Rather than increasing over time, per se, it is possible that recollection rejection 
was inhibited on the immediate test for these subjects.  Recollection rejection was particularly 
low on the immediate test, which implies that either memory for the surface features of targets 
was poor or CDs were not adequate retrieval cues for verbatim traces of targets (see Brainerd, 
Reyna, Wright, & Mojardin, 2003).   If verbatim traces are affected by arousal according to the 
Yerkes-Dodson law (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), access to these traces might be limited when 
arousal is particularly low, and may peak at a moderate arousal level.  Furthermore, inspection of 
the parameter estimates in Table 6.1 reveals that the low recollection rejection for subjects in low 
arousing moods was driven by long lists:  recollection rejection was at a more typical level (.24) 
for short lists but was only .03 for long lists.  Perhaps the presentation of many targets 
strengthened gist traces to the point that surface details became fuzzy, particularly for subjects 
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with low arousal.  Again, however, it should be reiterated that the present study is the first to 
measure retrieval processes associated with arousal and further replications are needed before 
drawing definitive conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this dissertation I explored the relationships between mood valence and arousal—
separately—and true and false memory.  The goal of these studies was to determine whether 
valence and arousal can have independent effects on false memory and to identify the retrieval 
processes involved in these effects.   
Summary of Methodology 
Through three pilot tests I developed two new MIPs that were able to successfully alter 
subjects’ moods when administered online.  The first MIP was able to alter subjects’ valence 
while maintaining a low and equivalent arousal level across the three valence groups.  The 
second MIP elevated the arousal level of the subjects in the positive and negative groups so that 
their arousal levels were equivalent to each other but higher than the neutral group, with valence 
still differing across the three groups.  In Experiment 4, subjects were grouped instead by 
arousal, with valence being equal across low-, medium-, and high-arousal groups. 
Experiment 1 tested the prediction that mood valence could impact false memory for 10-
item DRM lists when mood was induced prior to the study phase.  A mood manipulation check 
ensured that subjects’ moods were successfully manipulated and differed in the intended way.  
Subjects in positive, negative, and neutral moods with low arousal completed immediate and 
two-day delayed conjoint recognition tests.  The immediate recognition test was comprised of 
half of the test items and the delayed test was comprised of the items tested on the immediate test 
as well as the second half.  The data were analyzed first using ANOVAs to identify effects on 
standard true and false memory.  Then, the data from all three instructional conditions were 
analyzed and effects of the mood manipulation as well as the other factors were identified.  
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Finally, model fits, parameter estimates, and parameter differences tests were computed to 
identify the processes underlying the ANOVA results.   
Experiment 2 followed the same general procedure as Experiment 1 and used the same 
mood manipulation.  The primary difference was that instead of 10-item DRM lists, half of the 
lists contained 6 items and half of the lists contained 14 items.  Experiment 3 followed the same 
procedure as Experiment 2, including the two list lengths, but the primary difference was in the 
MIP used.  Instead of the low-arousal MIP, Experiment 3 used the high-arousal MIP in which the 
positive and negative mood groups had higher arousal levels than the neutral group.   
Finally, in Experiment 4 the data from Experiment 3 were re-analyzed by grouping 
subjects based on their self-reported levels of arousal following the recommendation of 
Mirandola and Toffalini (2016).  This restructuring resulted in three groups of subjects, with low, 
medium, and high arousal levels but equivalent valence levels on average.  The data were 
analyzed in the same manner as the first three experiments with a focus on new effects of arousal 
and their accompanying retrieval processes.   
Summary of Results  
The Effect of Mood on False Memory 
Negative moods reduced false memory compared to positive moods because of enhanced 
verbatim processing, confirming the prediction of Experiment 1.  The effect was replicated in 
Experiment 2 with two list lengths, but the mechanism was different:  Negative moods reduced 
false memory for long lists by increasing recollection rejection, but they reduced false memory 
for short lists by reducing familiarity.  When arousal in the positive and negative mood groups 
was increased, in Experiment 3, negative moods still reduced false memory compared to positive 
moods, but now false memory was lowest for subjects in neutral moods and the differences 
 126 
among all three mood groups were reliable.  This new pattern of results suggested that arousal 
increased false memory, but that valence effects remained.  Increased false memory in high-
arousal positive moods compared to negative moods was driven by reduced recollection rejection 
(i.e., a verbatim process), and increased false memory in negative moods (compared to neutral 
moods was driven by increased phantom recollection and familiarity (i.e., gist processes).  These 
findings provided initial evidence that negative moods reduce false memory via verbatim 
processing and arousal increases false memory via both verbatim and gist processing.  
Experiment 4 provided a direct test of the prediction that arousal can affect false memory 
independent from valence, confirming that prediction and locating the mechanism primarily 
within gist processing, via increased phantom recollection.  Together, these results provide a 
coherent story of mood-false memory effects:  Negative moods reduce false memory compared 
to positive moods by emphasizing verbatim processing and high arousal moods increase false 
memory compared to low arousal moods by emphasizing gist processing.   
Additional Manipulations 
The retrieval processes that contribute to several other manipulations were identified, 
which served several purposes: a) to confirm the predictions that have been made about the way 
these manipulations dissociate verbatim and gist memory and b) to provide further support for 
the verbatim valence/gist arousal hypothesis through the way these manipulations interacted with 
mood valence and arousal.   
List length.  Experiment 2 revealed that false memory was higher for longer lists because 
of reduced recollection rejection and increased familiarity.  When arousal was increased in 
Experiment 3 mood effects on false lists were isolated to short lists because familiarity was high 
for long lists across all moods.  This effect is unsurprising because longer lists repeat the gist of 
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the list more than short lists.  Emotional moods with high arousal increased familiarity for short 
lists, where familiarity was low to begin with, because higher arousal increased gist retrieval.   
Repeated testing.  In Experiment 1 repeated testing increased familiarity and phantom 
recollection of CDs.  Experiment 2 revealed that the repeated testing effect depended on list 
length because it increased CD acceptance for short lists more than long lists, again because 
longer lists provide stronger gist due to repeating the gist to subjects.  In Experiments 3 and 4, 
repeated testing increased phantom recollection in negative and neutral moods but not positive 
moods, and in low arousal moods but not high arousal moods, because phantom recollection was 
already high when arousal was high.  
Forgetting.  Forgetting of CDs in Experiment 1 was a result of reduced phantom 
recollection over time, whereas forgetting of targets was due to reduced identity judgment.  
When the list length manipulation was introduced in Experiment 2 forgetting occurred more for 
short lists than long lists and was driven by reductions in familiarity for CDs.  When arousal was 
high in Experiment 4, forgetting of CDs was driven by declines in phantom recollection whereas 
when arousal was low it was driven by declines in familiarity and increased recollection 
rejection.  Furthermore, forgetting of both targets and CDs occurred more for short lists than 
long lists.   
Theoretical Implications 
The main goals of this dissertation were to determine the nature of valence and arousal 
effects on false memory with controlled methods, to identify the nature of those effects, and to 
identify the conditions under which false memory is most likely to occur.  To achieve those goals 
I posed several main research questions.   
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Experiment 1 addressed the question of whether mood valence impacts false memory 
even when there is no potential influence of arousal.  The finding that negative mood reduced 
false memory and positive moods increased false memory compared to neutral moods is 
consistent with predictions of both AAI and FTT.  False memories should be more likely when 
subjects use relational processing or favor gist retrieval, whereas they should be less likely when 
subjects use item-specific processing or favor verbatim retrieval.  Because arousal was controlled 
at a low level, this finding provides credence to the claims made previously that mood valence 
can—on its own—influence false memory (Storbeck & Clore, 2005, 2011).  Estimation of the 
parameters of the CR model provided a more direct test of the processing explanation.  
Consistent with the verbatim hypothesis, negative moods increased identity judgment.  However, 
as identity judgment is a verbatim process but does not have a direct impact on false memory, 
Experiment 2 was designed to further dissociate verbatim and gist retrieval and provide a more 
cohesive process explanation. 
When two list lengths were used in Experiment 2, negative mood still reduced false 
memory but did so via different processes for short versus long lists, confirming that the list 
length manipulation dissociated verbatim from gist retrieval.  Indeed, in Experiment 3, mood 
effects were isolated to short lists, where verbatim traces were stronger, providing further 
support for the hypothesis that negative moods reduce false memory via stronger verbatim 
processing.   
Experiment 3 was designed to determine how mood valence effects on false memory 
would change when arousal was increased for positive and negative moods.  The fact that the 
pattern of mood valence effects changed indicated that arousal had an impact on false memory as 
well.  In Experiments 1 and 2, negative moods reduced false memory compared to neutral moods 
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(although the only reliable difference was between negative and positive moods).  In particular, 
the fact that now both positive and negative moods reliably increased false memory compared to 
neutral moods provided an important theoretical distinction.  AAI predicts that increased arousal 
strengthens the current active processing style.  If more false memories occur in positive moods 
than negative moods when arousal is low, this gap should expand when arousal is high, 
increasing the difference between valenced moods from neutral moods.  On the other hand, FTT 
predicts that increased arousal would weaken verbatim memory traces, increasing false memory 
for subjects in negative moods.  The results provide support for FTT’s prediction but not AAI’s 
prediction, because when arousal was increased false memory was higher in negative moods 
compared to neutral moods.   
The results from Experiment 3, considered with the results from the first two 
experiments, provide context for interpreting prior research as well.  The lack of control of 
arousal in early mood-false memory research made it difficult to conclude with certainty that 
mood valence was truly the only cause of false memory differences (Storbeck & Clore, 2005, 
2011).  Here, I found that a) when arousal was controlled the pattern of valence effects was the 
same as what was found previously and b) when arousal was increased the pattern of valence 
effects was different from what was found previously.  Therefore, if prior research was suffering 
from arousal differences among the valence groups, one might expect results more similar to 
Experiment 3.  The fact that their results were more similar to Experiment 1 supports their claim 
that it was indeed valence, and not arousal, that caused the observed differences in false memory.  
Of course, it is still not possible to know without any arousal data from those studies, and of 
course it is still best practice to include proper controls in the first place.  That being said, I 
would argue that the current results aid in correct interpretation of early results.   
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Finally, Experiment 4 demonstrated that arousal influences false memory independent of 
valence.  In particular, higher arousal levels led to higher levels of false memory because of 
increased phantom recollection.  When subjects experienced higher arousal, they stored gist 
traces that were so strong that they thought CDs had been previously presented, and perhaps 
even had specific memories of their prior presentation.  The arousal result is consistent with 
Corson and Verrier’s (2007) claim that high arousal increases false memory and expands upon 
that result by identifying phantom recollection as the mechanism for that effect.  That arousal 
could influence false memory independent from valence is consistent with predictions of FTT 
but not AAI.  In AAI, arousal does not directly affect processing; rather, it influences whatever 
processing is currently being employed, encouraging that processing when arousal is high and 
attenuating it when arousal is low.  AAI does not explain how arousal could influence false 
memory if neither item-specific nor relational processing is already being favored.  On the other 
hand, in FTT arousal may influence verbatim or gist processing directly.  The fact that high 
arousal enhanced phantom recollection is therefore consistent with FTT but not AAI, because 
high arousal is expected to reduce access to verbatim traces according to FTT.   
Using the same method of grouping subjects based on self-reported arousal, Mirandola 
and Toffalini (2016) found the opposite—that arousal reduced false memory.  Their finding is 
not inconsistent with the present research because of an important methodological difference.  
Mirandola and Toffalini manipulated mood after the study phase and before their recognition 
test, whereas I manipulated it prior to the study phase.  Both AAI and FTT predict that mood 
influences false memory at encoding, by either affecting how targets are processes or memory 
traces of them are stored.  Neither theory makes a direct prediction regarding how mood would 
affect false memory when manipulated after targets have already been presented.   
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Some might argue that the fact that there were no mood effects on false memory after a 
delay is evidence that induced moods need to be currently active in order to affect retrieval.  
However, the lack of delayed test results can easily be explained by the fact if mood valence 
affects verbatim traces more than gist traces, and verbatim traces decline more rapidly over time, 
mood effects may disappear.  Indeed, forgetting occurred more in the V condition than in the G 
condition consistently in all four experiments because verbatim processes declined over time 
more so than gist processes, especially for targets.  Forgetting also declined more for short lists 
than long lists, because more verbatim traces were stored for short lists and more gist traces were 
stored for long lists.  However, forgetting occurred for subjects in all moods.  Despite retention 
interval being a verbatim manipulation, it did not impact subjects in negative moods more than 
others.  If it is true that forgetting of both accurate and false memories is not impacted by mood, 
that would be a positive finding in the context of real-life remembering, because negative moods 
would not promote more risk of inaccuracy due to forgetting.   
On the other hand, repeated testing affected subjects in positive and negative moods 
differently.  Although repeated testing increased both true and false memory for subjects in all 
moods, subjects in negative-arousing moods were more likely to have false memories driven by 
phantom recollection and lower levels of recollection rejection for items that had been tested 
previously.  This difference is of high importance because it means that people in negative 
moods may be more confident in false memories that are based on earlier memory tests, 
compared to people in positive moods.   Police interviews in which witnesses are asked similar 
questions repeatedly could lead people—especially those who are feeling fearful or otherwise 
negative during the reporting process—to state with certainty that they remember something that 
did not occur but that they were asked about earlier.  
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More generally, when arousal was low repeated testing increased false memory across all 
mood valences because it increased familiarity and sometimes phantom recollection.  Although 
negative-arousing moods may put people at particular risk for illusory memories due to repeated 
testing, repeated testing will increase false memory via weaker gist traces for people in a variety 
of moods.  This effect was particularly strong for short lists.  Although longer lists increased 
false memory in general compared to short lists, short lists were more susceptible to the repeated 
testing effect, because they provided lower levels of familiarity to begin with.  Therefore, if there 
is less gist-consistent information to be remembered, the act of repeatedly testing it may create 
more distortion by providing better gist, compared to repeatedly testing information that has a 
stronger gist to begin with.   
There is other evidence for repeated testing increasing phantom recollection from other 
conjoint recognition research.  Bookbinder and Brainerd (2017) found that an earlier memory 
test increased phantom recollection of emotional pictures.  They also found that phantom 
recollection was higher on the immediate memory test and declined over time, which is 
somewhat consistent with the present research.  I found that forgetting of CDs was driven 
primarily by familiarity, but sometimes by phantom recollection as well.  In both designs, 
forgetting occurred more for targets than CDs because it occurred more for verbatim than gist 
memory traces.   
The results of the four studies in this dissertation provide the following picture of the 
conditions most apt to produce false memories.  Positive moods foster false memories more than 
negative moods and arousing moods create more false memories than non-arousing moods.  
Although negative moods can be protective against false memory, negative-arousing moods can 
promote distortion.  This pattern of results supports FTT better than other mood theories.  False 
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memories may fade with time, but they are more robust over time compared to true memories.  
Repeatedly testing false memory items can lead to even stronger false memories, particularly for 
people in negative-aroused moods.  To-be-remembered items that create a strong gist (through 
longer study lists) will lead to more false memories, but false memories for items with a weaker 
gist (short lists) can be strengthened through repeated testing.  Forgetting of true memories is 
more likely for short lists, as well, which means that short lists may be more prone to distortion 
than longer lists over time.   
Applications 
Knowledge about the context that is most conducive to false memories may be useful 
outside the laboratory.  This dissertation has provided some preliminary conditions under which 
false memories may be particularly strong.  Importantly, some of those conditions may map onto 
the conditions in certain real-life situations when false memories can be dangerous.  Negative, 
low-arousal moods may protect against memory distortion, potentially because it would be 
adaptive to remember the specific details of risky or threatening situations (Schwarz & Clore, 
1983).  However, the protective nature of negative moods apparently disappears when arousal 
becomes higher, at least in comparison to neutral moods.  The fact that increased arousal may 
promote memory distortion especially in negative moods—and that that distortion is 
accompanied by phantom recollections of experiencing non-experienced events—is of particular 
concern when recalling traumatic events in therapy or reporting on witnessed crimes.   
Although the applicability of the DRM paradigm to such real-life situations has been 
questioned (e.g., DePrince, Allard, Oh, & Freyd, 2004), Gallo (2010; 2013) reviewed several 
lines of evidence pointing to its relevance.  For example, there is a correlation between 
autobiographical false memory and false memory in the DRM illusion (e.g., Platt, Lacey, Iobst, 
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& Finkelman, 1998).  Additionally, brain damage that affects autobiographical memory can also 
affect false memories in the DRM paradigm (e.g., Schacter, 2012).   The data show that in fact 
the DRM illusion is a good predictor of real-world memory performance despite the criticisms 
that have been put forth.  
Others have questioned the generalizability of experimentally-induced moods, as well 
(Martin, 1990), whereas proponents of MIPs have attested to the reality of the emotions 
experienced in response to these procedures, especially when videos are used (Rottenberg, Ray, 
& Gross, 1995).  One alternative would be to study differences in false memory in clinical 
populations with a variety of moods, which has clear importance, but introduces additional issues 
and confounding variables (Otgaar, Muris, Howe, & Merckelbach, 2017).  Experimentally 
induced moods have the advantage of not confounding trait and state moods and allow for better 
control of valence and arousal (when the methodology permits, of course).   
Limitations and Future research 
Despite the advantages of an experimental MIP using videos, a limitation of this design 
may be the artificiality of the induced moods and their short time span.  One avenue for future 
research could be the replication of this design with a MIP that provides a closer approximation 
of moods experienced in real life, perhaps with a particular focus on forensic applications.  Such 
a mood induction would be limited by the types of emotions that are ethically acceptable to 
induce, but there might be a middle ground.   Even without a forensic focus, it would be 
beneficial to replicate these effects using a more realistic mood induction; for example, Yang, 
Yang, Ceci, and Isen (2015) gave subjects candy as a positive mood induction.  Despite the 
limitations of studying moods that cannot be experimentally controlled, it would also be of 
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interest to identify retrieval processes involved in false memory in naturally-occurring clinical 
and non-clinical moods.   
Concerning the generalizability of the DRM paradigm, studies using the same controlled 
mood induction within other false memory paradigms will be useful.  There is evidence that false 
memory for words and pictures are affected differently by the emotional content of the stimuli 
(Bookbinder & Brainerd, 2016), so it is possible that mood may affect false memory for pictures 
differently.  As there is little research on how mood affects picture memory, studies with 
controlled valence and arousal, and studies that measure retrieval processes, may provide new 
information.  Similarly, there is yet little research on mood effects on implanted false memory in 
the misinformation paradigm.  Use of this paradigm is another way to enhance the applicability 
of false memory results, but we have yet to fully identify mood’s role in implanted false memory 
and the associated retrieval processes. 
With a similar focus on enhancing the relevance of mood-false memory research it will 
be necessary to apply developmental considerations.  MIPs have not often been applied to 
children, particularly in the context of memory, but researchers in other fields have succeeded at 
altering children’s moods with consequential effects on information processing (Harper, 
Lemerise, & Caverly, 2010).  We have begun to identify factors that make children more or less 
prone to false memory compared with adults, and emotional content may be one of those factors 
(Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008).  Mood may similarly tie into the developmental trajectory of 
false memory, which is important information to have both theoretically and because of 
children’s essential role in legal proceedings and the debates surrounding it.  A similar 
investigation should be done with the aging population as well, based on evidence that proneness 
to false memory may change with healthy aging (Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997) as well as the 
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tendency to adopt certain moods or remember emotional information (Mather & Carstensen, 
2005).  
The negative-arousing moods induced in this research may be relevant to the law and 
other real-life remembering situations, but rarely is it the case that the information being reported 
is entirely neutral.  Evidence of mood-congruent true and false memory has accumulated in 
recent years, but there are still unanswered questions.  Some of those questions remain 
unanswered because these studies have not been immune to the issue of conflated valence and 
arousal seen in the rest of the emotion literature.  Careful control of valence and arousal and 
identification of retrieval processes may begin to answer those questions.  
 In short, there remain many directions for future mood-false memory research.  Many of 
them will provide information that can be applied outside of the laboratory and others will 
continue to aid in the refinement of theoretical conceptions of human emotion.   
Concluding Comment 
The debate about whether mood-dependent false memory is driven by valence or arousal 
may be answered with a compromise:  Mood valence can affect false memory, but arousal can 
affect false memory just as well.  At certain levels of valence and arousal, the result may be the 
perfect combination to create high levels of distortion that are accompanied by strong feelings 
that those distortions are, in fact, real.  The knowledge that both valence and arousal contribute 
to false memory and that their impacts are due to different retrieval processes, as well as 
understanding of the other factors that make memory particularly unreliable, may be of high 
practical importance.     
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Appendix A 
Experiment 1 Acceptance Probabilities 
Unrelated Distractors – Immediate Test 
  M SD 
 Negative .21 .27 
V Neutral .24 .28 
 Positive .26 .27 
 Total .24 .27 
 Negative .31 .30 
G Neutral .37 .34 
 Positive .47 .31 
 Total .38 .33 
 Negative .16 .27 
VG Neutral .27 .31 
 Positive .33 .30 
 Total .25 .30 
 Negative .23 .36 
Total Neutral .29 .29 
 Positive .36 .38 
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Unrelated Distractors – Delayed Test 
  M SD M SD M SD 
  Tested Not Tested Total 
V Negative .51 .34 .37 .29 .42 .32 
Neutral .42 .35 .39 .31 .40 .34 
Positive .52 .27 .56 .35 .54 .31 
Total .47 .33 .42 .32 .44 .32 
G Negative .32 .35 .31 .34 .31 .35 
Neutral .33 .32 .22 .27 .27 .30 
Positive .41 .36 .35 .32 .38 .34 
Total .34 .34 .28 .31 .31 .33 
VG Negative .44 .33 .36 .39 .40 .36 
Neutral .42 .38 .33 .31 .41 .35 
Positive .37 .31 .35 .29 .44 .30 
Total .42 .35 .34 .33 .41 .32 
Total Negative .42 .34 .35 .34 .34 .34 
Neutral .41 .35 .32 .29 .32 .32 
Positive .41 .30 .42 .32 .41 .31 
 
Targets – Immediate Test 
  M SD 
V Negative .30 .23 
Neutral .25 .25 
Positive .25 .25 
Total .27 .24 
G Negative .17 .21 
Neutral .24 .23 
Positive .10 .16 
Total .18 .21 
VG Negative .54 .27 
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Neutral .43 .36 
Positive .38 .30 
Total .45 .33 
 Negative .33 .23 
Total Neutral .30 .29 
 Positive .24 .24 
 
Targets – Delayed Test 
Valence Question 
Times 
Tested M SD 
Negative V Once .13 .15 
Twice .25 .17 
 Total .19 .16 
G Once .19 .22 
Twice .19 .25 
 Total .19 .23 
VG Once .34 .32 
Twice .45 .34 
  Total .40 .33 
 Total  .26 .24 
Neutral V Once .11 .18 
Twice .14 .18 
 Total .12 .18 
G Once .22 .20 
Twice .15 .18 
 Total .19 .19 
VG Once .34 .30 
Twice .37 .31 
  Total .35 .30 
 Total  .22 .22 
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Positive V Once .06 .13 
Twice .10 .16 
 Total .08 .14 
G Once .08 .12 
Twice .11 .14 
 Total .10 .13 
VG Once .21 .19 
Twice .27 .27 
  Total .24 .23 
 Total  .14 .17 
 
CDs – Immediate Test 
  M SD 
V Negative .33 .34 
Neutral .40 .34 
Positive .45 .34 
Total .41 .34 
G Negative .20 .25 
Neutral .29 .32 
Positive .20 .23 
Total .24 .28 
VG Negative .62 .33 
Neutral .56 .39 
Positive .46 .32 
Total .55 .36 
 Negative .39 .29 
Total Neutral .42 .34 
 Positive .37 .29 
 
CDs – Delayed Test 
 153 
 
Valence Question 
Times 
Tested M SD 
Negative V Once .21 .23 
Twice .24 .23 
 Total .22 .23 
G Once .23 .27 
Twice .21 .21 
 Total .22 .24 
VG Once .39 .35 
Twice .53 .33 
  Total .46 .34 
 Total  .30 .27 
Neutral V Once .12 .16 
Twice .27 .26 
 Total .19 .21 
G Once .21 .25 
Twice .16 .23 
 Total .19 .24 
VG Once .37 .31 
Twice .50 .33 
  Total .43 .32 
 Total  .27 .26 
Positive V Once .10 .21 
Twice .16 .21 
 Total .13 .21 
G Once .21 .22 
Twice .14 .19 
 Total .18 .20 
VG Once .32 .27 
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Twice .41 .28 
  Total .37 .27 
 Total  .23 .23 
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Appendix B 
Experiment 2 Acceptance Probabilities  
URDs – Immediate Test 
  M SD 
 Negative .26 .33 
V Neutral .39 .36 
 Positive .29 .32 
 Total .32 .34 
 Negative .45 .29 
G Neutral .50 .30 
 Positive .39 .31 
 Total .45 .30 
 Negative .22 .28 
VG Neutral .21 .30 
 Positive .25 .34 
 Total .23 .31 
 Negative .31 .43 
Total Neutral .37 .39 
 Positive .30 .40 
 
URDs – Delayed Test 
 Valence M SD M SD M SD 
  Tested Not Tested Total  
V Negative .46 .33 .34 .28 .38 .31 
Neutral .45 .35 .41 .35 .47 .35 
Positive .44 .31 .30 .30 .38 .30 
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Total .45 .33 .36 .31 .41 .32 
G Negative .37 .33 .29 .31 .31 .32 
Neutral .42 .35 .37 .37 .43 .36 
Positive .40 .33 .34 .35 .36 .34 
Total .40 .33 .32 .35 .37 .34 
VG Negative .30 .26 .29 .30 .29 .28 
Neutral .46 .32 .50 .40 .49 .36 
Positive .47 .37 .29 .34 .38 .38 
Total .39 .33 .37 .36 .38 .35 
Total Negative .40 .31 .33 .29 .37 .30 
Neutral .44 .34 .40 .37 .42 .36 
Positive .42 .33 .35 .33 .37 .33 
 
Targets – Immediate Test 
  M SD M SD M SD 
 Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Negative .34 .28 .37 .33 .36 .30 
Neutral .30 .30 .26 .33 .28 .31 
Positive .34 .28 .31 .34 .33 .30 
Total .33 .29 .31 .33 .32 .30 
 
G 
Negative .15 .22 .15 .24 .15 .23 
Neutral .17 .25 .11 .18 .14 .21 
Positive .22 .28 .24 .29 .23 .28 
Total .18 .25 .17 .24 .17 .25 
 
VG 
Negative .44 .32 .46 .33 .46 .32 
Neutral .44 .31 .51 .35 .47 .33 
Positive .50 .37 .51 .39 .50 .38 
Total .46 .33 .50 .36 .48 .34 
 Negative .31 .27 .33 .30 .32 .29 
Total Neutral .30 .29 .29 .29 .30 .29 
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 Positive .35 .31 .36 .34 .35 .33 
 
Targets – Delayed Test 
  M SD M SD M SD 
  Not Previously Tested 
  Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Negative .12 .19 .18 .29 .15 .24 
Neutral .11 .17 .11 .15 .11 .16 
Positive .14 .20 .15 .21 .15 .20 
Total .12 .18 .14 .22 .13 .20 
 Negative .48 .29 .19 .24 .33 .27 
G Neutral .42 .30 .18 .26 .30 .28 
 Positive .40 .30 .24 .26 .32 .28 
 Total .43 .30 .20 .25 .32 .28 
 
VG 
Negative .41 .30 .33 .32 .37 .31 
Neutral .31 .31 .19 .23 .25 .28 
Positive .38 .37 .30 .36 .34 .37 
Total .37 .32 .27 .31 .32 .32 
 Negative .34 .26 .23 .28 .29 .27 
Total Neutral .28 .26 .16 .21 .22 .24 
 Positive .31 .29 .23 .28 .27 .29 
  Previously Tested 
  Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Negative .27 .25 .20 .24 .24 .25 
Neutral .25 .27 .22 .23 .24 .25 
Positive .26 .24 .29 .27 .27 .26 
Total .26 .25 .24 .25 .25 .25 
 
G 
Negative .23 .27 .23 .27 .23 .27 
Neutral .18 .23 .16 .17 .17 .20 
Positive .15 .21 .22 .26 .19 .24 
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Total .18 .24 .20 .24 .20 .24 
 
VG 
Negative .41 .31 .45 .29 .43 .30 
Neutral .24 .25 .30 .29 .27 .27 
Positive .30 .33 .35 .30 .33 .32 
Total .31 .30 .37 .30 .34 .30 
 Negative .31 .28 .29 .27 .30 .28 
Total Neutral .22 .25 .23 .23 .22 .24 
 Positive .24 .26 .29 .28 .26 .27 
  Across Prior Testing 
  Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Negative .20 .22 .19 .27 .19 .25 
Neutral .18 .23 .16 .19 .17 .21 
Positive .20 .22 .22 .24 .21 .23 
Total .19 .22 .19 .24 .19 .23 
 Negative .36 .28 .21 .26 .28 .27 
G Neutral .30 .27 .17 .23 .23 .25 
 Positive .28 .26 .23 .26 .25 .26 
 Total .31 .27 .20 .25 .26 .26 
 
VG 
Negative .41 .31 .39 .31 .40 .31 
Neutral .28 .28 .25 .26 .26 .27 
Positive .34 .35 .33 .33 .33 .34 
Total .34 .31 .32 .30 .33 .31 
 Negative .32 .27 .26 .28 .29 .28 
Total Neutral .25 .26 .19 .23 .22 .25 
 Positive .27 .28 .26 .28 .27 .28 
 
CDs – Immediate Test 
  M SD M SD M SD 
 Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 Negative .25 .40 .35 .37 .29 .39 
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V Neutral .32 .39 .34 .36 .33 .38 
Positive .39 .44 .42 .33 .40 .39 
Total .32 .41 .37 .35 .34 .39 
 
G 
Negative .26 .38 .17 .30 .21 .34 
Neutral .36 .42 .20 .32 .28 .37 
Positive .44 .45 .32 .37 .38 .41 
Total .35 .42 .23 .34 .29 .37 
 
VG 
Negative .57 .38 .68 .39 .62 .39 
Neutral .55 .39 .57 .43 .56 .41 
Positive .50 .38 .68 .40 .59 .39 
Total .54 .38 .64 .40 .59 .40 
 Negative .36 .39 .41 .36 .38 .38 
Total Neutral .41 .40 .40 .37 .40 .38 
 Positive .44 .40 .43 .37 .43 .38 
 
CDs – Delayed Test 
  M SD M SD M SD 
  Not Previously Tested 
  Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Negative .14 .17 .29 .32 .21 .25 
Neutral .14 .20 .36 .33 .33 .27 
Positive .20 .26 .41 .31 .36 .29 
Total .16 .22 .35 .32 .26 .27 
 Negative .24 .26 .43 .42 .25 .26 
G Neutral .19 .28 .40 .39 .30 .34 
 Positive .26 .29 .37 .38 .25 .34 
 Total .23 .28 .40 .39 .32 .34 
 
VG 
Negative .35 .37 .37 .37 .31 .37 
Neutral .26 .28 .24 .31 .32 .30 
Positive .31 .36 .34 .32 .32 .34 
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Total .30 .34 .31 .33 .31 .34 
 Negative .24 .27 .36 .37 .30 .33 
Total Neutral .20 .25 .33 .34 .27 .26 
 Positive .26 .30 .37 .34 .32 .32 
  Previously Tested 
  Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Negative .29 .32 .30 .33 .29 .33 
Neutral .32 .32 .28 .29 .36 .31 
Positive .37 .33 .30 .25 .53 .29 
Total .33 .32 .29 .29 .31 .31 
 
G 
Negative .45 .38 .27 .31 .30 .35 
Neutral .21 .33 .22 .25 .22 .29 
Positive .41 .41 .27 .32 .36 .37 
Total .36 .39 .25 .29 .31 .34 
 
VG 
Negative .48 .34 .58 .35 .34 .35 
Neutral .36 .32 .36 .34 .34 .33 
Positive .42 .33 .42 .38 .42 .35 
Total .42 .33 .45 .37 .44 .35 
 Negative .41 .35 .38 .33 .39 .34 
Total Neutral .30 .32 .28 .29 .29 .32 
 Positive .40 .36 .33 .32 .37 .34 
  Across Prior Testing 
  Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Negative .21 .25 .29 .33 .25 .29 
Neutral .23 .26 .32 .31 .28 .29 
Positive .29 .30 .36 .28 .32 .29 
Total .24 .27 .32 .31 .28 .29 
 Negative .35 .32 .35 .37 .35 .35 
G Neutral .20 .31 .31 .32 .26 .32 
 Positive .24 .35 .32 .35 .33 .35 
 Total .30 .34 .33 .34 .31 .34 
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VG 
Negative .41 .36 .48 .36 .45 .36 
Neutral .31 .30 .30 .33 .30 .30 
Positive .36 .35 .38 .35 .37 .36 
Total .36 .34 .38 .35 .37 .35 
 Negative .32 .34 .37 .35 .35 .35 
Total Neutral .25 .29 .31 .32 .28 .31 
 Positive .33 .33 .35 .33 .34 .33 
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Appendix C  
Experiment 3 Acceptance Probabilities 
URDs – Immediate Test 
  M SD 
 Negative .38 .24 
V Neutral .31 .30 
 Positive .24 .30 
 Total .30 .31 
 Negative .41 .33 
G Neutral .35 .29 
 Positive .41 .29 
 Total .39 .30 
 Negative .22 .29 
VG Neutral .27 .34 
 Positive .33 .32 
 Total .28 .32 
 Negative .34 .29 
Total Neutral .31 .32 
 Positive .32 .30 
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URDs – Delayed Test 
 Valence M SD M SD M SD 
  Tested Not Tested Total 
V Negative .41 .33 .29 .28 .35 .31 
Neutral .45 .35 .41 .35 .42 .35 
Positive .49 .31 .30 .30 .41 .31 
Total .45 .33 .33 .31 .39 .32 
G Negative .37 .33 .29 .31 .33 ,32 
Neutral .47 .35 .37 .37 .42 .36 
Positive .40 .33 .34 .35 .37 .34 
Total .41 .33 .32 .35 .37 .34 
VG Negative .30 .26 .25 .30 .38 .38 
Neutral .46 .32 .50 .40 .31 .36 
Positive .43 .37 .29 .34 .35 .36 
Total .39 .33 .35 .36 .37 .35 
Total Negative .35 .32 .27 .30 .32 .31 
Neutral .41 .35 .41 .37 .41 .36 
Positive .42 .34 .33 .34 .37 .34 
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Targets – Immediate Test 
  M SD M SD M SD 
 Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Negative .26 .26 .28 .29 .28 .27 
Neutral .25 .28 .33 .31 .29 .30 
Positive .42 .30 .33 .33 .38 .32 
Total .30 .28 .32 .31 .32 .30 
 
G 
Negative .24 .28 .23 .32 .23 .30 
Neutral .17 .25 .22 .28 .20 .27 
Positive .13 .18 .15 .24 .14 .21 
Total .18 .25 .20 .29 .19 .27 
 
VG 
Negative .48 .35 .54 .35 .51 .35 
Neutral .38 .35 .47 .36 .42 .36 
Positive .41 .40 .40 .37 .40 .39 
Total .42 .36 .47 .36 .45 .36 
 Negative .33 .30 .35 .32 .34 ,31 
Total Neutral .27 .29 .34 .32 .30 .31 
 Positive .32 .29 .29 .31 .31 .30 
 
Targets – Delayed Test  
  M SD M SD M SD 
  Not Previously Tested 
  Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Negative .15 .20 .22 .26 .19 .23 
Neutral .08 .15 .19 .26 .14 .15 
Positive .16 .19 .24 .25 .21 .20 
Total .13 .18 .21 .25 .17 .18 
 Negative .43 .35 .18 .22 .31 .29 
G Neutral .42 .28 .20 .26 .31 .27 
 Positive .49 .29 .19 .22 .34 .32 
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 Total .45 .31 .19 .23 .32 .32 
 
VG 
Negative .34 .33 .26 .28 .30 .32 
Neutral .31 .32 .22 .26 .26 .29 
Positive .36 .32 .29 .34 .33 .35 
Total .34 .32 .26 .29 .30 .31 
 Negative .31. .29 .22 .25 .27 .27 
Total Neutral .27 .25 .20 .26 .24 .26 
 Positive .34 .27 .24 .27 .29 .27 
  Previously Tested 
  Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Negative .32 .27 .31 .28 .32 .28 
Neutral .30 .26 .30 .31 .30 .29 
Positive .36 .21 .27 .25 .32 .23 
Total .32 .25 .29 .28 .31 .27 
 
G 
Negative .22 .27 .21 .27 .22 .27 
Neutral .22 .27 .21 .24 .22 .26 
Positive .20 .23 .23 .26 .21 .25 
Total .21 .26 .22 .26 .22 .26 
 
VG 
Negative .35 .34 .36 .29 .36 .32 
Neutral .34 .34 .34 .29 .34 .32 
Positive .36 .33 .38 .36 .37 .35 
Total .35 .34 .36 .31 .36 .32 
 Negative .30 .29 .29 .28 .30 .29 
Total Neutral .29 .29 .28 .28 .28 .29 
 Positive .31 .26 .29 .29 .30 .27 
  Across Prior Testing 
  Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Negative .24 .24 .27 .27 .25 .25 
Neutral .19 .21 .25 .29 .22 .22 
Positive .26 .20 .25 .25 .26 .23 
Total .23 .22 .25 .27 .24 .24 
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 Negative .33 .31 .20 .25 .26 .29 
G Neutral .32 .28 .21 .25 .26 .27 
 Positive .35 .26 .21 .24 .28 .27 
 Total .33 .29 .20 .25 .27 .28 
 
VG 
Negative .35 .34 .32 .29 .33 .34 
Neutral .32 .33 .28 .28 .30 .32 
Positive .36 .33 .33 .35 .35 .34 
Total .34 .33 .31 .30 .33 .33 
 Negative .30 .29 .26 .27 .28 .39 
Total Neutral .28 .27 .24 .27 .26 .37 
 Positive .32 .27 .27 .28 .29 .28 
 
CDs – Immediate Test 
  M SD M SD M SD 
 Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Negative .47 .43 .66 .36 .71 .40 
Neutral .29 .51 .68 .34 .57 .43 
Positive .62 .42 .54 .31 .66 .37 
Total .65 .48 .63 .34 .65 .41 
 
G 
Negative .34 .40 .25 .39 .29 .40 
Neutral .26 .38 .19 .34 .22 .36 
Positive .31 .37 .24 .32 .28 .35 
Total .30 .38 .22 .35 .27 .25 
 
VG 
Negative .63 .40 .54 .45 .58 .43 
Neutral .51 .38 .63 .41 .57 .40 
Positive .44 .41 .56 .37 .50 .39 
Total .53 .40 .58 .41 .55 .41 
 Negative .58 .41 .48 .40 .53 .41 
Total Neutral .41 .42 .50 .36 .45 .39 
 Positive .51 .40 .44 .33 .48 .37 
 167 
 
CDs – Delayed Test 
  M SD M SD M SD 
  Not Previously Tested 
  Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Negative .18 .24 .32 .35 .25 .30 
Neutral .09 .18 .27 .34 .19 26 
Positive .29 .33 .36 .37 .33 .35 
Total .18 .26 .32 .35 .26 .31 
 Negative .25 .29 .29 .36 .27 .33 
G Neutral .19 .24 .35 .38 .27 .31 
 Positive .26 .29 .33 .38 .29 .34 
 Total .23 .27 .32 .37 .28 .32 
 
VG 
Negative .30 .34 .35 .30 .32 .32 
Neutral .29 .35 .34 .38 .31 .37 
Positive .46 .39 .46 .40 .46 .40 
Total .34 .36 .38 .36 .37 .36 
 Negative .24 .29 .32 .34 .28 .32 
Total Neutral .19 .26 .32 .37 .26 .32 
 Positive .34 .34 .38 .38 .36 .36 
  Previously Tested 
  Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Negative .46 .32 .29 .32 .38 .32 
Neutral .39 .36 .32 .29 .35 .33 
Positive .41 .34 .28 .26 .35 .30 
Total .42 .34 .30 .29 .36 .32 
 
G 
Negative .29 .35 .24 .27 .26 .31 
Neutral .32 .36 .24 .31 .28 .34 
Positive .30 .37 .24 .31 .27 .34 
Total .31 .35 .24 .29 .27 .32 
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VG 
Negative .45 .34 .47 .37 .46 .36 
Neutral .40 .36 .52 .37 .46 .37 
Positive .41 .33 .56 .37 .49 .35 
Total .42 .34 .51 .37 .47 .36 
 Negative .40 .34 .33 .32 .37 .33 
Total Neutral .37 .36 .36 .32 .37 .34 
 Positive .37 .35 .36 .31 .38 .33 
  Across Prior Testing 
  Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Negative .32 .28 .31 .34 .31 .30 
Neutral .24 .27 .30 .32 .27 .30 
Positive .35 .34 .32 .32 .34 .33 
Total .31 .30 .31 .32 .31 .31 
 Negative .27 .32 .26 .32 .27 .32 
G Neutral .26 .31 .30 .34 .28 .33 
 Positive .28 .33 .28 .34 .28 .34 
 Total .27 .32 .28 .33 .27 .33 
 
VG 
Negative .37 .34 .41 .34 .39 .34 
Neutral .35 .36 .43 .38 .39 .37 
Positive .44 .36 .51 .39 .47 .38 
Total .39 .35 .45 .37 .42 .37 
 Negative .32 .32 .33 .33 .32 .33 
Total Neutral .28 .31 .34 .35 .31 .33 
 Positive .36 .35 .37 .35 .36 .35 
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Appendix D  
Experiment 4 Acceptance Probabilities 
URDs – Immediate Test 
 Arousal M SD 
V Low .31 .33 
Medium .31 .33 
High .31 .26 
Total .31 .31 
G Low .43 .34 
Medium .36 .35 
High .41 .38 
Total .39 .35 
VG Low .26 .32 
Medium .24 .27 
High .40 .43 
Total .27 .32 
 Low .33 .33 
Total Medium .30 .31 
 High .37 .36 
 
URDs – Delayed Test 
 Arousal M SD M SD M SD 
 
 Previously Tested 
Not Previously 
Tested 
Total 
V Low .41 .35 .30 .29 .36 .33 
Medium .45 .32 .35 .31 .40 .32 
High .52 .30 .31 .23 .42 .26 
Total .45 .32 .33 .29 .38 .31 
G Low .44 .29 .31 .35 .38 .33 
 170 
Medium .38 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 
High .42 .32 .31 .31 .42 .32 
Total .41 .33 .33 .34 .37 .34 
VG Low .38 .37 .24 .33 .31 .36 
Medium .42 .34 .42 .37 .42 .36 
High .41 .38 .33 .34 .40 .37 
Total .40 .35 .35 .36 .37 .36 
Total Low .41 .35 .29 .33 .35 .34 
Medium .44 .34 .36 .34 .40 .34 
High .45 .34 .34 .28 .40 .33 
 
Targets – Immediate Test 
 Arousal M SD M SD M SD 
  Short Long Total 
V Low .30 .29 .32 .34 .31 .31 
Medium .31 .28 .32 .30 .31 .29 
High .29 .30 .29 .27 .29 .29 
Total .30 .28 .32 .31 .30 .30 
G Low .15 .22 .21 .28 .18 .25 
Medium .20 .26 .23 .31 .22 .28 
High .20 .24 .10 .19 .15 .22 
Total .18 .25 .20 .29 .19 .27 
VG Low .40 .38 .46 .38 .43 .38 
Medium .44 .35 .49 .33 .47 .34 
High .40 .41 .46 .42 .43 .41 
Total .42 .36 .47 .36 .44 .36 
 Low .27 .30 .27 .34 .27 .32 
Total Medium .31 .32 .25 .31 .28 .31 
 High .33 .34 .25 .29 .29 .32 
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Targets – Delayed Test 
  M SD M SD M SD 
  Not Previously Tested 
  Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Low .11 .17 .22 .26 .16 .23 
Medium .11 .17 .21 .25 .16 .22 
High .24 .20 .24 .24 .24 .22 
Total .13 .18 .21 .25 .19 .22 
 Low .34 .30 .24 .27 .30 .29 
G Medium .47 .30 .16 .20 .32 .25 
 High .55 .32 .19 .26 .37 .39 
 Total .45 .31 .19 .23 .33 .32 
 
VG 
Low .36 .37 .29 .34 .33 .36 
Medium .34 .31 .23 .25 .29 .28 
High .27 .25 .27 .30 .27 .28 
Total .34 .32 .26 .29 .29 .32 
 Low .27 .28 .25 .28 .26 .28 
Total Medium .31 .26 .20 .23 .26 .25 
 High .35 .26 .23 .27 .29 .27 
  Previously Tested 
  Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Low .29 .24 .29 .26 .29 .25 
Medium .33 .25 .30 .29 .32 .27 
High .38 .25 .28 .28 .33 .27 
Total .32 .25 .29 .28 .31 .26 
 
G 
Low .14 .18 .20 .26 .17 .22 
Medium .28 .29 .24 .26 .26 .27 
High .16 .19 .15 .25 .15 .22 
Total .21 .26 .22 .26 .19 .23 
 Low .41 .37 .40 .34 .40 .26 
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VG Medium .31 .30 .34 .30 .32 .30 
High .38 .37 .34 .31 .36 .34 
Total .35 .34 .36 .31 .36 .30 
 Low .28 .26 .30 .29 .29 .28 
Total Medium .30 .28 .29 .28 .20 .28 
 High .30 .27 .26 .28 .28 .28 
  Across Prior Testing 
  Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Low .20 .21 .25 .26 .23 .24 
Medium .22 .22 .25 .27 .24 .25 
High .31 .23 .26 .26 .28 .25 
Total .24 .22 .26 .26 .25 .25 
 Low .24 .24 .22 .27 .23 .26 
G Medium .37 .30 .20 .23 .29 .27 
 High .35 .26 .17 .26 .26 .26 
 Total 32 .26 .20 .25 .26 .26 
 
VG 
Low .38 .37 .34 .34 .36 .36 
Medium .32 .31 .28 .28 .30 .30 
High .32 .31 .31 .31 .32 .31 
Total .34 .33 .31 ..30 .33 .32 
 Low .27 .27 .27 .29 .27 .28 
Total Medium .31 .27 .25 .26 .28 .27 
 High .33 .27 .25 .28 .29 .28 
 
CDs – Immediate Test 
 Arousal M SD M SD M SD 
  Short Long Total 
V Low .36 .44 .35 .34 .37 .39 
Medium .40 .41 .40 .34 .43 .38 
High .48 .36 .36 .37 .42 .37 
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Total .44 .41 .38 .34 .41 .38 
G Low .37 .41 .18 .31 .28 .36 
Medium .25 .36 .24 .39 .25 .37 
High .34 .40 .25 .32 .30 .37 
Total .30 .38 .22 .35 .27 .37 
VG Low .50 .41 .57 .43 .53 .42 
Medium .59 .37 .63 .39 .61 .38 
High .41 .46 .42 .43 .41 .45 
Total .53 .40 .58 .41 .56 .41 
 Low .42 .42 .37 .36 .39 .39 
Total Medium .43 .38 .42 .37 .43 .38 
 High .41 .40 .34 .37 .38 .39 
 
CDs – Delayed Test 
  M SD M SD M SD 
  Not Previously Tested 
  Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Low .15 .25 .28 .36 .21 .31 
Medium .18 .27 .35 .36 .27 .32 
High .22 .28 .27 .30 .25 .29 
Total .18 .26 .32 .35 .24 .31 
 Low .18 .23 .27 .36 .22 .30 
G Medium .26 .30 .38 .37 .32 .34 
 High .22 .23 .25 .35 .24 .29 
 Total .23 .27 .32 .37 .26 .32 
 
VG 
Low .39 .41 .41 .44 .40 .43 
Medium .30 .34 .35 .31 .32 .33 
High .38 .36 .40 .37 .39 .37 
Total .34 .36 .38 .36 .37 .36 
 Low .24 .30 .32 .39 .28 .35 
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Total Medium .25 .30 .36 .35 .30 .33 
 High .27 .29 .31 .34 .29 .32 
  Previously Tested 
  Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Low .39 .36 .35 .31 .37 .34 
Medium .45 .34 .26 .28 .36 .31 
High .36 .32 .32 .27 .34 .30 
Total .42 .34 .30 .29 .36 .32 
 
G 
Low .35 .37 .25 .32 .30 .35 
Medium .31 .36 .25 .28 .28 .32 
High .20 .29 .21 .30 .20 .30 
Total .31 .35 .24 .29 .26 .32 
 
VG 
Low .44 .39 .56 .40 .50 .40 
Medium .42 .32 .50 .34 .46 .33 
High .36 .33 .46 .38 .41 .36 
Total .42 .34 .51 .37 .46 .36 
 Low .40 .38 .39 .36 .39 .37 
Total Medium .40 .34 .34 .30 .37 .32 
 High .31 .32 .33 .33 .32 .33 
  Across Prior Testing 
  Short Lists Long Lists Total 
 
V 
Low .27 .31 .31 .34 .29 .33 
Medium .32 .30 .31 .32 .31 .31 
High .29 .30 .30 .29 .29 .30 
Total .29 .30 .31 .32 .30 .31 
 Low .27 .30 .26 .34 .26 .32 
G Medium .28 .34 .31 .33 .30 .34 
 High .21 .26 .23 .33 .22 .29 
 Total .25 .30 .27 .33 .26 .32 
 
VG 
Low .42 .40 .49 .42 .45 .41 
Medium .36 .33 .43 .33 .39 .33 
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High .37 .35 .43 .38 .40 .37 
Total .38 .35 .45 .37 .42 .36 
 Low .32 .34 .35 .38 .34 .36 
Total Medium .32 .32 .35 .33 .34 .33 
 High .29 .31 .31 .34 .30 .33 
 
